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Readers Comment on Crisis in Party Membership

90UN1052A Moscow PARTIYNAYA ZHIZN in
Russian No 2, Jan 90 (signed to press 9 Jan 90) pp 8-12

[Review of reader letters by F. Petrenko: "Party Authority is Strong in the Deeds of the Communists"]

[Text] The article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences F. Petrenko "To Strengthen the Qualitative Composition of Party Ranks" (No 12, 1989), and the response to it by party member K. Zarkhin "Is the Free Leaving of the CPSU Possible?" (No 19) and the letter by A. Popov "I Categorically Do Not Agree" (No 20) have evoked extensive reader mail. In particular, many communists continue to be disturbed by instances of leaving the party. As can be seen from the letters, the attitude toward this phenomenon is far from uniform. The editors have asked F. Petrenko to comment on the incoming mail.

A significant number of communists who wrote to the editors have validly asked the question: Is it possible for a person who values the party to simply abandon it, particularly now, in the very complex period for our nation? And if he does leave, what are the actual reasons which impelled him to take this step? Or, are these accidental mere fellow travelers of the party? In such an instance, what attitude should we take to them? What does the party gain from their departure, and does it become stronger? In a word, as the mail shows, there are many viewpoints, at times irreconcilable and widely diverse.

The CPSU member and participant in the Great Patriotic War, P.Ya. Khromushin from Kiev, with pain in his heart sharply condemns any desertion from the party. "At present, when things are difficult for the party," he writes, "its individual members are turning in their party cards, abandoning the party, clearly feeling that the party is going to the bottom. They are acting just as those who are the first to abandon a sinking ship. But the party is not sinking. Things have been more complicated in the life of the party before and it has found a worthy way out.... During the war it was much more difficult, but the people did not abandon the party but rather linked their fate with it and joined it. I remember this time well."

Adhering to a similar stance is the CPSU member since 1943, N.B. Mandzhiyev from the settlement of Yashkul in the Kalmyk ASSR. "The communists who were admitted to the party in the war years," he recalled, "bore on their shoulders all its burden and later the burden of postwar reconstruction. The cry 'Communists, Forward!' led the communists on the front into the attack. They were the first to go to work, in dangerous jobs, and they raised the kolkhozes, sovkhozes and industrial enterprises. We are not to blame for Stalin, Brezhnev or the others who defamed Lenin's party. The person who wishes to freely leave the CPSU probably was a fair-weather friend in our ranks. Real, dedicated communists do not leave it to the end of their lives...."

The Deputy Secretary of the Party Buro at the Sorochinskiy Dairy Combine in Orenburg Oblast, S.A. Tulupov, and the propagandist and leader of the Party Education School, L.D. Tararukhin, in sharing the view of the article voiced on the pages of the journal that the dramatic pages in our history are greatly linked with the populating of the party by ideologically and politically immature elements, complement this with their own views. They propose that our nation and its economy have been brought to the present state by careerists, corrupters, embezzlers of state funds, bribe-takers, bureaucrats, despoilers of nature and other persons who are alien and hostile to the party and society. In this context, the authors of the letter consider it wise to recall Lenin's cautioning against the "excessive broadening of the party, as careerists and crooks inevitably try to worm their way into the ruling party...." (PSS [Complete Collected Works], Vol 41, p 30). "These words," the letter states, "were written in 1920, when the party had just 611,000 members. Now it has almost 20 million and the party bodies are concerned by how not to allow the party membership to drop numerically and dramatize each instance of departure from the CPSU. In our opinion, let all sorts of fellow-travelers depart the party; the party will only be purer for this."

These are some of the letters. It seems that in principle the comrades have correctly raised the question that in fact there is no place for persons alien to the party or to accidental fellow travelers. There is certainly no argument with this. But the reader mail also shows how complex and diverse are the problems related to the withdrawal of individual members from the party. The fellow travelers, the careerists and similar elements, as a rule, are in no hurry to leave the party ranks and do not want to give up their party cards. In endeavoring to use their belonging to the CPSU for unseemly, selfish purposes, they conceal their true face. It is not so difficult to recognize such a party member with a "double bottom," as he endeavors to give to his external appearance and conduct the impression of a conscientious and even active communist.

It is a different matter when a person has come to the party with a sincere desire to share its concerns and responsibility and who for long years has served its cause with faith and truth, but, in encountering difficulties, injustice or indifference in their party organization, in the labor collective, rayon or city, and without receiving the necessary support in the party bodies, has shifted his injured feelings to the party. Another, flabbergasted by the criticism and revelations related to the Stalin cult of personality and to the time of stagnation, has not been able to correctly understand what has happened to us and who is to blame for the occurring deformations and illegalities. A third expected quick results from perestroika but did not have sufficient patience, losing faith in the policy being carried out, without feeling the changes in his own life.

Such people, if there is prompt help in overcoming the shortcomings, the insults and disappointments, if they

are not left alone with their doubts and confusions and the problems of concern to them are promptly explained, such persons often are capable of recovering as party members, strengthening their will, being charged with optimism and even emerging from such hardships as stronger. We must fight for such communists.

The CPSU member and shop foreman at the Elektronika Scientific-Production Association in Voronezh, A.T. Shaley, wrote the journal editors precisely about this with concern and alarm. "I am concerned by the fate of those leaving the party," he said in his letter, "and I would like to ask why the party leaders and the journalists often endeavor to explain such cases merely by immaturity, selfishness or other failings in individual persons. Certainly among them are many who have kept pace with the party for 10-20 and more years, who have tried to fight for perestroika, who wanted to understand and support it.... But suddenly these people have written out their terrible requests. This is the result of a heart-felt tragedy in which all of us who are party members are to blame. And it is precisely about this that we must speak most of all, we must speak honestly and frankly, strengthening in the communists a belief in the reality and possibility of the strengthening and renewal of our society.

"I have been for more than a quarter of a century in the party. Over this period, there have been all sorts of things and this gives me the right to say to those who vacillate: Don't rush! Think over your step!

"Leaving the party is the error of not just a man but also the party organization and his comrades. The communists who are fighting to put their own collective and the nation in order should find support in the party bodies."

One cannot help but agree with the voiced arguments as they come from life, they are permeated with a spirit of party comradeship and a concern for keeping worthy people in the party ranks.

Unfortunately, the reasons mentioned by A.T. Shaley are not the only ones which have caused certain party members to take the decision to leave its ranks. There have been numerous instances when a person, having joined the party out of the best motives, in sharing and supporting its policy, does not then find in himself the qualities essential for a communist. He, often with strong emotions, realizes that he cannot realize himself as a party member, that the party and political activities are not for him, that his calling is rather technical creativity or orchard-raising, sports, the raising of children and so forth.

In such situations should one hold the people, in artificially creating the appearance of well-being in the party organization? "In my view," wrote the CPSU member and participant in the Great Patriotic War, Docent Borchenko from Poltava in the Ukraine to the journal editors, "we must not impede the departure from the party for those who consciously leave its ranks for any

reasons. The CPSU will strengthen itself in purging itself of such communists who have accidentally ended up with a party card."

The readers have proposed that the bylaws state the right for the free departure from the party. In their opinion, the granting of such a right would give those who end up in such a situation an opportunity to rectify their error, at the same time maintaining their civil dignity.

In supporting the notion of the need for the bylaws regulation of the right for free departure from the party, the Party Buro Secretary at the Plant for Repairing Radio Television Equipment in the town of Yefremov of Tula Oblast, O.F. Butenko, has proposed incorporating in the new CPSU Bylaws the following provision: "The question of halting membership in the CPSU is to be settled in the primary party organization. Membership in the CPSU can be halted by a party member at his own request, after having informed the primary party organization of this and turned in his party card." "This," the author of the letter commented, "would clearly contribute to solving the question better fewer in quality but higher in quality!" A valid judgment. But of course, such a procedure does not "destroy the organizational structure of the party" which concerns certain readers.

If one proceeds from the democratic principles of organizing the CPSU and the real notions of the sources for strengthening its membership, then it is difficult to agree with the opinion of the pensioner V.M. Shkaranda that "the party Bylaws cannot state that anyone who so wishes can leave the party." The reference of the author of the letter to the fact that "the party is not a revolving door" is no argument for restricting the civil rights of anyone. Such a limitation would contradict the principles of a socialist state under the law and the principles of party construction. The party is a voluntary union.

Of course, nothing can justify the persecution and punishment of those who have decided voluntarily to leave the party, regardless of the reasons which have caused them to take such a step. As can be seen from the letters, certain party workers count on resolving the problems which arise in relation to this by using precisely repressive administrative methods. This, in particular, was described to the journal's editors by the lathe operator at the Aktan Plant from Gayvoron in Kirovograd Oblast, S. Rudych. "Although in the recommendation issued by the shop party organization," he letter states, "there was not a single bad word written about me, some 4 months after I had turned in my party card, the rayon newspaper OGNI KOMMUNIZMA published the decision of the Buro of the Gayvoronskiy Party Raykom on expelling me from the CPSU for political immaturity, for a failure to understand the role and tasks of the party in perestroika and reticence to be in its ranks." As could be seen from the newspaper clipping sent by the author, his expulsion as well as the expulsion of the machinist V.P. Trigubchik from the party was motivated by precisely such reasons.

Certainly, no party organization or no CPSU raykom or gorkom can fail to respond in the most serious manner to instances of leaving the party. But what does it mean to consider such facts in a reasonable manner? This means first of all to analyze why such phenomena are occurring. Why is a communist leaving? What has served as the cause? And draw the appropriate conclusions in order to eliminate the factors which at times lead the party members to such difficult decisions. It is essential to be concerned primarily with their analysis and elimination and not pick up the bludgeon of punishments in the spirit of the worst traditions from the period of Stalin's cult and the time of stagnation.

There was lively debate, support and, at the same time, strong arguments over the proposal by K. Zarkhin "in preparing for the new CPSU Bylaws to provide an opportunity for introducing the title 'Honorary Member of the CPSU.' This title could be given to those party members who are unable to fully carry out the bylaw obligations of a CPSU member."

The proposal of K. Zarkhin was supported by the party organization Secretary L.N. Gorstkov from the town of Orsk in Orenburg Oblast, the CPSU member A.M. Tarnovskiy from the village of Kambuleyevka in the Northern Ossetia ASSR, the party committee Secretary M. Saykulov from Buynakskiy Rayon and the CPSU member S.K. Samazanov from Kulakhskiy Rayon in the Dagestan ASSR, the party organization Secretary S.K. Sultanov from the city of Tashkent and other authors of letters. The Secretary from the shop party organization from the town of Kaspiysk in the Dagestan ASSR, Yu.P. Bykov, agrees with K. Zarkhin that many communists of advanced age and pensioners who at one time were good party members at present, because of their state of health, are unable to take an active part in party work. And this impotence forces them to submit a request to leave the party. The author of the letter proposes awarding such communists with the title "Honorary Member of the CPSU," but the "party card will not be exchanged for an identification, as K. Zarkhin proposes, but rather on one of the pages of the party card there is to be a stamp or printing 'Honorary Member of the CPSU,' having freed the communist pensioner both from the obligatory execution of party assignments as well as from the paying of party dues."

Certain correspondents, including the CPSU member P.M. Shumkin from Mordovia, in agreeing with the idea of an honorary title for communists who have great experience in party work and length of membership, were against the replacing of the party card with an identification, referring to the fact that this would put the veteran party member in an unequal situation with others and infringe on his rights. Individual journal readers were against releasing anyone whatsoever from the payment of party dues, while others proposed approaching the solution to this question in a differentiated manner.

A majority of the communists who responded to the letter by K. Zarkhin published in the journal categorically and at times even sharply argued against his proposals and in particular against the idea of awarding the title of Honorary CPSU Member.

In the letter from the communist K. Orazbekov from the town of Sergiopol in Ayaguzskiy Rayon of Semipalatinsk Oblast, we read: "I categorically do not agree with the proposal of K. Zarkhin. All communists, regardless of age or former accomplishments, are equal before the CPSU Bylaws. They all have the same rights. There can be no question of any 'Honorary CPSU Member'.... Proposals for replacing the party card with an identification and the presence of the 'Honorary Members' at the party meetings with a consultative vote are senseless and insulting for the CPSU members, regardless of their age and health." The CPSU member since 1939 A.Ye. Ovsyannikov from the city of Omsk writes: "Humiliating proposals for the party veterans...you could not think up anything worse for the party veterans!"

The CPSU member since 1932, S.T. Zozulya, the CPSU member since 1927, A.M. Gavrilov, and the CPSU member from 1939, V.P. Sokach, viewed the article by K. Zarkhin with particular insult and viewed it as a sort of proposal for the withdrawal of pensioner communists from the party. They wrote:

"Can the author not understand that to take away the party card of a party veteran and to deprive him of the right to vote in his own party are tantamount to execution? If one considers that elderly people are very vulnerable, such a resolution of the question of their party affiliation can lead to a personal disaster...."

One cannot help but agree with this position of the communists who have been in the party for 50-60 years, who do not claim an honorary title but firmly defend their right to fight for the party cause to the end, with as much strength as they have. But here is there not the key for a correct approach to the question of the pensioner communists, their place and role in the CPSU and their participation in party activities?

There is an obvious validity and soundness in the opinion of those readers who point to the good opportunities for using the experience of the veteran communists. "I largely agree with the arguments of Comrade Petrenko," writes the CPSU member and labor veteran N.F. Tatarin from the village of Novaya Usman in Voronezh Oblast. "It is very true that without counting on an influx of young forces into the party it cannot escape from the crisis. But then how are they, these young forces, to be attracted, what is to interest them, what traditions should they be taught and what authorities referred to? These are discussion questions. Undoubtedly, the young cannot get by without the experience (both positive and negative) of the old communists. This is why the Old Guard must be protected.... A real communist, as long as he has the strength, will carry out the assignment of the party organization to the

last. If he is ill, all the more how would it be possible to 'excommunicate' him from the party to which he honestly and conscientiously dedicated his life.... It is another matter if the communist himself wishes this."

Certain authors of letters clearly not without grounds viewed the proposals to remove the elderly communists from party rolls as a bureaucratic attempt by other party bodies and their workers to make life easier for themselves, as this category of party members causes them a lot of trouble involved with the holding of party meetings, the collecting of party dues and other problems. But as was correctly emphasized in his letter by CPSU member V.I. Atamasov from the village of Beloye in East Kazakhstan Oblast, "the party veterans must be looked after and cared for. They endured great hardships in a difficult time for the motherland and at present to the degree of their ability are participating in perestroika."

Many communists have validly pointed out that in and of itself a long party membership does not bespeak the accomplishments of a party member and automatically does not provide any grounds for awarding an honorary title. "Communists are judged by their deeds," as was pointed out by the CPSU member P.K. Ten from the settlement of Oktyabrskiy, Krasnogvardeyskiy Rayon in Crimea Oblast. There is the different question of the chest insignia of a CPSU veteran.

The letters voiced the proposal to present this insignia to the communists not on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of their membership in the party, as is now done (many do not reach such an age), but rather present them to those having 40-year or even 30-year party membership. Such an approach, as was stated in the letters, would be a good moral incentive for the older communists and at the same time would be a proper sign of respect for them. As P.K. Bervenov feels, this insignia could be presented in the raykoms to the communists who have taken an active part in party, social, political and economic life upon presentation by the primary party organizations. Analogous proposals were sent to the editors by the CPSU member and labor and war veteran, Ye.A. Gilev from Aleksandrovsk in Perm oblast, N.F. Tatarkin, excerpts from whose letter were given above, and others.

The fate of the party veterans concerns the journal's readers. And not without reason. As was pointed out in the received letters, the current bylaw regulations put the veterans in a difficult situation. "I fear being expelled from the ranks of the CPSU," writes S.P. Gopanenko from Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan. "My health is broken and at present I carry virtually no party burden. But I do not want to leave the CPSU." "It is very painful to hear at a meeting when the matter is raised of the personal file of a veteran communist who, because of his health, has left the party organization," writes G.N. Barbashov, CPSU member since 1956 from Chernigov, in continuing this thought. "A person has dedicated his entire life to the party's cause and to serving the people,

and then in the twilight of his years turns out to be unneeded. The bylaw regulations do not favor the veterans."

Many authors, including V.V. Titarenko from the city of Dneprodzerzhinsk in Dnepropetrovsk Oblast, in line with this, have proposed that the new CPSU Bylaws make provision for the right of the veterans to participate in the life of the primary organization "to the degree of their ability and considering their state of health." And this should be where they feel that they will provide maximum benefit. It is difficult not to agree with this.

In the course of the review, I have voiced certain considerations on the proposals from readers. In conclusion, I feel it necessary to say the following. The vital response of the communists to the questions concerning their fate, their tie to the party and their place in the party system is proof of the concerned attitude of the enormous mass of party members for progress in restructuring party life and work, and a visible reflection of their concern for increasing the role and responsibility of each party member and all the party bodies for strengthening party ranks, as well as for securely having the CPSU perform its mission as the political vanguard of Soviet society.

From the Editors. In a single review, certainly, it is impossible to cite and name all the authors of received letters. The editors thank those who responded to the journal's publication and who shared their thoughts on the problem of party membership. This question will be continued on the pages of the journal and we are hopeful that the further participation of the communists in it will enrich the preconference debate.

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Democratic Platform Roundtable

90UN1173A Moscow SOVETSKAYA KULTURA in Russian No 10, 10 Mar 90 p 3

[Roundtable discussion reported by T. Yakhlakova: "The Party: Does It Guide? Direct? Struggle?"]

[Text] *Today we are hearing ever more insistent voices raised concerning the crisis in the party and the crisis of the party itself. "The party is late" or "the party is lagging behind restructuring": nowadays we can hear these things at Central Committee plenums, not just at rallies and meetings of primary party organizations. Then two weeks prior to the February Plenum the All-Union Conference of Party Clubs and Party Organizations met in Moscow and approved a statement announcing the establishment of the "Democratic Platform" movement within the CPSU. This movement now has over 100,000 communists as members. Its founders have proposed their own "model" for party restructuring without waiting for the CPSU Central Committee draft platform. Other alternative documents addressed to the 28th CPSU Congress have also appeared in the press.*

The participants in our roundtable discussion today are Aleksey Bryachikhin, Sevastopolskiy CPSU Raykom (Moscow) secretary, Vladimir Kryazhkov, doctor of juridical sciences, Vladimir Lysenko, docent at the Moscow Aviation Institute, Igor Chubays, docent at the State Institute of Theatrical Art imeni Lunacharskiy, and Vasiliy Shakhnovskiy, setup engineer for Mospromtekhmontazh Trust; Lysenko, Chubays and Shakhnovskiy are all members of the coordinating council of "Democratic Platform in the CPSU."

[Bryachikhin] Since in our country the party is a governing party and still handles all matters without exception, and since people do not sense any change for the better in their lives, then it is more likely the other way around, i.e. it is only natural that all the reproaches are levelled at the CPSU. Economic reform is overdue, political reform is overdue... Yet at the same time various democratic and non-democratic movements are coming into existence and without any experience with leadership are already rousing people, goading them on with some idea. Sometimes this amounts to playing with fire; everything could be burned up, including the movements themselves... A real danger? Yes, it is. Because unfortunately these processes are as yet undirected. And they are also new to our society, hence the bewilderment within party structures and the failure to comprehend what is happening. Today various kinds of people are working in the party and even in the party apparatus. Some are capable of foreseeing the course of events, others are even able to take steps to stay ahead of events, and yet others are clinging firmly to the past... As a result we have no intraparty unity in regard to how to lead the party. We are divided, and therefore we are late in almost all our decisions, the need for which is clear in public opinion long before the party is able to get used to the idea that those decisions are unavoidable.

Recall the debate surrounding Article 6. In my opinion this was purely a formality: that article neither adds to nor subtracts from the party's real authority. It is not the constitution, but rather the logic of our society's development which has transformed the party from a political organization into a state power structure. Was it worthwhile to resist when people demanded repeal of the article? All that did was inflame emotions...

It is another thing (and one which is the most important of all today) to call things as they really are: either the party is going to give up power, or it is not. And if it does, then it is time to turn everything over to the soviets, both cadre matters and management of the economy. And to stop evaluating lower-level party organizations on how well they perform economic functions, as is still the practice today. Delineation and transfer of authority: we are late in this regard as well... As a result we have a situation in which no one has power and events develop spontaneously.

[Chubays] Realistic policy should be oriented, at the very least, toward two levels of assessment and projection. The first is the level of public opinion: the way broad

segments of the population perceive the processes which are occurring today and how they envision the future. The second is assessments by experts and specialists (economists, political scientists, etc.). For in my opinion the party has not come up to the level of experts in its work; it has not even been able to keep pace with public opinion.

Today virtually everyone realizes that the best road to reform is the nonviolent, democratic, constitutional way. The party has appealed for this, but its unhurried (to say the least) pace and sometimes its failure to think through actions are creating more and more social problems, new areas of tension. Take a simple example from just recently. Why did the USSR Procuracy's party organization have to expel Gdlyan and Ivanov from the party literally on the eve of 25 February, just before a mass rally announced by the bloc of democratic forces, at a time when the slightest provocation could steer events in a dangerous direction? Fortunately, everything went off without any excesses, but one does not have to be an expert to see that things could have turned out differently.

Generally speaking, I feel that those individuals should not have been expelled from the party at all, but that is another matter. They say that Gdlyan is an extremist, that he should not be allowed to speak at rallies, etc. I would agree with that if Gdlyan's opinion were his alone. But he has the support of thousands of voters, and not just voters...

[Bryachikhin] Public opinion can be manipulated, that is no secret. And it can be manipulated most easily at rallies, when emotions are involved, not reason. Today the greatest danger is from provocations riding on the wave of rallies. One stone thrown through the window of a state office, one enticing appeal to storm something that everyone is fed up with... It does not matter whose hands or lips get it started, the question is: what then? Even if troops are not brought in force will be used and people will be hurt. Are you willing to live with the burden of responsibility for the deaths of innocent people?

Our country cannot be run with rallies. We need competent specialists who have hands-on experience with administration, especially now, at a time when the economy is in ruins. The party-state administrative structure is already tainted, but no replacement for it exists as yet. I am positively inclined toward Democratic Platform, both as a movement and as a document. Furthermore, I feel that in some ways the draft Democratic Platform is even more constructive than the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform. But only as a theoretical document. Now in practical terms... What kind of administrative structure are you proposing for the party and the country? Specifically: to whom will power be given, and who will have a claim to it? The party will no longer claim it—that is plainly stated in the draft Central Committee Platform. The soviets? They also still have

the task not only of replacing their deputies both quantitatively and qualitatively, but also of changing their structure, and it is still not quite clear what sort of changes those will be. Social democracy? Yet it, too, if you will excuse the expression, is still "in diapers." For good or for ill state authority in our country grew out of party authority not only in the extent of its powers, it also assumed the structure of the one-party model. We are rejecting the old structures, but what should the new ones be like?

[Chubays] The definitive feature of any totalitarian system is the fact that it never establishes a procedure for succession, never creates alternative power structures. Therefore when a totalitarian system collapses it clings like to a life preserver to the question: but who will take power in our stead? Who will replace us? Incidentally, the question formulated by Aleksey Mikheyevich (Bryachikhin) is a very serious one. But it by no means leads to the conclusion that we should stay on the sidelines and not intervene in what is happening...

[Bryachikhin] Excuse me, but I did not say that, nor do I believe it...

[Chubays] Then I must have misunderstood you. Well, we need to do the opposite: intensify our intellectual, scientific and political efforts to ensure the appearance of more alternative programs and more different public movements, so that democrats will be more united and better organized. The fact that the new movements do not have any serious programs is not their fault, but rather the fault of a system which rejected any and all alternatives. There was no alternative to Stalin when he died, and to many people his death seemed almost like the end of the world: hundreds of people died on the streets of Moscow trying to say farewell to "the leader." Khrushchev's exit was a drama for our country, Brezhnev's exit held dangerous unknowns... The party's exit—and it will have to give up the position which it holds today—could also turn into a drama if other political forces, whether citizens' movements, parties or any other sort of organization, do not appear and gain strength.

[Kryazhkov] Nonetheless, when we talk about transferring power we should bear in mind that soviets should be the ones to receive it. However, I feel that the process of delineating the functions of party organs and soviet organs is proceeding too slowly. It seems to many people that all we need do is elect new deputies everywhere and then things will move ahead faster. Why, for instances, have there been no noticeable changes in the work of those soviets which held elections several months ago? Because thus far no legal foundation has been created upon which to base the new structure. Nor will it be created in the near future, even if the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet finally passes a law on local self-government and local management. Why? I personally counted 12 references to republic legislation in the draft of the law. That is to say, this law will only take effect after the republics pass a series of legislative acts.

It is easy to say: "All power to the soviets!" But with that the deed is not even half done...

When we say, look, the party has stated its willingness to transfer power to the soviets yet does not seem in any hurry to do so, we seem to be forgetting that in order for this to happen both the party and the soviets must change. We are currently in a transitional period, a time when the legal preconditions for redistribution of power are being created, a time when both the party and the soviets are undergoing reorganization. I submit that for a certain period of time the soviets will be unable to perform fully the functions placed upon them by the Constitution, due to the inadequacy of their old structures to perform new functions, due to a lack of experience, etc. Obviously there lies ahead a period of something like dual authority, and in this situation much will depend on local party committees: will they continue to dictate to soviets, or will they help them get on their feet, gradually turning economic, administrative and other functions over to them?

As for the long term (incidentally, I do not measure that in years: events are unfolding rapidly, so that it would be more appropriate to reckon in months), the party will definitely be transformed into a parliamentary-type party and will struggle to win a leading role through the election of its candidates to positions of authority. Furthermore, it seems to me that today it is no longer appropriate to frame the issue as "the party and soviets." We should already be talking about **parties** and soviets and working on tactics to govern their interaction.

[Shakhnovskiy] "Transferring the party's functions to the soviets" strikes me as a highly debatable formulation. If we take that route we will be making a second party out of the soviets, one that will operate in the command-administrative mode. Functions should be redistributed, with some things left to regulation by the market and other things simply placed in various hands, bearing in mind that a multiparty system is going to take shape... Otherwise we will just be shifting old baggage from the raykom to the raysovet.

As for the difficulties of the transition period, they do exist, no one would dispute that. They include polarization of views, rising tensions and universal worsening of the standard of living... When one group of structures collapses and another group of structures takes their place some kind of stabilizing center is needed. And the party could be that center, in view of its capabilities and the resources it has at its command... Not a "consolidating force" as we are accustomed to say, because divisions have begun to arise even within the party itself, but precisely that, a stabilizing center, the sole real power structure. For what we call the CPSU is not today a political party in the strict sense of the word. But it is the power center, and thus it bears primary responsibility for all the areas of tension which arise in various places and for various reasons. Unfortunately, the CPSU is in no hurry to come up with policy which will stay ahead of events. And the problem is not that it has been late in

putting previously forbidden concepts and terms into use—terms like multiparty system, factions, etc. The problem is that it has been slow to take practical steps. The multiparty system is already a reality, no matter how organizationally weak the new parties might be. Today the question is not even whether the CPSU will interact with those parties, but rather how to create new power structures in view of the fact that a multiparty system is taking shape. If the party has seriously decided to give up its monopoly on power and build a democratic state it should be interested in a society with a system of checks and balances on both state power and party power.

[Bryachikhin] What are you saying? That the party should ensure that other parties are formed?

[Shakhnovskiy] Precisely...

[Bryachikhin] Nonsense! When the Supreme Soviet passes a law on parties and public organizations, when the Congress of People's Deputies repeals Article 6 of the Soviet Constitution, then all barriers will have been removed. Then go right ahead, register and defend your ideology, within the limitations of constitutional rights. I cannot recall a single case in which a political organization voluntarily nurtured opposition to itself. Let that opposition mature naturally, as should happen in a normal situation.

[Shakhnovskiy] If we were to regard the CPSU as a political party, then your comments would be justified. But, as I have already said, the CPSU is a ruling power. Your yourself said at the beginning that at the present time the party is the sole real power...

[Bryachikhin] Not such a real power anymore if within it there are occurring processes which it does not like. Just try to win when the system is functioning.

[Shakhnovskiy] Nevertheless, there is still no one who has gained greater power. For essentially what we have had is not a one-party state, but rather a partyless state, because the party, by usurping state functions, shed its political functions, like it or not. Today, at a time when more and more new movements and new parties are springing up alongside the ruling party, the state party, under what are clearly disadvantageous conditions—since their very existence is in fact illegal—thinking that the CPSU should stay out of the formation of a multiparty system is at the very least shortsighted. Of course I am not saying that it should set up new parties, but it should stimulate and encourage these processes so long as they are democratic in nature: that is plainly the party's debt to society.

[Bryachikhin] I will not argue about its debt, but it is sheer fantasy to expect any party anywhere to go about encouraging the establishment of its own opponents.

[Lysenko] I submit that in order for the party to quit lagging behind, as we have today said it is doing, it should change itself—no one has any doubts about that anymore. The party's reform program as outlined in the

draft CPSU Central Committee Platform is geared, in my opinion, toward a time frame of years, yet the CPSU has virtually no time left.

The Academy of Sciences Sociological Center did surveys in various cities around our country six months and one month ago; those studied yielded a far from optimistic cross-section of public opinion. In response to the question: "Would you vote for the CPSU if it was on a multiparty ballot?" a majority of those surveyed replied positively during the first survey, while by the second survey this number had already fallen below one-half. That is to say, the CPSU has already fallen below the line which marks the beginning of a crisis of confidence. So when you hear people today saying that the 28th Party Congress might be its last congress that is not a completely unfounded statement, I feel. In order to prevent that from happening the party must make radical changes in its structure, its place and role in society and its attitudes toward other organizations. Today people are not expecting from it forced concessions to public opinion, but rather steps which will keep ahead of the times. Are there such steps in the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform? I think that not even those attending the plenum which adopted the draft would claim that there are...

[Chubays] The Democratic Platform is a more goal-oriented document, because it reflects the viewpoints of a definite segment of the party, furthermore a segment of people who share the same ideas. The Central Committee's draft is no one's platform, because it attempts to reflect all viewpoints. And in that sense it is not, strictly speaking, a political platform.

Is there any point to such a "middle-of-the-road" document? Perhaps there is, at the initial stage: for example, it allows various groups to function within the party, it legalizes them.

[Lysenko] The differences between the Democratic Platform and the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform are, of course, more profound than would those who have accused us virtually of plagiarism, despite the fact that the Democratic Platform was published before the Central Committee's document, would like to believe. The most important of those differences lies in the fact that the CPSU Central Committee draft remains oriented toward a vanguard-type party, while the Democratic Platform is oriented toward a parliamentary-type party. Hence all the other differences.

[Shakhnovskiy] For that same reason the draft Central Committee Platform encompasses the broadest range of issues, while the Democratic Platform deals only with political reform...

[Lysenko] The attempt to reconcile the different viewpoints to which Igor Chubays referred makes the official document vague. The party appears to be giving up its leading role, yet the functions it retains turn out, upon careful reading of the draft, to be the same as before:

cadre policy, ideological leadership, political leadership... If it is to be oriented toward becoming a parliamentary-type party it must give up all those functions.

The party's organizational foundations would also remain unchanged. For example, what does it mean to "reinterpret" or "update" the principle of democratic centralism?

[Shakhnovskiy] I absolutely cannot understand how a party founded on the principles of democratic centralism can exist in a multiparty system...

[Lysenko] Much less on the principles of a territorial and production-related structure. In our opinion, communists themselves should be the ones to decide what kind of organizations to create, and where.

And, finally, one other point. Aleksey Mikheyevich (Bryachikhin) has already said here today that we supposedly have only theories without a mechanism for implementing them. I do not agree. The Democratic Platform does contain such a mechanism, and it is quite clearly formulated. If even the election of congress delegates was conducted the way we propose—directly, from among multiple candidates, on a secret ballot and on the basis of platforms—then party reform would proceed more swiftly and efficiently. And that would give impetus to all other types of reform.

Yet the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform really does lack such a mechanism, and therefore one can fill in its fuzzy formulations with any kind of content one desires. How are we to interpret this: elections should be conducted with the participation of all communists? Should they be direct? Use secret balloting? Be based on party districts? Interpret it however you like.

[Bryachikhin] I see other fundamental differences between the Democratic Platform and the Central Committee's draft. Firstly, the Democratic Platform categorically rejects democratic centralism and thereby transforms the party into a club where people gather, sit around, discuss and leave. No one obligates anyone to do anything... This is a fundamental question. And a second difference is in the selection of a path of development. The draft CPSU Central Committee Platform plainly states: only the socialist path of development. The Democratic Platform does not preclude the capitalist path of development, since it expresses support for private property.

But do we need to frame the question as an "either-or"? Either the Central Committee's draft or the Democratic Platform? I think that would be both unreasonable and undesirable. It is splendid that the Democratic Platform was published: let communists stop and think, including those in the highest leadership. Nevertheless now, at a time when the situation in our country is tense, the best solution is to draft a general platform, otherwise we would be encouraging centrifugal forces and could accelerate negative effects.

[Lysenko] Especially since there is common ground in the two platforms. First and foremost this is the CPSU's renunciation of its monopoly on power and its admission that the party is prepared to enter elections and there receive its mandate of confidence to govern the country. On the basis of these positions it is possible to conduct a constructive dialogue. The only questions are whether the party leadership is ready for that dialogue, and whether it wants it. I think that if preparations for the 28th Party Congress are handled not by the Central Committee but instead by an Organizational Committee set up especially for that purpose and comprised of representatives of primary party organizations which are well-known throughout the country, representatives of the various schools of thought which already exist within the party and the progressive part of the CPSU Central Committee leadership, then this kind of party "round-table" will make it possible to come up with a document which will unite rather than repel democratic forces.

[Kryazhkov] I am not in agreement with all the critical comments made about the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform. In my opinion it contains some statements which are quite simply historic. Consider, for instance, the transition to a multiparty system. That is essentially a complete change in the political system. A tremendous step, and I would like to direct attention to that fact.

Another comment was also made to the effect that there are no mechanisms for a transition to a multiparty system, to a parliamentary party, etc. But, comrades, we cannot expect mechanisms from the draft Platform. It formulates the basic ideas and principles; the mechanisms are yet to be developed, in part at the party congress. In lengthy documents. For now let us discuss the draft, then we can think about the mechanisms later.

About the concept of a vanguard party. Read the draft carefully: "The CPSU will pursue its policy and struggle to preserve its position as the governing party within the framework of the democratic process, striving to win votes in elections in order to obtain the people's mandate to form organs of government..." and so on. Today, under a one-party system, this might sound like an attempt to hold onto the party's leading role. But under a multiparty system this position is normal: any party would struggle to become the governing party. Why should the CPSU renounce its struggle to become the governing party?

[Lysenko] In my opinion, it is precisely this section of the draft Central Committee Platform which I would term unifying. As for a multiparty system, then the party is either late once again, or else, on the contrary, has carefully chosen its moment, just at the conclusion of the election campaign. For the next five years we will form organs of power at the republic and local level on a one-party basis, even though three preelection blocs had already taken shape in Moscow. These are "Democratic Russia," which unites left radical forces, "Russia," the bloc for movements which favor patriotically right-wing

positions, and finally the center, which is still not organized but supports the platform of the Moscow Party Gorkom yet avoids calling that platform its basic guideline. The most reasonable thing to do in this situation would be to publish separate lists of candidates who support each of these blocs, so that people can make a conscious choice.

Today the party itself also contains representatives of all viewpoints. CPSU members are on the rolls of both Pamyat and Memorial. Is it conceivable to achieve unity among people with diametrically opposed views, even if they are members of the same party? I believe that it is impossible.

Furthermore: it is not hard to predict that the example set by the Lithuanian Communist Party will be followed in Estonia and Latvia some time soon. In April the patriotic movements are convening the first Russian CP Congress; this congress will, first of all, divide Russia's communists, because Democratic Platform supporters will naturally not enter into a party of right-wing inclinations...

[Chubays] And we will have a minimum of two parties: one based on the OFT [United Workers Front] and another based on Democratic Platform.

[Kryazhkov] But Russia, as a sovereign republic, should have its own state and political institutions...

[Lysenko] No one would argue with that. Furthermore, we are in favor of the unification and organization of right-wing forces as well; that is only natural. It would be abnormal for arising movements to be made illegal. Now, at a time when rapid polarization is occurring, the center is being erased and the right and left wings are gaining strength, it would be extremely dangerous to ignore movements appearing on the political scene. If they are deprived of the chance to be elected to parliament or to local organs of power and there to defend the interests of the people who support them they will begin to operate in a non-parliamentary manner, and sometimes even use violent methods.

But we are talking about something else. The CPSU is on the verge of splitting up along regional and republic lines, as well as on the basis of communists' political orientations. One does not need to be an expert to predict this—the process has already begun. Yet the draft CPSU Central Committee Platform seems to take no notice of these processes and makes no effort to project their further development. Honestly, that is rather strange, because the fate of the CPSU is at stake. What will it be

if independent republic communist parties appear? A union of our country's communist parties? A party of parties? Or will it disappear as a political organization altogether, leaving behind something like a first secretaries' council at the all-union level? Going into the congress without posing these questions is once again to let the party tag along behind events.

[Bryachikhin] Unless the party takes some radical measures prior to the 28th Congress, then it will split up right there at the congress—that is obvious.

[Kryazhkov] I think that this process is occurring in different ways in different republics and regions, depending on people's political maturity and on the correlation of political forces. But the 28th Congress will mark the beginning of it, I agree with that. Especially since *de facto* parties already exist both inside and outside the party; when the Supreme Soviet passes a law on parties they will have an opportunity to declare themselves *de jure* as well.

[Shakhnovskiy] Until there is a law the status of all these parties and movements is dubious in a legal sense, to say the least. Therefore any disputes between them could become yet another destabilizing factor. For example, it seems to us that the transition to a multiparty system would be less painful if it were implemented via the formation and growth of factions within the CPSU. Firstly, we ourselves would learn how to function in a situation where there is an opposing side—incidentally, this would free people from the fateful certainty that only their own views are the right ones and get them accustomed to seeking agreement. Secondly, we would work out a practical mechanism for interaction between various political forces in a multiparty system.

[Lysenko] I think that we do not need to invent any sort of special mechanism; it has long existed and is currently being successfully employed by the countries of Eastern Europe. I am referring to a "roundtable" of democratic forces and the country's leadership in which the search for solutions to the most urgent problems involves participation by all interested parties. I think that this mechanism would also be useful in our party, especially right now before the congress. As far as I know the Interregional Deputies' Group has already appealed to our country's leaders to set up this sort of practical "roundtable," and a similar proposal was contained in the resolutions adopted at the rallies held on 4 and 25 February. Democratic Platform also supports this idea. Thus far no reply has been received... Are we going to be late again?

Voters' Attitude on Republic, Local Soviet Elections Surveyed

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[Article by Prof V. Komarovskiy, doctor of philosophical sciences, and A. Kostin, candidate of philosophical sciences, from Moscow: "Elections to Republic and Local Soviets"]

[Text] The article is based upon data from research conducted by the Scientific Research Institute Under the Academy of Social Sciences of the CPSU Central Committee in November-December 1989 in Vladimir and Tula Oblasts of the RSFSR and Donetsk Oblast in the Ukraine. Around 5,000 voters were questioned.

This research has reaffirmed that at present there remain ever-fewer persons who do not have their own stance on such major questions as assessing the course of perestroika in the nation and particularly on the specific problems in the life of the city or rayon. All of this, undoubtedly, has told on the heat of the struggle during the elections to the republic and local administrative bodies. Thus, over 80 percent of the voters have already firmly decided to participate in the elections, another 13 percent is still vacillating and only 4 percent has stated that they will not go to the election precincts. This provides grounds to predict that on the order of 90 percent of the voters will participate in the elections.

How, with what attitude, judging from the results of the research, will the voters greet the elections to the republic and local soviets?

It is very pleasing to note that around 40 percent consider participation in the elections as among the foremost factors in the fight to achieve the economic, political and social goals of perestroika. This shows the importance of the forthcoming elections in the eyes of the public and that democratic methods for problem-solving are winning ever-greater supporters. However, the present stage at the same time is characterized by a push toward radicalism: over 14 percent of those questioned mentioned protest meetings as among the effective methods, a few less said the same of strikes, almost the same number cited demonstrations and parades and approximately 1 out of 7 the signing of various appeals. In the questionnaires there were also many additions "from oneself."

The combination of radicalism and a desire for democratic methods in problem-solving can be explained by the contradiction of the perestroika processes as a whole (the successes in achieving glasnost, on the one hand, and difficulties in the economy, on the other) as well as the unevenness in the democratization processes in individual regions. Characteristically, where the development of democratic processes has been checked and where the local workers have not learned to heed and consider the opinion of the people and seek advice from

them, where they are unable to find a common tongue, here the voters show a greater desire for "hard methods."

For understanding the general attitude and the balance of responsibility among the local leadership, the central bodies and ordinary people for the state of affairs in the nation, indicative are the replies to the question: "What is the reason for our difficulties?" In first place (with almost 1/2 of those questioned) were such replies: "Our people do not like to work and have long gotten out of the habit of really working," while in second, third and fourth places the local leadership was considered to blame (42.0 percent); the saboteurs of perestroika were guilty (27.3 percent); our model of socialism does not meet modern conditions and the new one cannot be created immediately (24.4 percent). A little fewer were such replies: the central leadership is to blame while 5 or 6 percent of the respondents considered socialism in principle incapable of creating normal living conditions for man.

We would point out that in the different social groups, the notion of the main reason for our difficulties varies. Thus, among the workers there is a certainty in the blame of the local leadership; among the peasants the opinion is widespread that the difficulties are due to the major exporting of commodities. Non-party persons to a greater degree than the CPSU and Komsomol members, are inclined to put the blame for the difficulties on the local authorities and the technical intelligentsia on the saboteurs of perestroika. The number of voters inclined to see the reasons for the difficulties being experienced in local leadership declines significantly as the population points grow larger where these persons reside. At the same time, here criticism grows addressed to the central bodies.

Naturally, the candidate who has decided to run should first of all obtain information on what problems most concern his voters and what is the overall atmosphere in the rayon (district). Certainly, the voters not only see a multiplicity of unsolved problems but also are not very hopeful of positive changes in their life in the future. Only 5 percent assumes that in the next few years there will be a significant improvement in the living conditions in their rayon; some 36 percent are hoping for insignificant changes; the remainder feel that the living conditions will not change or will even deteriorate. This has led to increased social discontent and sociopolitical tension the degree of which was viewed by 40 percent of those questioned as high or very high and 32 percent as average. With such a degree of social tension, the elections, without any doubt, will be difficult for the candidates of the party committees and the soviet bodies.

But what are the "starting" positions of the local party committees and the soviet bodies in the election campaign as far as the matters which are determined by their particular activities, by the achieved successes and committed errors?

As the data show, the population views the elections to the local bodies primarily through the prism of their solution to specific, urgent questions in the life of the city, rayon or village. Unfortunately, for now the influence of the rayon soviets on improving life is felt, in the estimates of those questioned, extremely insignificantly. Around 60 percent of the respondents did not see any contribution by them and 22 percent feel this influence is insignificant. The influence of the party raykoms is viewed somewhat higher. And, as a rule, the more negatively the situation in the rayon and the activities of the executive committees are viewed, the worse also the activities of the party raykom ("the party is to blame for everything").

According to the views of the voters, the soviet executive committees clearly deal insufficiently with the tasks confronting them. For this reason, the participants in the poll in their majority felt it essential to change the membership of the rayon soviets either completely (over 30 percent) or as a minimum by $\frac{1}{2}$ (this was demanded by more than $\frac{1}{3}$ of the voters).

At present, voices are frequently heard that it is hard to find persons who want to work in the local soviets. If one judges from the data of the poll, the problem clearly is that the candidates are being sought according to the old, customary scheme. In actuality, a goodly portion of the voters is ready to assume a more active stance in relation to the elective bodies and assume responsibility for their work. Almost 1 out of 10 answering the questionnaire would have agreed to become a candidate deputy to the rayon soviet while another 14 percent would be ready to think over such a proposal, if it arose. Approximately $\frac{1}{3}$ of the voters knows in their circle persons worthy of holding office in the local bodies.

According to the data of the poll, one can also trace the desire of the voters to take a more active part in the activities of the various self-management bodies of the rayons and microrayons, and this includes CPSU members. This shows that the voters are assuming a completely different attitude toward the elections to the local soviets than before, and see in them a real political force. In any event, they are hoping that the new soviets will assume real weight in society and many of them are ready to help the soviets. This is particularly so in the rayons.

The research indicates that in the existing situation, it is particularly important to broaden information on the life of the rayon, city or oblast and on the real state of the problems and the specific programs for solving them. A majority of the voters feels that the public does not possess sufficient information on the life of the rayons where they reside; almost 40 percent of those questioned consider as insufficient the glasnost in the work of the party raykoms, the executive committees and the economic organizations of the rayons. Attention is particularly focused on the need for additional information on the ecological situation, on the organizing of trade,

transport and domestic services, the activities of the soviets, housing construction and the state of crime.

The city and rayon newspapers and the local radio are the most active among the information sources concerning the life of the rayons and are most capable of influencing public opinion. However, equally effective channels or the shaping of public opinion, as is clear from the materials of the poll, were conversations with relatives, friends, neighbors and comrades at work, conversations in lines and in public transport as well as their own experience in life. Unfortunately, the local television broadcasts, the exercises in the system of party and economic studies, talks with propagandists and agitators, lectures and meetings with the party and soviet leaders of the rayons were insufficient sources of information. The voters at times were unable to discuss the problems concerning them with no one except relatives, comrades at work and acquaintances. At the same time there is a great need for these discussions.

The voters questioned in the course of the research consider it necessary to discuss more actively the questions concerning the public in the course of public opinion polls (36 percent of those questioned pointed to this), at meetings at the place of residence (44 percent), during meetings with the leadership of the executive committees of the rayon soviets (27 percent) and at sessions and commissions of the soviets (20 percent).

The public must also be provided with information not only on the level of creating confidential relations between the people and the local authorities. This is an important aspect in the successful functioning of the self-managing bodies on the spot (the house committees, the soviets of the microrayons and so forth). For now affairs in this regard are clearly bad. Only 3 percent of the voters questioned stated that in their microrayon there was a good basis for the development of self-management; around another 16 percent felt that in the rayon there were only individual elements for the development of self-managing principles, while almost 50 percent felt that such conditions were virtually absent in their rayon, or it was difficult to answer the question.

Certainly, it would be unrealistic to assume that the rayon bodies will be able in the remaining time to alter fundamentally the style and methods of their work, to organize it along the new lines and establish good, complete and professional contacts with the populus. But it is not only possible but necessary to work out a program for organizing the work in a new manner. Without this now it would be difficult for the party and soviet workers to count on success in the election campaign.

With all the importance of such factors in influencing public opinion and voter behavior as the overall situation in the nation and in the specific region (city, rayon), crucial here are the effective activities of the local bodies of Soviet power and the party committees and the ability

of the candidate himself to conduct the election campaign, his program and personal qualities. What, in the opinion of the respondents, should mark such a candidate?

In replying to the question: "What is the main thing in the activities of a deputy?" only 18 percent (25 percent among the workers) stated that a deputy is a person expressing the interests of his sociodemographic group. Most often, two other judgments were mentioned: the deputy is the representative of the interests of the voters in his district (territory) and that he is a person the main task for whom is to provide help to those coming to him.

And the third in terms of the frequency of mentioning was the view that the deputy is a person capable of performing state duties.

These foreshortened views dominate in the notions of the voters about the candidate, although among various groups there are, of course, differences on this score.

The long years of alienation from power did not leave the workers unscathed. Only a few of them have any notion of the mechanism of its functioning on the local level. While the central television and central press have already done rather a lot to demonstrate the functions, the character of the work and the importance of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, this cannot be said of the local mass information media.

The participants in the poll pointed out that since the local soviets were actually deprived of real power, it is largely unclear in what manner they will acquire this power and use it. The Law on Local Self-Administration has not yet been adopted and the rank-and-file voters in the region know little of the polemics which are being conducted over it. Moreover, many are still not acquainted with the new Law Governing Elections to Local Bodies of the RSFSR, for this has been published only in the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA. Thus, the voters have actually not been armed with the essential knowledge and will be forced, if the situation is not changed, to vote largely "blind," in being guided only by common sense and political instinct. It was no accident that the question of "Do you have the same requirements for the candidate deputies of the various soviet levels: rayon and city, oblast and republic?" over 60 percent replied affirmatively and only 1 out of 5 emphasized: "Partially (or mainly) other ones." For this reason, it seems that the elections to the republic and local bodies could be conducted at different times. In the absence of experience in holding elections in the new manner, this would help the voters make a sounder choice.

How, under the existing conditions, will the voters find their way in the fine points of the election campaign? In their opinion, the greatest chances for success are found among those candidates who will be able to propose the most constructive and realistic program which is close to voter interests (this was pointed out by almost 60 percent

of the voters) and who possessed positive personal qualities (around 55 percent).

There will also be significant chances for candidates whom the voters know (1/3 of those questioned pointed out this) are able to conduct an election campaign and win the sympathy of people (1 out of 4 emphasized this) and who have political views that evoke sympathy among the voters (almost 1 out of 3 drew attention to this). The designated demands are very stable and vary only insignificantly by regions.

Clearly, we must halt in more detail on two of the mentioned components of success. The content of the candidate's program is certainly determined by the level of the soviet and by those problems incorporated in it which most concern the voters. In addition to the general ones of housing and ecology, the individual regions and even districts have their own specific priorities. Naturally, the people are interested in how a candidate intends to solve them and by what resources. As for the personal qualities of the candidate, these are largely independent of local conditions. Over 90 percent of those questioned felt that the candidate should above all be an honest and just person (in all groups of voters), 80 percent felt he should be able to carry the job out; 70 percent felt he should know the real problems of the rayon (city, oblast); 60 percent felt he should be able to convince others and defend his own viewpoint and almost the same number felt he should be sensitive, responsive and humane. Over 50 percent of those questioned considered as the most important character traits of the candidate: professionalism, entrepreneurship, while a little more than 50 percent felt this was a high cultural level, breadth and long-range view of his thinking, and about 40 percent ideological conviction and loyalty to the ideals of socialism. The presence of work experience in a leading position was not necessarily welcomed: 12 percent felt this was necessary for a deputy, 37 percent felt it was desirable but in the opinion of 42 percent there was no need for this.

The high regard for such qualities as the ability to carry things out to their completion, to know the real problems of local life, professionalism and entrepreneurship shows that the voters are hopeful that the new local soviets will actually acquire power and will effectively solve the specific problems of the village, rayon, city or oblast. This is why, we feel, the voter today is hoping not on the "politicians" (many of them were viewed comparatively lowly for such qualities as ideological conviction and dedication to new political thinking), but rather on "professional" people who are able not to speak eloquently and propose slogans and ideas but rather work and solve specific problems. But this common sense ultimately does not differ from the concerns of perestroika which are aimed at concern for man and work for man.

The data given and the conclusions drawn from them by us can be judged differently and may be seen as correct

or incorrect; the rebukes and fears voiced by the respondents toward the local soviet and party bodies may be found valid or invalid. However, one thing must not be done and that is to ignore these. The party organizations and candidate people's deputies cannot help but consider the specific situation existing in the rayon or oblast, the nature of the problems and questions which require an immediate solution and the particular features in the awareness and conduct of the residents. The same is true of the particular features in the individual demographic population groups.

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Belorussian Writer Calls for Federation Law

90UN1118A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Mar 90 Second Edition p 2

[Article by Nil Gilevich, secretary, USSR Union of Writers Board: "Remain Human Beings: A Matter of Concern"]

[Text] My soul grows more and more alarmed with each passing day. No sooner is the fire of inter-ethnic strife extinguished in one region, than it flares up in another region. And again the savage pogroms, and again the foul violence, death, and mutilations. And the sufferings of thousands of innocent persons, torn from their dormitories and comfortable residences. As people say: if anyone had said just five years ago that matters would reach such a stage.... But now matters have reached that stage. It has become a reality of our times. And what will the future be like?—we ask each other. We really must do something to prevent the "fire" from affecting other territories."

It will be prevented from doing so only if our union of republics accomplishes something major and suitable. This "something" should have been done a long time ago, or at least about five years ago—at the beginning of perestroika. What I have in mind, is, of course, solving the problem of inter-ethnic relations within the USSR, and more specifically—the problem of arranging our Union federatively, based on a genuinely democratic, agreed-upon foundation.

Nowadays, in my opinion, it is must be clear to everybody that, unless we solve this problem, we will not make any serious progress in solving any other ones. I think that is likewise obvious to everyone that we probably could have avoided these lamentable events of the last few years if, at the very beginning of the revolutionary renewal of our life, we had engaged in a business-like way in restructuring our own federation.

History has for a long time now and persistently shown by the hands on the face of the clock that it is high time! It is time to give the republics economic and political independence, to guarantee by law their genuine sovereignty within a large Soviet federation; for only this will allow us to solve the most essential social, ecological,

cultural, and other problems of our life. and thereby to remove the tension from our society.

Unfortunately, I cannot say that nowadays the "top echelons" have already manifested the most profound understanding of this problem. Otherwise—why was the present session of the USSR Supreme Soviet not begun with a consideration of this matter? Or are there some persons here who still assume that maybe we can "get by" without any essential changes in this sphere, that, perhaps, everything will calm down and right itself, and that we can roll on ahead smoothly? All the more so in that we clearly hear voices at the session which are hardly in favor of a radical renovation of the principles of federation. Oh, how far we all are from being prepared to understand the most pressing demand of our times! And the main thing is that we are still far from prepared to hear the voices of our brothers, voices which are rising to the heavens. All my life, since my student days, I have been amazed and saddened by this strange deafness, this inability to hear and understand the desire of others the rights granted, as it is said, by the Lord God himself. Yes, only the lawful rights—and no more.

Here, for example, at the Supreme Soviet session presently taking place: it was only with great difficulty that the Belorussian delegates succeeded in including on the agenda the top-priority matter of the state program to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe. But it was placed 21st, as a kind of afterthought! One might well ask how the Belorussian people are supposed to react to this? For them, this is not Item No. 21, but rather the first among the first. Because this is a matter of life and death for the people. Because in our enormous country, which has no shortage of serious misfortunes, there is no more horrible misfortune than this one.

It is a terrible thought, but the indifference to the fate of a people numbering about 10 million is so great that, willy-nilly, you arrive at the following despairing conclusion: Could it be that this planet has decided to observe the consequences of Chernobyl in Belorussia as a kind of monstrous scientific experiment to see whether this peaceful, meek Slavic tribe will survive or die out?... The radiation is moving over the Belorussian land like a plague, farther and farther. We need billions of rubles to resettle hundreds of thousands of inhabitants, as well as to treat children and adults who have already fallen ill. These billions of rubles must be paid immediately by those persons who brought unprecedented misfortune and the most serious damage to the Belorussian people, those persons who have cast a shadow upon all thoughts of its future.

I have focused attention on the tragedy of my own people because if the news of our pain has not yet reached everyone, there are other misfortunes and pains which we could talk about. And there are many of them. And we will not be able to surmount them without solving the problem of federation. Let's take, for example, our concern over the fate of the Belorussian language and the

Belorussian ethnic culture. Here again: what a level of deafness there is to this ethnic culture! Here again: what a wall of deafness there is to this ethnic tragedy for our people, or, as many persons are saying and writing in our republic, to this spiritual Chernobyl in Belorussia! The dying away of the Belorussian language and the killing of the independent, unique Belorussian culture has lasted for more than half a century and has transpired right in full view of the entire country. Belorussian writers were shouting about this even 20 or 30 years ago. And what did we always read as a response in the pages of the central press, as well as in lofty reports and co-reports? "Our prime duty is to struggle against manifestations of nationalism." Is it a matter of nationalism to cry out with regard to saving one's native language? But that is the way it was treated. That is also the way a disease was driven inward, fraught with the danger of eventually breaking out.

At a sitting of the present Supreme Soviet session the presiding officer leveled a sharp reproach at the republics: why, he said, don't you yourselves in the localities solve your own problems and put your own house in order? Why do you place all your hopes on the central authorities? After a bit of thought, one comes to the following conclusion: it is, of course, because that is precisely what we were "taught" to do for so many decades—i.e., everything down to the most trifling matter was to be decided and prescribed only at the center. You yourselves were not supposed to take a single step, not a one! To exaggerate somewhat: people used to ask the central authorities even about where and what kinds of buttons to sew on.

When the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet was discussing the public-education law about four years ago, I raised the issue of the need to correct the abnormal situation regarding the Belorussian language in our republic's schools—so that the legislation could help, at least slightly, to facilitate the rebirth of the Belorussian school in Belorussia. And so what happened? They sent a bureaucrat to Moscow in order to consult with the country's Supreme Soviet. This comrade returned and reported as follows: No, no, they did not accept our proposal in Moscow; they said that this would be a violation of the Union-level Constitution.

Only one conclusion can be reached: questions such as in what language we in Belorussia are to teach our own children, or—to put it more precisely—whether or not a Belorussian school is to exist could not be decided by the Belorussian people themselves; they were decided somewhere else! And after this, amazement and even indignation were expressed at the ingratitude at the "ingratitude" of the "people here."

Based on the example of other republics, a law was recently passed in Belorussia which accorded state status to the Belorussian language. That is fine, of course. But the implementation of the laws regarding languages and, consequently, the temperature of the public climate will depend, to a large extent, on the contents of the Law

Concerning Federation. And that is why I would very much like to hope that, in deciding this question of the utmost importance for our public life nowadays, the people's deputies will have sufficient feelings of responsibility, political good sense, and wisdom.

Naturally, until the Law Concerning Federation has been adopted, we must do everything possible to see to it that internecine strife does not spread further anywhere, that people calm down and believe in the possibility of solving extremely complex problems by a lawful, constitutional procedure. In this situation, to my way of thinking, wise words from the most authoritative leaders in the fields of culture, science, education, art, and literature, as well as those from clergymen, could exert a calming influence upon the mood of our aroused fellow-citizens. Because, after all, among all peoples the words of such figures have always been honored. Furthermore, this is a prime duty for all conscientious citizens of any republic and of any region of the entire country. And, indeed, while we count ourselves as belonging to the civilized world, we cannot lose our reason to such an extent as to also lose our characteristics as human beings. Beginning with political meetings and processions, we sometimes end in slaughter. Let's come to our senses, good people!

Estonia's Lauristin on Russian Republic, Integration With Europe

90UN1167A Moscow SOBESEDNİK in Russian No 5, Feb 90 p 10

[Interview with sociologist Maryu Lauristin, member of the board of the Estonian People's Front, department head at Tartu University, conducted by Mikhail Sokolov: "Let Us Become Europeans"; date and place of interview not given]

[Excerpts] [Passage omitted] **Sociologist Maryu Lauristin, member of the board of the Estonian People's Front and the head of a department at Tartu University, triumphed in the elections, becoming a USSR people's deputy. She also represents the republic in the Supreme Soviet. A year after our first interview with Lauristin as a member of an informal group, we now interview her as a parliamentarian.**

[passage omitted]

[Sokolov] There is yet another very important problem on the agenda: distinguishing the national from the imperial. Separating, especially in the minds of those who belong to the "older brothers," the concepts of homeland and state. So that, like Saltykov-Shchedrin's character, "They won't confuse the words 'Fatherland' and 'Your Excellency.'"

[Lauristin] That problem is related to the legacy whereby the imperial interests of the great state suppressed national awareness. In particular, Russian came to be conceptually merged with Soviet. And they are by no means the same thing. Because, if "Soviet" becomes

synonymous with "Russian," all sorts of distortions arise: both messianism and a belief in being God's chosen.

[Sokolov] And we acquire an "older brother" not in his Christmastide-stagnation form, but in a sense that is close to the Orwellian. In the form of an all-beneficent, all-suffusing force. ... I think that what V. Rasputin said with a certain sense of offense about the "question of the RSFSR's secession from the USSR" is not empty words but a realistic objective: the separation of the republic from the union. Then, incidentally, you in Estonia would not transfer the mistakes of the center to the whole Russian people.

[Lauristin] Our deputy K. Khallik talked about that at the first congress! Until we have in the union an independent and equal republic of Russia, the solution of any national problems in the USSR will be blocked. After all, if the largest people is still the most unequal and tries to take its inequality out on others, we will constantly come up against this problem. What seems to me to be a very important process of Russia's dawning recognition of its own interests is taking place. And if awareness of the Russian population's specific regional interests comes along with awareness of its national interests, relations with other republics or nations will not be impersonal, and an equal "we" and "you" will emerge. For me, a rational, intelligent model is taking shape approximately as follows: I see in the future something like Russian states: Siberia, the Urals, the Don. ... Every part of Russia that has its own deep history should, in my opinion, acquire the same rights within the framework of what is, properly speaking, a federation, that Nevada, Kansas or Alabama have in the United States.

It seems promising to me to grant them their own names, laws and symbols—everything that gives the people living there the possibility of identifying themselves with their locality and feeling that they have something in common. Another stratum is "republics within the republic." If autonomous national formations are preserved within the RSFSR, they should have an additional status that stems from the indigenous rights of nations.

[Sokolov] Until recently, the idea of national rebirth was a banner in the hands of extremist, chauvinistic forces. The very idea was becoming isolationist, conservative of past myths, and even aggressive. ... Now the country's democratic forces are countering the myths with a realistic objective—the rebirth of the Russians as a people will consist in an awareness of themselves not as God's chosen people, the Third Rome, and a paternalistic nation, but as a participant in the country's renewal that is equal with other nations and nationalities.

[Lauristin] This is related to the rebirth of genuine Russian culture. Forbidden names, philosophy and history are being returned to it. The stream of genuine lofty spirituality is nourishing the Russian democratic movement. No matter how they contrive, the pseudopatriots

cannot make Berdyayev or Nabokov out to be their allies. ... I often come back to Dostoyevskiy. In young people's minds in Estonia he saved the honor of the Russians as a nation. It was no longer the nation of Brezhnev and Romanov, but something different. Great culture allows one to separate the grain from the chaff. Herein, incidentally, lies our hope, which is based on the premise that for the Russian diaspora in the republics the center—not as the center of the state, but as the center of spirituality and culture—is Moscow. Before, conservatism emanated from the center's bureaucratic structures, but today a fairly powerful democratic charge is coming from there to the periphery. Maybe it will force many Russians to reflect on who finds it advantageous to manipulate them in the Baltics or Moldavia, and to organize political strikes in the republics directed against national revival.

[Sokolov] Do you believe that the keys to removing internationality conflicts lie in those values that, apart from our "Soviet experiment," were developed by Western civilization?

[Lauristin] There are scarcely many people beyond the boundaries of our republic who know that a slogan that was very important for the development of the people's national awareness was put forward in Estonia in 1904: "Let us remain Estonians but become Europeans." It seems to me that now, at a time of new thinking and acknowledgement of the values of common European civilization, that slogan is again becoming relevant, and not just for Estonia but for general use within the union.

For a long time the USSR was oriented toward America. Remember, there was the slogan "to overtake and surpass the United States!" But what is America? A state with a brief history formed by immigrants from every end of the earth, by people who began their lives from scratch. The pioneers' revolutionary consciousness triumphed. It was something on the order of Chernyshevskiy's society of "new people" without a burden of the past. Of course, America has grown older and more staid. Nonetheless, its essence remains unchanged.

And what is Europe? It is the old world. And previously people devoutly renounced the old world. But now a turnaround is taking place. We are again recognizing ourselves as part of the old world, which means part of Europe. A process of mutual enrichment and integration is taking place, but without any sort of merger of nations. It is the basis for a fundamentally different attitude toward the past, culture and national property. And from this also comes a different politics based on respect for the small peoples.

[Sokolov] How do you assess the present situation in our country?

[Lauristin] I personally am seriously concerned over the fact that the forces who see in the people's awakening a threat to their own bureaucratic power structures and to great-powerism under the name of socialism are uniting and bristling with hatred for what is new. They are

capable of striking a blow in the back. The fact that the people are not informed and have not been forewarned that the changes will exact a high price is also soil for the reaction. The Polish variant, spontaneous rebellion, would be ruinous for us. In Poland, as a single-nation, Catholic state, it was possible to rely on the values of statehood and on religion, but in our tormented state there is not enough restraining principle, enough sense of ultimate taboo. No, here a pogrom could be the signal for a coup and for extreme-reactionary forms of rule. And then, goodbye, restructuring, and with it, our hopes.

Everything depends on the people's wisdom—they must not allow themselves to once again be made fools of by promises of miracles—as well as on the leadership's political courage. There must not be a stagnant political festering. Like a surgeon, the politician must have the courage to lance the festering boils of public consciousness. Even though it hurts, it is necessary in order to save life.

[Sokolov] But for such serious operations, is there enough knowledge of how and why?

[Lauristin] The broadest goal—to make the USSR a civilized society that can enter the world community of nations—has been stated. From it stem all the criteria: democracy, pluralism, legality. ... It is a kind of compass. But right now we are straying a bit off course. The route to the harbor of common European civilization—that's our way.

[Sokolov] It remains for us to hope that the compass will still show that same course now.

[Lauristin] But let's not forget that storms can occur.

[Sokolov] Maryu, I have heard that you have made your personal political choice.

[Lauristin] On 2 January I applied to quit the CPSU. I wrote that I could more effectively realize my socialist convictions in the ranks of the Estonian Social Democratic Party. I do not have change my beliefs, since I held these convictions even before. ... Moreover, I believe that the times are forcing us to hurry: now, along with the rejection of the totalitarian system that called itself "real socialism" and oppressed the people, a process of society's "swinging to the right" is taking place. Soon the role of market mechanisms and competition will increase, which will knock the familiar ground from beneath many people's feet and lead to a rise in people's social defenselessness. The solution of these problems has traditionally been addressed by social democracy; it has experience in counterbalancing such political changes, and it has the answers to the questions that we are starting to raise. The birth of such movement is an objective necessity both for Estonia and for Russia. Without a revival of the traditions of reformism and social democracy, a return to Europe is unthinkable.

Estonian Party Assesses Past Errors

90UN1545A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 29 Mar 90 p 2

[Resolution: "Resolution of the Estonian Communist Party 20th Congress: 'On the Historico-Political Assessment of the Estonian Communist Party's Activity'"]

[Text] The communist organizations in Estonia were created under the conditions of the tsarist regime in order to struggle against national oppression and social injustice, to achieve a new social system where we could implement mankind's historical dream of a state with equal rights and liberty, a state where the free development of each person would be a prerequisite for the free development of all. In the struggle for this ideal thousands of Estonian communists perished during the days of the Revolution, during the period of the Estonian Republic, in the struggle against fascism, as well as during the period of the Stalinist dictatorship.

During all this time most Estonian communists were trying from the best motives to express and defend the people's interests, and they did this under extremely difficult conditions. However, these goals and ideals, which were formulated in all programs of activity that, over the course of time, were directed by Estonian communists remained unimplemented for the most part. Present-day Estonia has turned out to be in a position of economic and social crisis; the existence of the Estonian people on its historic territory is in danger.

Today, under the conditions whereby society is being democratized and there is an awakening of Estonia's national self-awareness and independence, this congress frankly acknowledges that the party committed serious mistakes and errors in the past. The Estonian Communist Party was incapable of avoiding false ideals and erroneous evaluations, theoretical dogmas, and an ideology which was hostile to Estonia's independence. The Estonian Communist Party underestimated and denied the importance of state sovereignty in providing for the preservation of the nation and liberty. The traditional tenor of the people's life was destroyed under the conditions of the Stalinist totalitarian regime, the Estonian Republic was annexed, the national culture and science suffered, a policy of Russification was purposefully carried out, and it became possible to deport and persecute tens of thousands of persons for political reasons. The enforced collectivization and the colonial policy in the sphere of economics and resettling people led to onerous consequences. All this seriously threatened the existence of the Estonian nation on its historical territory.

We understand that following the political line which was inimical for Estonia deepened the rift between the authorities and the people, between the party leadership and the rank-and-file communists. Unfortunately, this continued even under the conditions of perestroika. Only the 11th Plenum of the Estonian CP Central Committee, when the new party leadership acknowledged the people's demands, for the first time expressed

the people's true aspirations. The progressive part of the Estonian Communist Party joined in the growing democratic and national movement.

The history of the Estonian Communist Party proves that the principal errors made by our party were caused by the fact that, during the entire time of its existence, the Estonian Communist Party has not been, in fact, an independent political force, even during the 1920's and 1930's, when it functioned as a section of the Comintern, as well as during the events of 1940. In October of that year the Estonian Communist Party was unilaterally incorporated into the VKB(b) [All-Union Communist Party (bolshevik)] (CPSU), essentially as an oblast-type organization. And this is the position it finds itself in today. Of course, in certain cases, maintaining and directing the activity of the Estonian Communist Party, managing the leadership and rank-and-file communists, were determined by circumstances beyond their control. This pertains particularly to the period of the Cult of Personality, when the Estonian Communist Party, like the entire Estonian people, had no possibility of a choice or elections.

Having critically and thoroughly analyzed the Estonian Communist Party's past, this congress condemns the past erroneous predilections and decisions which led to serious consequences with regard to the Estonian people and independent statehood. Together with the CPSU and the central authorities of the Union, the Estonian Communist Party bears responsibility for acts of violence against the Estonian people. But the responsibility of each party member for his own deeds is specific and individual.

Estonian Central Committee Members Listed

90UN1545B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in
Russian 29 Mar 90 p 2

["Members of the Estonian CP Central Committee
Elected by the Estonian CP 20th Congress"]

[Text] Allik, Ya.Kh.—chairman, Vilyandskiy Uyezd
[District] Soviet

Bannikov, Yu.S.—engineer, Estonenergoremont Pro-
duction Enterprise

Barabaner, Kh.Z.—leading scientific associate, Estonian
SSR Academy of Sciences Thermophysics Institute

Boytsova, V.I.—brigade leader, Kokhtla-Yarve Sovkhoz

Valkruzman, L.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP
Rakvereskiy Raykom

Vashurin, V.A.—traffic-controller, RET TPO [Trans-
port PO]

Viyra, A.I.—chairman, Kakha Agricultural Company,
Kharyuskiy Uyezd

Volkov, A.N.—partkom secretary, Tartu Monitoring
Apparatus Plant

Gaylit, V.V.—first secretary, Estonian CP Pyarnuskiy
Raykom

Golikov, Ye.A.—deputy editor of the journal POLI-
TIKA

Dragunov, A.M.—partkom secretary, Tallinn Railroad
Terminal, Estonian Division, Baltic Railroad

Yefimova, V.M.—partkom secretary, Krengolmskaya
manufaktura Combine

Yermolayev, V.V.—partkom secretary, Estrybprom PO

Zakharov, N.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Kokhtla-
Yarve Gorkom

Kalmykov, I.I.—deputy director, Kekhra PO, Kharyy-
uskiy Uyezd

Kaur, Kh.E.—first secretary, Estonian CP Raplyaskiy
Raykom

Kivioya, V.P.—director, Ruuza Sovkhoz, Pylvaskiy
Uyezd

Langinen, V.P.—partkom secretary, Kekhra PO, Khary-
usskiy Uyezd

Leyto, T.A.-G.—editor of the newspaper RAKHVA
KHYAEL

Lummo, A.Ya.—head, Organization Section, Estonian
CP Tartuskiy Raykom

Luukas, M.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Paydeskiy
Raykom

Lyante, M.L.—first secretary, Estonian CP Tartuskiy
Raykom

Malkovskiy, V.S.—first secretary, Estonian CP Narva
Gorkom

Mamayev, A.M.—military serviceman

Maripuu, A.A.—construction engineer, Khiumaas
Petroleum-Product Center

Metssalu, K.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Khaapsa-
lusskiy Raykom

Miroshnichenko, V.A.—general director, Elektrotekh-
nika NPO [scientific-production association]

Mikheyeva, N.N.—first secretary, Estonian CP Kokhtla-
Yarvesskiy Raykom

Moks, Ya.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Oktyabrskiy
Raykom in the city of Tallinn

Orgulas, A.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Yygevaskiy
Raykom

Pyder, R.A.—Estonian SSR military commissar

Pylma, Ya.Ya.—first secretary, Estonian CP Pyarnu Gorkom

Raydla, Yu.E.—chairman, Pyarnuskiy Uyezd Soviet

Raud, E.A.—general director, Esttsement NPO

Renin, G.I.—partkom secretary, Tallinn Machine-Building Plant imeni I. Lauristin

Ruuts, Kh.O.—secretary Estonian CP Central Committee

Saluste, V.A.—first secretary, Estonian CP Leninskiy Raykom in the city of Tallinn

Sammalpyarg, Kh.A.—instructor, Estonian CP Khiy-maaskiy Raykom

Sillari, E.-A.A.—secretary, Estonian CP Central Committee

Simagin, V.V.—electrician on the electric streetlighting system in the city of Tallinn

Smirnov, G.P.—partkom secretary of the Estonslanets PO

Sobchak, V.T.—director of the Kiviyiskaya Factory of the Noorus PShO [expansion unknown]

Soobik, Ya.E.—first secretary of the Estonian CP Tallinn Gorkom

Suurmets, E.E.—secretary of the primary party organization of the Vilyandi Sovkhoz, Vilyandskiy Uyezd

Tamm, T.O.—second secretary, Estonian CP Vilyandskiy Raykom

Tamme, Yu.O.—first secretary, Estonian CP Tartu Gorkom

Tinn, E.E.—editor-in-chief of the journal POLITIKA

Tolmachev, Yu.I.—first secretary, Estonian CP Sil-lamyae Gorkom

Tombu, V.G.—editor of the newspaper SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA

Urvas, R.Kh.—second secretary of the Estonian CP Morskoy Raykom in the city of Tallinn

Khaga, Ya.E.—first secretary, Estonian CP Vyruskiy Raykom

Kheynyarv, Kh.E.—section head, Estonian CP Val-gaskiy Raykom

Chetvergov, V.I.—general director, Baltiyets PO

Ekhala, E.E.—first secretary Estonian CP Saareskiy Uyezd Committee

Yulegin, B.P.—section head for organizational-party and personnel work, Estonian CP Central Committee

Ruutel Addresses Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet 15 Mar

90UN1415A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 18 Mar 90 pp 1,2

[Speech by A. Ruutel at the 15th Session of the 11th Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet]

[Text] Today's session concludes our long and productive work which was full of pressure but certainly satisfying and interesting. I think that we should not be ashamed of what we have done, since we have been able to do quite a lot, and to organize our work in the spirit of the times.

Even though the rapid pace of events in society forces us to look more and more to the future, permit me nonetheless to take a look back and to take stock by recalling the most important moments in the work of the 11th Supreme Soviet.

I think it may be divided into two stages: the first from February 24, 1985, to November 16, 1988, and the second from November 16, 1988, to the present.

In Estonia, the ice began to crack in the spring of 1988 and the harbinger of it was the joint plenum of artistic unions. It provided a forum for voicing all the pain and concerns accumulated over several decades. Serious and rapid changes in all aspects of life were urged. The change in public consciousness which began there and the extraordinary upswing in the activity of the people had a direct impact on the work of deputies at all levels. The turning point was the extraordinary session of the Supreme Soviet on November 16, 1988. Discussing proposals for the draft Estonian SSR law on changes and amendments to the USSR Constitution and the draft law on electing USSR people's deputies, as well as changes and amendments to the republic Constitution and the Supreme Soviet declaration of sovereignty, we took our cue from the will of the majority. Our decisions became the focus of special attention of the republic's population. The Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium received over 25,000 letters signed by some 900,000 people. Draft amendments to the USSR Constitution, which were published for public discussion, posed a grave threat to sovereign rights of the Estonian SSR. On the request of public movements, labor collectives and the majority of the republic's population, we passed a number of historic decisions, the most weighty of which was the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet declaration of Estonian SSR sovereignty. We stated openly and uncompromisingly that the sovereignty of Estonia is total and indivisible. Of decisive significance were also changes in the Estonian SSR Constitution which legally defined the area of exclusive jurisdiction of the Estonian SSR and affirmed the right of citizens to own property. We stressed that Estonian SSR laws have priority over USSR legislation, and we have the right to suspend the implementation of all-union acts if they violate the sovereignty of the Estonian SSR or are insensitive to the republic's

concerns. Public movements, too, received constitutional recognition. The language of the Constitution stated that international pacts ratified by the Soviet Union are an inalienable part of the Estonian SSR legal system. We remember well that our aspirations were not understood everywhere and that our behavior caused indignation and ill will. Although the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium demanded that we bring our resolution in line with the stagnation-era constitution, we remained faithful to our goals and with the passage of time they began to understand us more and more. This signified also the approval for the political course we set on November 16. The second great milestone on the path to sovereignty was the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet resolution dated November 12, 1989, "On Historical and Legal Assessment of Events in Estonia in 1940". That act used scientific proof to declare that in 1940 Estonia became the victim of aggression and that our state was occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union. The declaration of the Estonian state parliament dated July 22, 1940, on joining the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was declared legally void. Strong support was lent to us by the resolution of the congress of USSR people's deputies dated December 24, 1989, "On Political and Legal Assessment of the 1939 Soviet-German Nonaggression Pact". It also legally annulled the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, as well as the deal struck by two dictatorial powers against independent third states. After the above-mentioned resolutions, a clear conviction was formed that historic rights of Estonia should be restored and that we should once again become sovereign and decide our affairs on our own.

On February 2, 1990, USSR people's deputies elected from Estonia and deputies elected to all organs of power in the republic took another step of international significance when they passed the declaration of political independence of Estonia in the Tallinn city hall. It clearly expressed the desire of the representatives of the people to restore the Estonian Republic on the basis of the Tartu Peace Treaty signed on February 2, 1920, by Soviet Russia and the Estonian Republic. The last session on February 23 saw another important step by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet: the resolution "On Preparation for Political Independence of Estonia" was passed and the composition of the commission on preparing for negotiations with the USSR was approved.

Respected Deputies:

The course we set on November 16, 1988, laid the legal and political ground for reorganizing the entire socio-political system of Estonia to create a new structure of power. As is well-known, the Estonian SSR Constitution has long contained a provision (Article 49), giving its citizens the right to join in voluntary associations to pursue civic initiatives. But only the years 1988 and, especially, 1989 gave citizens real opportunity to use their right voluntarily and freely. Only starting then can we speak of the emergence of conditions for independent mobilization of our society, of the start of reorganization of the political system of society based on true social and

political activity of citizens. Alongside the Estonian People's Front, which emerged as a result of the free expression of the will of the people, the Green movement and the Society for the Preservation of Ancient Monuments, many other societies, associations and movements have sprung up.

This multifaceted wave of civic initiative brought up the need to define the legal status of citizens' associations, the rules for their establishment and relations with various other links of the political system of society and citizens, and to establish guarantees for their activities. To attain this goal, a working group of the Supreme Soviet Presidium drafted the bill "On Citizens' Associations", which became law on May 18, 1989. Currently, in accordance with norms defined by the law "On Citizens' Associations", over 230 republic and local movements and organizations have been registered. Some of them in effect transformed themselves into political parties whose activity in society needs more thorough regulation than provided by the above-mentioned law. The Supreme Soviet Presidium is currently working on the law on parties. To legalize parties we have now amended the law "On Citizens' Associations". The most representative public organization, the unions, are also shifting to new forms of activity and organization based on the new Estonian SSR law on trade unions passed December 15, 1989. We can also state with all responsibility that the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and its Presidium did not pass a single act restricting rights of citizens based on their nationality, even though some people occasionally try to claim this. The declaration of sovereignty dated November 16, 1989, clearly states that the people of Estonia will never accept a law that discriminates against any nationality living on the territory of the Estonian SSR. If regulatory acts related to citizenship rights do consider it necessary to restrict certain rights, such as the right to vote, it has never been done based on nationality. But at the same time it should be taken into account that various ethnic groups have different interests, needs and aspiration which require legal guarantees, too. These were provided by the law on ethnic rights of Estonian SSR citizens passed in December 1989, which was drafted by the Supreme Soviet commission on ethnic relations. Based on this law, the state protects the cultural heritage of ethnic groups and safeguards the development of their language and culture, so that representatives of every nationality can openly and proudly proclaim their nationality and the so-called Russian-speaking population can claim its ethnic identity. Thus, we have the basis for formulating open cultural autonomy in the Estonian SSR.

On January 18, 1989, we passed the Estonian SSR law on language. There is no need to repeat why the law on language was necessary. We have spoken about it in great detail in this hall in two sessions. The implementation of the law on language is proceeding purposefully and in a businesslike manner. Much has been done: the order of establishing language fluency requirements has been

defined and will be passed to offices, as will be the system of teaching the language to workers. The necessary study materials are being published and the Language Center has been set up. The media is being used to explain articles of the law on language and the order of their implementation. A commission on protecting the language has been set up at the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

A heavy burden for entire Estonia and for every family has been the issue of military service of Estonian young men. The situation is disheartening, and sometimes even tragic. After an in-depth and thorough study of the problem, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet passed on December 6, 1989, a politically important resolution "On Organizing Military Service for Estonian SSR Citizens" which we submitted to the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. This is the first attempt to solve problems which since 1940 have been abrogated by the USSR. We do not agree with so one-sided a right to decide. Estonia must not be powerless in such an important area. This resolution is rich and multifaceted. We consider it a priority task to revive Estonian military units, our own military schools and laws on national defense. The second important point is the ability to choose alternative labor service, which we are actively discussing today. Third, cases of sending reservists, under the pretext of retraining, to other union republic for forced labor (to Chernobyl, virgin lands, etc.) as well as of drafting people for military service and retraining, now will have to be submitted for review to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium. Forth, we are trying to help young men who find it difficult to adapt to military life to be allowed to serve in Estonia or in the Baltic military district. There are other urgent points, such as military training in the native language, exemption for students, etc.

Extremely important is the demand contained in the resolution to engage in negotiations with Moscow on reducing troops in Estonia and including it into nuclear-free Europe. This resolution is rather political, but it delineates future steps. Along with the law on alternative service, which already exists as a draft, we also need a law on defense of the state. We are currently working on an agreement with Moscow to suspend the spring 1990 military draft in Estonia, and to allow young men born in Estonia to serve here. The fate of young men who have already been drafted is subject of separate negotiations. What we have mentioned here is a tangle of problems, but we must solve them, even if on a step by step basis.

It is useless to reassess the past if such reassessment does not lead to conclusions for the future. Without correcting past injustices, words about democracy and law-based state will remain empty talk. Embarking on the path to new independence, the people have not forgotten tens of thousands of those to whom the loss of independence cost their life, liberty, native farm or fatherland. People's pain caused by Stalin's crimes against the people of Estonia is impossible to allay; to give a just, yet legally precise assessment to the past is the right and the duty of

the legislator. I am pleased to state that the current Supreme Soviet, without waiting for people elsewhere in the Soviet Union to start sharing this attitude, found a solution for this complex issue and properly framed it in legislative acts.

On December 7, 1988, after heated discussions and great preliminary work, we passed the law "On Arbitrary Mass Repressions in Soviet Estonia in the 1940s-50s", in which the highest representative organ unequivocally condemned arbitrary repressions and labeled them illegal and inhumane. The law rehabilitated all those who were deported and laid the basis for a determined work by legal authorities to review, appeal and annul decisions of the so-called extraordinary boards and other tools of stalinist repression perpetrated under the guise of legality. The Estonian SSR prosecutor's office began investigating mass executions in Estonia and other crimes against humanity.

The government of the republic set up the system for paying damages to victims, and the whole system was established at the local level. To date, 23,000 deportees have received certificates of rehabilitation, 3,800 decisions by the tribunals of extraordinary boards or courts have been annulled and the persons' good names have been restored. Former owners have been given back 77 homes and 356 farms, and the state paid a total of R67.5 million in compensation last year.

Nevertheless, practice has shown that if the process of rehabilitation continues at the same pace, it may drag on for many years. An appropriate act has been drafted to help accelerate it.

Last February 19, the Supreme Soviet Presidium passed the ukase "On Rehabilitating Arbitrarily and Unjustly Convicted Persons", which was drafted by the joint efforts of deputies and legal experts and which added to the previously rehabilitated those who were convicted on articles of the RSFSR Criminal Code, i.e. one from a different state, based on which people were unjustly charged for their patriotic activities to create an independent Estonian state, to defend its independence and to establish life in the Estonian Republic. The ukase abolished articles 68 and 194 in the Estonian SSR Criminal Code, which were used for decades to persecute honest people for so-called anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda or for disseminating deliberately false information undermining public order. It opened an opportunity to clear the names of those who were hounded by the authorities for their moral courage.

To gauge the importance of this legislative act, I will say that it affects the lives of 60,000 people. Today, we can say that practically all legal barriers have been removed for restoring historical justice with regard to the repressed.

A new concept of law in Estonia is being developed; it should lay the foundation for the future legal system in Estonia. I mean a political and legal programmatic

document that will be directly and closely tied to our current political development.

The new era ushered in by the adoption of the declaration of sovereignty has created in the work of the Supreme Soviet the fertile soil for the development of the idea of Estonian economic independence, which was first mentioned in the proposal of four (Edgar Savisaar, Siym Kallas, Tiyt Made and Mikka Titma).

As a result of cooperation by the IME [Self-Managing Estonia] Problems Council, an ad hoc research collective set up at the Economics Institute of the Estonian Academy of Sciences and many other participants, the Estonian SSR General Economic Accountability Concept was drafted, which was a qualitatively new step in reorganizing economic relations. The passage of the General Concept by the Supreme Soviet, together with the passage of the law on the basics of Estonian SSR economic accountability, which took place on May 18, 1989—i.e., less than 10 months ago—forced us to work hard to prepare and pass new economic legislation.

One can boldly state that the great challenge posed without excessive optimism is, even if not yet fully met, unprecedented and has no equal in the parliamentary practice of economic legislation. The limits of this summary do not permit me to mention even the full list of acts, to say nothing of a more profound analysis. Let us opt, therefore, for listing the most important documents.

The law on enterprises (passed November 17, 1989) lays legal foundations for free enterprise and represents one of the primary conditions for shifting to market economy. The law on budget (November 17, 1989) places financial relations between the republic and organs of local administration on an independent footing. The law on prices (December 6, 1989), by establishing the rules for price setting and regulation, is a step toward creating necessary conditions. The law on taxation (December 28, 1989) defines the base of revenues necessary for the government to function and the use of taxes for economic and social regulation, in accordance with basic IME concepts. The law on banks (December 28, 1989) takes the first step toward making our economy independent, since banks are the conduits of real economic transactions; here, central authorities have unfortunately begun to raise various impediments and could create considerable difficulties through their banking system. This is why the quick establishment of Bank of Estonia, decreed by the Supreme Soviet resolution dated December 15, 1989, will have great practical importance and probably help implement the statute of Bank of Estonia which was approved today.

I must say that all these acts were passed by the Supreme Soviet fairly unanimously. Nevertheless, it can not always be said that they are understood similarly by central authorities and here in the republic. But life shows that events move toward broadening and strengthening the ideas we have expressed. For instance, the General Concept of IME mentions private property very

timidly. Now, however, this idea has even found its way into the USSR law on property. The draft Estonian law on property, which is being prepared by our legal experts and scientists, explores it further.

When speaking of our own laws, it would be wrong not to mention union legislative acts based on our actions. Even though they do not fully satisfy us, they are a step forward compared to the past in recognizing Estonia's economic independence.

Let us list the following: the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution dated July 27, 1989, "On Proposals of the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR on Switching to Economic Accountability by These Republics" and the USSR law on economic independence of the Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR (November 27, 1989), which, even though they are contradictory and do not reflect all of our aspirations by a long stretch, still open opportunities for broader activities and more resolute negotiations with central entities.

I must also mention the so-called four government agreement, signed as a joint resolution in Moscow on February 7 by heads of governments of the USSR, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia on implementing the above-mentioned law on economic independence. To be honest, the agreement attempts to restrict the scope of the law, but it has a major moral significance, recognizing us as independent economic partners.

In the case of most major conflicts we relied on the amendment to the Constitution dated November 16, 1988, whereby we, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, have the right to stop or limit the application of any legislative or other normative act of the USSR if it violates the sovereignty of Estonia.

Based on this we stopped payment of the union tax on us which was set too high by the USSR law on 1990 state budget. This having been said, it does not mean that Estonia has been able to accomplish everything on its economic independence agenda. January 1, 1990, did not become a decisive turning point in implementing the new system of economic regulation and transition to market economy. There are different reasons for it, both objective and particular, including some that are the fault of the Supreme Soviet.

We have not achieved a political breakthrough to ensure true recognition of our economic independence by central authorities and their agencies. We put too much confidence for achieving results in legislative acts. The implementation of every law has to be preceded by a very complex range of actions and other steps. For instance, the law on pricing and market economy cannot be legislated without appropriate agreements among business partners. Most of our economic players are not ready for it, nor are many of us. The dynamic economic situation urgently demands new solutions to many issues, even for recently adopted points of view.

The current Supreme Soviet will bequeath the idea and support for economic independence to the new Supreme Soviet: it will not be perfect, but the new Supreme Soviet will not be starting from zero. The start, which is always the most difficult part, has been made. We can assume that the greatest problem will be resistance by central authorities. Difficult negotiations lie ahead. Besides results of the work of the current Supreme Soviet, we will also pass on the idea of Estonia's national independence contained in the declaration passed on February 2 at the joint meeting of Estonian deputies, which is also key to achieving economic independence.

Along with issues covering the economy as a whole, the Supreme Soviet passed a number of important resolutions in particular areas. An important one was the law on farms, which, while not solving of course all the problems related to reviving farm economy, creates a necessary precondition for it. By the start of this year, 1,053 individual farmers had been granted 26,600 hectares of land. There is an equal number of people hoping to become individual farmers.

The exploitation of nature depends most of all on the economy and practically determines the quality of our entire ecological system. This is why the Supreme Soviet paid much attention to environmental issues. The reason for this is the fact that our environmental protection activities are still flawed and there is no overall approach to solving problems of environmental protection and rational use of natural resources. As a result, the environmental situation is poor in many regions, and critical in some. In some areas, deterioration in environmental protection has even occurred and the ecological system and ecological balance are in danger, especially in areas of great concentration of industrial and agricultural production such as northeastern Estonia, the Pandiverskaya Hills, Tallinn and its metropolitan area, the islands of western Estonia and the coastal areas. As a consequence of general development of industrial activity, some environmental components in northeastern Estonia began to harm human health. The main cause of the worsening environmental situation is environmental pollution stemming from the production and use of shale in the energy and chemical industries.

The environmental situation in northeastern Estonia can reach an irreversibly catastrophic state if the extraction and processing of phosphorite is begun there based on currently used technologies while allowing energy production and the chemical industry to carry on in the old way. Negative changes in our environment unfortunately spill over our borders, affecting primarily the condition of the Bay of Finland.

Based on this, the Supreme Soviet drafted a whole series of laws needed to protect the environment, from the concept of qualitative renewal to the general law, including reorganization of management. With the help of scientists and active participation by the public, we prepared and passed on December 6, 1989, the Supreme

Soviet resolution "On the Condition and Goals of Environmental Protection and Use of Natural Resources in the Estonian SSR", and approved the concept of environmental protection and rational use of natural resources of the Estonian SSR.

Among individual issues, much attention was paid to the issue of protection and rational use of soil, resources in the ground, water, air, flora and fauna. On December 15, 1989, we passed the Estonian SSR law on rules for using the environment and natural resources, which defined the rights and responsibilities of everyone exploiting the environment and natural resources. Violation of conditions set in the rules may result in a ban on using the environment or natural resources.

Based on preliminary work and acquired experience, last February 23 we passed the general law "On Protecting the Environment of Estonia". According to it, all relations connected to the protection and use of nature will have to be reorganized, based on the principle that environmental protection measures have precedence over economic and social issues and over the needs of defending the state in peacetime.

Attainment of political and economic independence by the republic requires reorganization of the government system on the level of both state and local administration. The old state administration apparatus was large and cumbersome: it had useless structures and too many levels. We had to reassess also the responsibilities of the government and its executive organs, replacing their personnel, as well.

Bills were drafted with the participation of our well-known management experts, lawyers and representatives of public organizations and movements. Bills drafted by them were actively discussed in three readings at government meetings, in permanent commissions and in two readings at the Supreme Soviet.

We passed the law on Estonian SSR government on December 6, 1989. Based on it, the government has been reorganized, made much smaller and simplified. Changes raised a number of problems, however, especially related to ensuring the transition to the new economic order, organizing smooth cooperation with central entities, etc.

Another managerial issue that has crucial significance from the point of view of state and economic organization is related to creating true autonomy at the local level, replacing the old ultra-centralized hierarchical government model with a decentralized, democratic and flexible one, thereby clearing the way for popular initiative.

The basis for implementing administrative reform has been the Supreme Soviet resolution on this subject passed August 8, 1989. By September, the bill laying the ground for local autonomy was ready, too: after a public discussion and two readings it became law on November 10.

This law opened the way for framing all legislation with interests of local power organs in mind. The goal of the law is to create legal foundations for establishing local self-management in practice, using this experience to draft laws for volosts, uyezds and cities.

Renewal has changed the work of permanent commissions of the Supreme Soviet. From the start, the 11th Supreme Soviet expanded its links with experts and scientists. Experimental groups were set up at every commission to work on draft laws proposed by deputies and to present solutions. Thus, the work of permanent commissions acquired new dimensions and became more professional.

Rapidly changing life has caused changes in the makeup of permanent commissions and even required new ones to be set up. On December 7, 1988, a commission on interethnic relations was formed and began to function actively and in a businesslike fashion. Permanent commissions found great scope for cooperating with deputy groups formed as a consequence of increased activity of deputies.

During sessions, permanent commissions had to quickly solve problems and form opinions on rapidly changing political and economic life.

A major part in the five-year life span of the Supreme Soviet was devoted to a time-consuming and often ineffective work of improving, specifying and changing existing laws by altering their language, editing various clauses and even introducing completely new ideas into existing legal acts.

The volume of such work is described by the figure 65, which is the number of times the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium discussed such issues. Each change was an outcome of work by deputies requiring advice by lawyers or economists employed as consultants as it tried to take all possible situations into account.

Not everything has survived the test of time—which is seen in the need that has emerged today to start drafting new general codes (some of them, such as the Criminal Code, are already being worked on)—but we should not forget that seemingly inconspicuous steps in this area have had, and will continue to have, real social consequences.

If we were to try to describe this aspect of the work of the Supreme Soviet and to find in it something useful for the new Estonian representative organ, we could use the word *de-ideologization*. Under normal conditions, the legislator must be guided by the future needs of society and refuse temptations to cull current political dividends. Then, legislation will become stable and the legal system will be strengthened, which is what the law-based state needs.

The change in the essence of the work of the Supreme Soviet required changes in procedures, as well. Deputies made a number of proposals in this area. They were

drafted by a group of experts set up by the Supreme Soviet Presidium which included also USSR people's deputies and Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet deputies. The group especially stressed the need to improve the process of drafting legislation and to create better opportunities for taking various opinions into account. Four deputy groups were formed: the deputy group for democratic development, the deputy group of land cultivators, the deputy group "For Social Rights" and the deputy group "For Equal Rights". All these groups worked actively, expressing their opinions and making proposals on issues discussed at the sessions.

We also drafted and passed provisional principles of proceedings for the next Supreme Soviet. These are our recommendations for the order of work and proceedings of the new Supreme Soviet.

As we see, the work of the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium contained much that was new compared to the previous Supreme Soviet. I would like to repeat here one extremely important point. Along with deputies, scientists, highly trained experts and representatives of public organizations and movements participated in drafting acts of the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium. As early as on May 19, 1988, the Supreme Soviet Presidium set up working groups to draft new legislative acts. Speaking on your behalf, I want to express heartfelt gratitude to members of all working groups for the great job they did. As a result of this joint work, the Supreme Soviet Presidium passed 1,707 ukases and 572 resolutions in five years.

And another important innovation: the Supreme Soviet Presidium resolution dated September 4, 1989, established at the Presidium the advisory committee consisting of representatives of social and political movements and public organizations. The committee was formed to broaden the cooperation between organs of state power and various political movements. This was especially important since our old one-party parliament had no necessary feedback channels. We think that this organ could be useful in the future, too, since it is doubtful that even the political structure of the new Supreme Soviet will fully reflect the rapidly changing political structures of society.

The advisory committee met 10 times. All important decisions and laws passed by the Supreme Soviet were first reviewed by the committee.

The committee discussed in detail the draft of the historical and legal assessment of events in Estonia in 1940, the draft declaration passed by the joint meeting of deputies and dedicated to the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty, problems related to the elections to the Supreme Soviet and Congress of Estonia. Based on the work of the advisory committee we can claim that the laws we passed have the support of public movements.

Five years ago, 285 deputies were elected to the Supreme Soviet; the mandates of 27 of them ended early. Twenty five new deputies were elected to replace them.

The work of deputies both in the Supreme Soviet and in their electoral districts improved qualitatively during the life of this Supreme Soviet. Ties with voters were strengthened and much was done to improve professionalism. Naturally, this cannot be said of a number of deputies, however few, whose ties with the Supreme Soviet and voters were not sufficiently strong or even broke off completely.

A measure of effectiveness in deputies' work is the number of queries to executive officials. In the past five years, 21 queries on various aspects of life were submitted.

Permanent commissions and the Supreme Soviet Presidium were in charge of supervising the implementation of resolutions related to the queries. The Supreme Soviet also discussed the implementation of the resolutions.

The involvement of voters has increased greatly in recent periods, too. In the past five years, 14,063 people submitted appeals to the Supreme Soviet Presidium concerning personal problems, of whom 2,756 came to see their deputies in person. People appealed to the Supreme Soviet about problems related to housing and municipal services, material assistance, legal help, welfare, environmental protection, labor relations, cruel treatment in the armed forces, foreign travel, etc. Over 50,000 individuals and collectives appealed to the Presidium on public issues.

People appealed to us especially frequently in the second period of our work. Ahead of the extraordinary session on November 19, 1988, and related to it, we received 25,583 appeals, mostly collective ones, and on declaring Estonian the state language, 11,625 appeals.

In the past, most appeals were related to housing, but in recent years the situation has changed considerably. Now, people mostly appeal to us on public and political issues.

This year, the growth of political activity of the republic's population has continued. People are concerned about unsolved problems and identify new ones; they make proposals on how to accelerate the process of renewal.

The process of renewal in society has also required changes in the practice of awarding state decorations. Thus, the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, with a ukase dated February 17, 1989, approved the new edition of the statute of Estonian SSR state decorations.

Labor collectives and soviet entities are now more demanding in assessing work achievements of persons recommended for decorations, as well as their personal contribution to improving our public life. As a result, the number of decorations awarded has decreased considerably, while the respect for state decorations has grown.

In 1989, 74 people received honor certificates of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, or one fifth of

the number of recipients in previous years. There were 25 percent fewer honorable titles awarded in the Estonian SSR than in the past.

Continued processes of democratization in society require further improvements of the system of state awards. A new award, a republic order, is in its preparation stages.

Respected Deputies! We, in the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium, have strived to carry out the will of the people. Every deputy contributed greatly to it, as did experts, scientists and representatives of movements and other public organizations who lent us their active assistance and the support personnel of the Supreme Soviet Presidium.

I want to thank all the deputies for their intense and fruitful work, since during the second period of our work we had to work practically as though we were a permanently functioning Supreme Soviet. I wish you health and success in all your future endeavors.

Allow me to thank on your behalf all our glorious assistants.

I want to hope that our intentions were honest and reflected the aspirations of the people of Estonia. The people and its state must be independent. History and today's reality have shown that even when independent, Estonians respect human rights and the rights of ethnic groups in accordance with the principles of international tolerance.

A few words now about the proposal by Jukhan Aare to declare the Estonian Republic at this session.

I only want to say that at our recent sessions we have set a firm course toward restoring the Estonian Republic. This is the aim of the work of the commission on economic and political independence.

The Estonian Republic was declared in 1918. To restore it, we need cooperation by all forces: it must be done in a purposeful manner, working to attain recognition of legal continuity of the Estonian Republic and creating economic, legal and political guarantees for its future existence.

I can say that we have started to work toward restoring freedom with restoring national symbols. Now, as our Supreme Soviet concludes its work, we must pass the baton to the new Supreme Soviet that will be elected. We are convinced that it will carry on the work we have begun and will win statehood for Estonia. Let this sacred wish be the baton we pass to the new Supreme Soviet and let it bring happiness and fulfillment of aspirations to the people of Estonia.

Väljas Address to Estonian Party Congress

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Russian 24 Mar 90 pp 2-3

[Address by V. Väljas, first secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee, to the 20th Estonian CP Congress: "Report of the First Secretary of the Estonian CP Central Committee, V. Väljas"]

[Text] Dear Comrades! The 20th Congress of the Estonian Communist Party has assembled at perhaps the most critical moment in the whole postwar history. At present the foundations for the formation of the future world are being laid. The countries of the Eastern Bloc are shaking off from themselves one after the other everything that prevents their participation in the creation of the new all-European house. This is a dramatic moment in the history of the Soviet Union, when every people must make its choice. This is a critical time also for the Estonian people, when the restoration of our own statehood seems closer to us than at any time during the past 50 years. And, indeed, we have come together to make our choice, to decide the fate of the Communist Party of Estonia. So let us acknowledge our responsibility before history and, what is the main thing, before the Estonian people.

For this reason, I would ask the comrades to perceive everything that follows not as a report of the Estonian CP Central Committee for the period that has passed since the preceding congress or since 1988, but as a political address. Indeed, the main thing that concerns all those present in this hall, all the communists of Estonia, is the future. Our task today does not consist in reporting about what has been done and not done, but in determining our future path. How did we act at all the preceding congresses? Exclusively so that everything positive from what happened in society was represented as the unquestionable result of the party leadership. All this we credited to our account and we were silent about what did not succeed in our activity or what was deformed in life. Can we now appear before the people with such an approach? No, this is impossible now or in the future. Let us ask ourselves the question—is everything that has happened in Estonia, beginning with the 16 June 1988, the result of the activity of the Estonian Communist Party? I think that the answer here cannot be simple. True, beginning with the 11th Central Committee Plenum, the Estonian Communist Party refused to oppose the interests of its people and embarked on the path of following them. This is indicated by a number of legislative initiatives in the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the repudiation of the role of prescribing and directing on a daily basis in economic and political life, the decisive reduction of the party apparatus, and the abolition of the nomenklatura. Nevertheless, we can in no way assert that all the positive changes in our life, glasnost and democratization, have been called forth exclusively by the activity of the Estonian Communist Party. This is first of all the result of the self-consciousness of the people, creative activeness, and

gainful initiative—everything that awakened restructuring in the people. Why must we report in such a case about this in the manner of the party?

The surprisingly rapid development during the current year has led to a new rise of the national consciousness. The population of Estonia, the Estonians, and the inhabitants of every city and district have begun to feel themselves increasingly as the masters of their life and the makers of their history. We have succeeded in getting used to an approaching all questions from the positions of the interests of Estonia, the confrontation of its past and future. This is natural and inevitable—indeed, if not we here, who else will be able to define a policy which is interpreted through the prism of Estonia? And nevertheless, Estonia is not the center of the universe, which predetermines the development and final results of all processes. What has happened both in our republic and throughout the Baltic has demonstrated that the great powers take into account both mutual interests and the global interests connected with this. It is from them that their attitude to our problems results. Just as we must realize that our fate is not decided only by our will, no matter how many times we express it.

Why do I begin precisely with this? Surely because all of our problems are extremely interlaced both among themselves and with the problems of the entire world. We should understand if only the following three fundamental facts, without whose consideration the adequate participation of Estonia in political life is hardly possible.

First of all, Estonia, as the age-old home of the Estonians and the land of their ancestors, is located precisely here. Only here can it be located in the future as well.

Secondly, just as it is the truth that the neighbors of Estonia are precisely the states and peoples who surround us in the East and the West, the North and the South, and they will not disappear anywhere. People do not select their neighbors, they are simply given.

Thirdly, at the given moment, hundreds of thousands of people of other nationalities live in the territory of Estonia, whose integration with respect to Estonia is extremely different, however, regardless of this, they live precisely on this plot of land. This is a fact which must be taken into account.

The stormy development of events in Eastern Europe shows that the propagation of the Stalinist model of socialism to the countries of this region has failed. The regimes which were imposed by force have collapsed. The transformations being carried out in the Soviet Union are aimed at the democratization of society, and it is to a significant degree thanks to this that the transformations in Estonia were accelerated and became possible in terms of realization. For this reason, both for us and for Europe, as well as for the entire world, it is extremely important for the process of democratization to become increasingly intensified in the entire Soviet Union.

Both Eastern Europe and the West are now interested, above all, in the continuation, in the Soviet Union, of the policy of Gorbachev. Everything else which is supported along with this recedes into the background there. In Europe, as well as in the United States and Japan, there exists a common view that Gorbachev's boat cannot be rocked, that nothing should be done of the sort that can do damage to his political course. That kind of approach is now predominant, it has deep roots, and it must be taken into account.

The new political structure of Europe signifies the final summing up of the results of the Second World War, which defeated Europe and brought many people injustice and suffering.

A prerequisite for the creation of a new Europe is the departure of the armed forces of other countries from the territory of the European states. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia and Hungary is a good beginning of this process; the same goal is served by the reduction of the Armed Forces of the United States in Central Europe, the mutual reduction of the number of missiles and other arms, as well as arms control measures. In the end, this must lead to the elimination of the military structures of NATO and the Warsaw Pact, evidently, still before the beginning of the formation of a nuclear-free Northern Europe.

Thereby are opened up completely new possibilities for free contacts between states and all-round mutually-advantageous cooperation. The necessity for defensive political blocs of states will also disappear, since there no longer will be a strategic enemy. The reunification of Germany occupies a special place on the road to a new Europe. The division of Germany is a terrible consequence of the war begun by Hitler. But it cannot continue for ever and ever. Just the same, the injustice which the criminal agreement of Hitler and Stalin on the eve of the Second World War brought on the Baltic states must not continue. The proposed peace agreement must in this respect, too, draw a line. All this is the world and the European background against which we must form our positions with respect to the basic question of today's Estonia—with respect to the question of its statehood.

There is no doubt that the people demands from all the political movements, the parties and their members, a concrete answer to the question—how do they see the future of Estonia? The Communist Party of Estonia is facing an election. If it makes up its mind to rigidly hold on to ideological constructions excluding the national [gosudarstvennaya] independence of Estonia, it must be clearly stated: The majority of the Estonian people is pressing for one thing, and the Communist Party of Estonia—for the complete opposite. If the Estonian Communist Party decides to follow the majority of the people, this, too, must be unequivocally stated.

However, precisely in this question the weight of historical guilt of the Estonian Communist Party is most

painful. And this is stated in the draft historical-political assessment that has been presented to the congress. Of course, it should not be thought that, if the Estonian Communist Party accepts the idea of national independence, the majority of the Estonian people will at once return to us. Common ideological positions with the majority of the people do not yet signify the strengthening of the positions of the party. Now we must give a clear-cut answer: Yes, the Estonian Communist Party supports the national independence of Estonia, its statehood.

If this position appears to anyone to be incompatible with Marxist ideology, it can be theoretically substantiated. Evidently, proletarian internationalism signifies support and solidarity with the aspirations of the workers of all countries, but it does in no way signify forceful state unification. The latter is the Stalinist, great power treatment of proletarian internationalism.

Our aspiration to independence may to some people appear somewhat strange, especially against the background of the present-day integration of Europe. Here one needs to take as the point of departure the dialectical interrelationship between national independence and inter-state integration. The restoration of the national independence of Estonia is necessary precisely in order for it, proceeding from its state and national goals, to join in the most active manner in the process of the formation of the all-European house. If Estonia intends to find, for the guarantee of its political and economic prosperity, the place of an intermediary in the relations between East and West, it must closely integrate itself with the influential economic and political forces both in the East and in the West. In other words: The national independence of Estonia does not lead us to the Europe of the beginning of the century, but to the present-day Europe that is becoming unified. Our goal cannot be the attainment of independence and then the erection of a wall around Estonia. On the contrary, we need national independence in order to become an equal participant in the creation of the all-European house. For small Estonia, the idea of an all-European house is, perhaps, even more important than for the other, larger and more powerful states. This is the fundamental guarantee of our national and state interests. Historical experience shows that the independence of Estonia can be preserved only in the presence of stability of the external factors, which is guaranteed both from the East and from the West.

Having expressed the will of the overwhelming majority of the political movements of Estonia—to create a sovereign Estonian state—we must realize the fact that conceptions of the ways of achieving this goal to which we aspire are by no means identical.

In so doing, it is impossible to pass over in silence the Congress of Estonia, which took place immediately before the elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The Congress of Estonia and the Committee of Estonia elected by it represent the national-democratic movement. We must treat the Congress of Estonia and the

Committee of Estonia as a political reality whose decisions will exert a significant influence on the work of the future Supreme Soviet. We must take into account that the citizens of Estonia have a priority right of voting in the decision of questions of self-determination. However, the state system can be determined only by the Supreme Soviet, which represents both the citizens of Estonia as well as the people who have come here later and who live here.

If the new Supreme Soviet and the Congress of Estonia will find a common language and will not see each other only as rivals, the path to national independence will be calm.

If the Estonian Communist Party supports the idea of the independent statehood of Estonia, the question arises involuntarily how we differ in this respect in this respect from the other Estonia-centered political forces, including the national fundamentalists. This question was put to us at the meeting with M. S. Gorbachev and the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee that took place in Moscow not long ago. There are three important aspects here. First of all, it needs to be said that in the present-day civilized world, the questions of national independence, as a rule, are not the object of inter-party discussions, but the object of a broad consensus. The ruling, as well as the opposition parties, do not usually include in their programmatic goals the repudiation of statehood. Secondly, and in this our difference is manifested, it is not at all correct to suggest that the restoration of national independence culminates in the adoption, by an overwhelming majority of votes, of an appropriate political act. The restoration of independence must be regarded as a process, in the course of which not only the legal, but also the economic, political and social foundations are created. Negotiations between Estonia, the Soviet Union, and other interested parties are a practical step in the formation of the independence of Estonia. In the course of the negotiations, we must take into account all the interests and guarantee the preservation and development of the necessary relations. Only relations based on the principles of mutual advantage and respect, the existing integration, can provide real guarantees for the non-Estonian community in Estonia. In connection with this, I would like to dwell in some words on the question of Lithuania. There is no doubt that, having an identical historical fate, we support in every conceivable way the realization of the legitimate right of the Lithuanian people to self-determination. We hope that the central organs of the Soviet Union understand the necessity of the immediate beginning of negotiations with Lithuania. Moreover, the development of Lithuania has graphically demonstrated how important the achievement of the unanimity of the whole people is in the formation of independence. All of us know that the demographic situation in our republic and the national composition of our republic are different, and during the negotiations it will be extremely important on which side of the negotiation table the representatives of the non-Estonian community of Estonia will turn out to be.

The third aspect in the approach of the Estonian Communist Party to the restoration of statehood is the already mentioned question of guarantees. The basis for negotiations about the restoration of independence we see in the guarantee of equal civil rights for all inhabitants of Estonia, along with all political and economic guarantees of national independence. Respecting the historical traditions of the Estonians, the language and culture, the communists at the same time advocate legislatively anchored conditions which guarantee the development of the language, culture and education of the other ethnic groups living here, the preservation of their national distinctiveness, and the protection of civil rights. In the sphere of nationality relations, without a doubt, it is necessary to observe the general Declaration of the Rights of Man, as well as other internationally-recognized acts.

In a situation where the lion's share of the new movements and parties has formed primarily on the basis of nationality, the Estonian Communist Party has constantly declared its fundamental position: We want to unite the aspirations of both the Estonians and the representatives of the other nationalities for the purpose of the democratization of public life and the attainment of social justice. We are convinced of the fact that the Estonians and the non-Estonians separately cannot attain progress. Any movement forward presupposes the joint actions of the democratic forces, presupposes an understanding of the distinctive features of other national groups and their interests.

One of the illusions very widespread now is the idea that the statehood of Estonia will at once solve all problems of the Estonian people. However, also groundless is the idea that this will entail social hopelessness and the national humility of other national groups living here.

If we turn to the social development during the past two years, it becomes clear that the sharp rise in the national consciousness of the Estonians could not but call forth uneasiness of part of the population, which saw in this an attack on the possibility of playing its role in public life. Along with this, there always also existed the understanding that our life will not be improved through nationality opposition. The idea of civic peace began to receive increasingly greater recognition. Serious inter-nationality tensions would to a significant degree be mitigated by the establishment of a clear and unequivocal citizenship. This we declared already at the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum, but, unfortunately, the matter was brought to a standstill for a variety of reasons. Our fundamental point of view is that citizenship should be given to all who, at the moment of the introduction of citizenship, are permanently living in Estonia. Including to those who are not the descendants of citizens of the Estonian Republic. This point of view of ours differs from the approach of a number of other parties, but we are convinced that only in such a manner can the stability of society and the unity of actions on the way to sovereignty be secured. It is natural that in the future, with respect to those who want to change to

residence in Estonia, the demands regulating and restricting migration must take effect.

In independent Estonia it is necessary to put on a firm foundation the satisfaction of the demands of all the national groups in the sphere of culture and education. We have already embarked on this road. One can only welcome the emergence of the national cultural societies. These societies, without a doubt, need state support in the solution of both nationality-education and cultural problems. In accordance with the traditions of European democracy, the favoring of the development of relations in the sphere of education and cultural relations of the nationality groups with their historic homeland pertains to this. On a broad plane we must secure the free contacts of the national groups living in Estonia with their fellow-tribesmen and relatives outside its boundaries.

Having decided the question of the state status of Estonia and having guaranteed the stability in internationality relations, we thereby will create the prerequisites for overcoming the economic and social crisis. It is difficult to imagine the realization of long-term economic and social programs, when political and nationality instability reigns, when we cannot become a reliable partner for other states. In these questions, the Estonian Communist Party is of one accord with the majority of the Estonia-centered political forces. As far as concrete economic questions are concerned, in Estonia, as elsewhere in the world, there are forces which represent various economic interests and which suggest various paths of solution.

World practice shows that, at various stages of socioeconomic development, the solution of these or those tasks is guaranteed by a certain optimal correlation of forces. When the increase of the efficiency of the economy is the main thing, it is necessary to solve the problems of structural changes in the economy, and for the achievement of success to accept radical right-wing forces. They, in their turn, are balanced by the active actions of left-wing forces, which try to attain the provision of social guarantees for the workers. For this reason there is nothing special in the fact that the left-wing forces—communists, socialists, and social-democrats—support radical economic programs, balancing them through an active struggle for the rights of workers. Obviously, such is the function of the Estonian Communist Party.

As the spokesman for the interests of the workers, the Estonian Communist Party has broad possibilities for cooperation with the new trade unions. The present-day Estonian Communist Party, as the state party, nevertheless defends the interests of the state employer, pretending to be in so doing the defender of the interests of the workers. We must put an end to such political hypocrisy. The resurrection of the Estonian Communist Party and our transformation into a genuinely political party does not signify that it thereby changes from a left-wing force into right-centrist one, on the contrary, it

is making the transition from the positions of the power apparatus and employers to the positions of the workers. And this not only in words.

Taking into account the new role of the workers of mental labor in the epoch of the scientific-technical revolution, the Estonian Communist Party must not regard itself as the defender only of those who are employed in material production and physical labor. The time has come to reject this dogma. The struggle for freedom and the conditions of creativity, for the public recognition of mental labor, must become the norm for the Estonian Communist Party. Support of nationality culture—for us—is one of the most important tasks.

The economy of Estonia, as of the entire Soviet Union, is in a state of crisis. The administrative-command system is collapsing. Leading the economy out of this situation requires decisive actions. But, unfortunately, the new laws and decisions being adopted, both in our republic and in the center, often remain indeterminate and contradictory.

In a report at a congress it is impossible to give a thorough analysis of the state of the economy. Today's situation requires the adoption of extraordinary measures. For this reason, we perceive only the radical reorganization of the entire economic system as the sole realistic path to a way out of the crisis. The development of enterprise, including private enterprise, the decentralization of production, a sharp reduction in the share of state property, and every conceivable protection of all forms of property—only this is capable of balancing the market. Monetary reform and price reform also pertain to this.

At the same time, the relations with the all-union market must be preserved and developed, especially with respect to the delivery of raw material and fuel, as well as the sale of finished products. As an exception, it makes sense only to reduce, within reasonable limits, the export of agricultural products to the USSR, in order to overcome the—for our economy disadvantageous—orientation to the role of all-union agricultural appendage. It is necessary to change the structure of agricultural production, to increase the share of processed, high-quality, finished products, and to saturate the domestic market with it.

During the transition period we must pay for the way out of the crisis. The Estonian Communist Party must tell the people openly and clearly what this means: That a temporary reduction in the standard of living, some deepening of social and property inequality, competition and other phenomena characteristic of the market economy are possible—phenomena which will accompany the development of this economy. We must not give rise to social illusions among the people, all the more be ourselves captives of them. But at the same time we think that, even in the conditions of crisis, it is necessary to secure social support for those whose standard of living is lower than the minimum.

It is the task of the Government, together with the enterprises, to secure for people, via the state, the necessary possibilities for requalification and retraining. Our position: We regard radical changes in the structure of the economy necessary, for without them the crisis cannot be overcome. On the other hand, we are trying to attain concrete measures in order for the working people to survive these difficult times more painlessly, within the limits of the possible. The interests of people must be defended even in the conditions of the crisis economy. The slogan: "Poor, but free!" is hardly suitable for our days. The people will not understand those who will undertake practical steps leading to poverty. Already now this threatens us through emigration to the West, with precisely the most enterprising and competent people leaving.

The transition to a new economic system cannot happen in one day, it requires balance. Not only local "conservatives", but also many authoritative Western specialists, who know our conditions and who are not burdened by emotions in the forecasting of the development of Estonia, have doubts about the possibility of an immediate transition to a market economy and the smooth inclusion of its levers.

Unfortunately, we strive to strengthen the social sphere and to make the distribution relations more just, not taking into account the fact that one can divide only what has been produced. Riches are not added up from the redistribution of poverty. For this reason, already today we must study large industry very seriously.

In Estonia it is necessary to develop in the near future a conception of development, which takes into account the state and the possibilities of the branches of industry and the enterprises, so that the new economic policy can be based on it. Here we must free ourselves of the illusions that it is possible to attain results immediately. Obviously, there are enterprises which, with their present profile, even taking into account an economically grounded price system, cannot operate profitably. It is necessary to be more cautious with demands for the transfer of such enterprises into republic management. Is it correct in general to adopt plants before changing their profile, if, to all appearances, they will only become a burden for the national economy?

The way out of the economic crisis and the choice of the correct tactic is complicated for us by yet another fundamental problem, which, unfortunately, was passed by the greater part of the social movements of Estonia. We are talking about the creation of the prerequisites and the foundations for joining in the technological progress which is increasingly accelerating in the developed countries. Indeed, the possibilities for development and growth of prosperity, as is obvious from the example of both Finland and Japan, are based on modern production and information technology. Our progress is unthinkable without entry into this channel.

From where to take the resources necessary for this? For us, the geopolitical position is such a resource. We can be an intermediaries in the production, scientific, and cultural exchange between East and West, in the expansion of which, according to the inevitable logic of the same technological progress, both sides are increasingly more interested. This resource will open itself up for us when we synthesize the principle of *khozraschet* with the principles of a free economic zone, when we guarantee the free movement of goods, capital, and manpower.

Defining in such a manner our vision of the further course of the development of Estonia, we must ask ourselves the question: Why did we not attain all this earlier? Great responsibility for what things came to in the Soviet Union and in the countries of Eastern Europe under the banner of administrative socialism rests with the communist parties of these countries, to which the monopoly of power belonged undividedly for decades. The circumstance that some communist parties were also the initiators of the policy of renewal, of course, must be welcomed, but this does not remove from them the responsibility for the previous grave errors.

The fall of the authority of the communist parties did not occur at suddenly. Now, when the the pressure fell away, all this simply came to light. It is not worthwhile for communist parties to construct any illusions. Most graphically, the actual state of affairs was shown by the elections which are being held in the countries of Eastern Europe. The former parties which had ruled monopolistically receive extremely weak support and are forced to go into opposition. The example of Poland confirmed this already last summer, the results of the elections in the GDR—a few days ago. What is more, the elections to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet also showed our situation.

Undoubtedly, the majority of deputies expresses democratic Estonia-centered ideas. Was the Estonian Communist Party successful in the elections? Yes, it was successful. However, by serious success we do not understand how many deputies carry a ticket of CPSU membership in their pocket. I think that the victory of the Estonian Communist Party and other realistic political forces consists, first of all, in the fact that the elections proceeded normally, in the fact that the people did not follow appeals to boycott the elections to the Supreme Soviet.

The new composition of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet makes it possible to talk about the possibility of a coalition government. Whatever the role of the Estonian Communist Party has become, it will continue activity as one of the parties of a democratic political system.

Yes, the Estonian Communist Party is now in a crisis state. Many communists are leaving its ranks, a part of the party organizations has discontinued its activity, membership dues are not being received as this is required by the Statute of the CPSU. In this are reflected both the process of restructuring, in the course of which

the pulling down of the power monopoly of the present-day ruling party is proceeding, and the errors and omissions of which we ourselves are guilty.

What kind of a party have we dealt with up to now? With a party which as the central part of the mechanism of power completely subordinated all the structures of government to itself. Without radical changes in this sphere it is impossible to build a rule-of-law state, to impart an irreversible character to the process of the democratization of society. In this sense, it is not worthwhile to dramatize excessively the party's loss of its past authority, as well as the departure of the disillusioned from a party which has lost its authority. The Estonian Communist Party is now going through a difficult, but inevitable process of transformation into a normal democratic party. Another question: What has the party done in practical terms during the less than 2 years, beginning with June 1988? If we are guided by the assessment of M. S. Gorbachev, which he gave at the recent meeting in the CPSU Central Committee, the new Estonian Communist Party leadership in 1988 received from its predecessors as an inheritance a situation which was characterized by extremely deformed relations and a deep crisis in the people's confidence in the party.

As is well known, the realization of the "phosphorite problem" in 1987 strengthened among Estonians the feeling of an inner link with the territory as the environment of habitation, but the former leadership of the Estonian CP Central Committee put obstacles in the way of these nationality aspirations. As a return reaction, the National Front arose in April of 1988. And the question arose: What role will the Estonian Communist Party play in the society which is undergoing renewal? Will it go with its people, will it express local interests or will it measure all processes in the republic by all-union yardsticks? Already then it became clear that the problems of our republic are not some kind of an exception, but with a certain time distance will begin to repeat themselves in other regions of the country. For this reason, the Estonian Communist Party has refused to put an equals sign between the growth of national consciousness and the so-called manifestations of nationalism. On the other hand, the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum in September 1988 assumed the obligation to secure through its policy, within the limits resulting from its position, the realization of the national interests of the Estonians and through this—the creation of conditions for the realization of the interests of the other national groups as well.

During the first stage of the renewal of Estonia we tried by all means to secure the irreversibility of the democratization of society. On the basis of its special public position, including basing itself on its monopoly of power, the progressive wing of the Estonian Communist Party was able to resist the pressure of the conservative forces both in the center and in Estonia. This created the conditions for the expansion and legalization of the

popular movements. And then, when the democratization in Estonia became irreversible, the Estonian Communist Party itself proceeded to the elimination of its monopoly of power and openly pursued a pluralistic policy. Already before the abolition of Article 6 of the Constitution, the Estonian Communist Party took practical steps in regard to the transfer of power to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Already several years ago, documents which are of great significance, were prepared in the Estonian CP Central Committee, and the guidance of the elections was carried out from there. Now the Estonian CP Central Committee has refused guidance through the so-called *nomenklatura*, stimulating the transmission of power to the Supreme Soviet and the local Soviets. Especially distinctly this was manifested after the elections to the local Soviets and the reform of the power organs.

In the success of democratization, our press plays an essential role. Almost all the parties and movements have accused the Estonian Communist Party of spasmodically holding on to the monopoly of information and is organizing an information blockade of precisely their movements. This was, indeed, natural since the Estonian Communist Party's policy of *glasnost* was aimed not at the emergence of a new monopoly of information of one movement or another, but at the creation of possibilities for all. The information policy is now realized by editorial boards, and the tone of the publications shows who in fact is dependent on whom and who is independent. We believe that for the most part thanks to the tolerant position of the Estonian CP Central Committee, public opinion in Estonia has become a key factor in political life.

We prudently refrained from too hasty and radical steps in the solution of the nationality question, since it was clear that, if the Estonian Communist Party begins to act very resolutely, the confrontation between the Estonian and the Russian communities will intensify. And this would benefit the union conservative forces in the attack on restructuring, in order to trample the shoots of democracy. Thus, the Estonian CP Central Committee, as the leadership of the ruling party, by no means prevented the dissemination of various views and the emergence of political movements and parties. The tolerant policy of the Estonian CP Central Committee favored simultaneously the radical reform of the political and economic systems. Thereby the Estonian Communist Party itself freed itself from the role of the head of a totalitarian system. For the Estonian Communist Party, these processes were not very propitious. What is happening gave foundations for accusations of inconsistencies. Many members of the party, among them, undoubtedly, honest and sincere communists, lost the ground from under their feet, and this led them even to withdrawal from the party. Unfortunately, the situation developed favorably also for those who, being still members of the party or who quickly withdrew from it in the interest of their political career and for the sake of prestige, simply began to slander the Estonian Communist Party.

The great-power oriented conservatives call all of this the surrender of party positions. In actual fact, what is happening is the dismantling of the present system of power, without which neither the genuine democratization of society nor profound economic reforms are unthinkable. The crisis of the Estonian Communist Party, which for decades had administered society, like a state-political colossus, is a natural link of this process. Now a pluralism is distinctly seen even in the ranks of the Estonian Communist Party itself. The Estonian Communist Party also now believes that it would be incorrect to intensify the aggravation of contradictions through the open protection of the positions of some and the suppression of others. The ideological and organizational reformation of the Estonian Communist Party is inevitably connected with the emergence of a multi-party system in the republic. It would be irresponsible under the pretense of democracy to interfere administratively with the naturally developing processes. And it is necessary not to reanimate the old Estonian Communist Party, but to reconstitute, on the basis of membership in a territorial organization of the CPSU, a union of like-minded persons, which would be capable of practically implementing a policy based on the universal and humane values of Marxism. Such processes are taking place or will begin to take place throughout the entire Soviet Union. In Estonia the smooth and balanced dismantling of administrative-state socialism is under way. And in this lies the great merit of the Estonian Communist Party, which undertook the political steps for the protection of the people in Estonia, and not for the protection of its own narrow group interests and increase of the popularity of the leaders.

On the other hand, we must recognize that up to now the Estonian Communist Party has been a territorial organization of the CPSU, and within one party there cannot be several ideological-theoretical foundations and strategic lines. Consequently, the Estonian CP Central Committee for a long time did not have the political conditions necessary to develop a long-term program, which would differ from the momentary directives of the CPSU Central Committee. The improvements in the policy of the leadership of the CPSU Central Committee by the present time have changed the situation. The ideas and principles emanating from the policy of the 11th Estonian CP Central Committee Plenum and born in the national movements of Estonia, already in many respects are not Estonian separatism. Many ideas have found reflection on the all-union plane, including in the CPSU Central Committee Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress.

A temporary change in the assessments of the CPSU Central Committee and the Estonian CP Central Committee of the processes that are taking place, unfortunately, have aggravated not only the relations between the two Central Committees, but also the relations of the Estonian Communist Party with the people.

What nevertheless concretely has the Estonian CP Central Committee succeeded in doing during the past 2 years in regard to change of the system?

First of all, the Estonian CP Central Committee has given up the real power which it possessed to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. The link of the 11th Central Committee Plenum with the Declaration of Sovereignty of 16 November 1988, with the Law on Language, the program of IME [Self-Managing Estonia] and many other laws is present.

Secondly, as has already been noted, the Estonian CP Central Committee has favored the division of legislative, executive, and judicial power in the republic, which is one of the basic principles of the democratic organization of society.

Thirdly, the Estonian CP Central Committee has aspired to act in such manner that even when the political and ideological tension reached the limit, civic peace was preserved, and opposition did not cross the fateful brink. We shall be honest, the Estonian Communist Party is nevertheless the only political force within the framework of which the representatives of the Estonian and Russian communities cooperated and, in proportion to their possibilities, searched for a solution to the problems that confront society today. Most likely, we were slow and late in something. However, we were able to avoid the worst.

Fourth, the tolerance of the Estonian CP Central Committee of the emergence of various political forces has to this day held back anti-communist hysteria in the republic. Thereby there was a possibility to protect the members of the party against spiritual terror, against the reproaches that every communist is guilty of the mistakes of the CPSU leadership. This, of course, does not mean took under protection those members of the party who perpetrated crimes against their people.

Fifth, the Estonian Communist Party was and remains a buffer between the interests of the Estonian people and the all-union conservative forces. In fulfilling this role, the Estonian CP Central Committee accepted the criticism of the nationalist radicals of the republic, as well as of the center. Many steps of the Estonian CP Central Committee have been interpreted incorrectly. However, a political reality exists: What forces in Moscow exist and with whom they agree to conduct a dialogue about the affairs of Estonia. To consider a policy of slamming the doors from our, Estonia-oriented side would, apparently, be unreasonable.

We understand the anxiety of the people and the mothers for the fate of their young men in the Soviet Army. But taking into account the forces that oppose us, we must avoid unnecessary emotions in these questions. The regulation of these problems will certainly have to be discussed as one of the basic subjects in the soon-to-begin negotiations with the central authorities of the Soviet Union. Our goal is to regulate through legislation the stay of part of the Soviet Army in Estonia and the

problems connected with the service of young men in the army. And this we can attain only through negotiations.

I ask the delegates to understand correctly: What has been talked about now in no way signifies the praising of achievements, as well as the giving out of the desirable for the real. We see also our errors and mistakes. The basic one of them, apparently, lies in the fact that we were unable to notice in time the changes in social development. Coming out of the crisis of confidence in 1988, we marked time for too long on the level of the 11th Plenum, we overestimated the limits of its favorable influence. Our non-interference in the ideological processes developed into the loss of our ideology. The tactic of the Estonian CP Central Committee became increasingly less clear for rank and file communists. Only most recently our positions and principles have started to become rehabilitated little by little in our republic. However, many communists during this time have managed to completely lose their points of reference and have waved their hand at the party. This is our mistake.

If now the dominating idea of the public life of all Estonia is the question of its own statehood, within the Estonian Communist Party the question of the independence of the party has the same weight. Let us realize that the policy which we have constructed must proceed, not from a momentary policy, but must take into account our past, the basic directions of the development of the political system of Estonia and the strategic interests of the Estonian Communist Party.

What does the history of the Estonian Communist Party teach us in this regard? The most serious errors of our party originated from the fact that, during its entire existence, the Estonian Communist Party was not an independent political force. Even now it is a territorial organization of the CPSU, which is practically in the position of an oblast organization.

Today the analysis of our policy shows: In order to participate actively in the life of Estonia, to flexibly change tactics, and to create coalitions, as well as to compete with other parties and movements, the Estonian Communist Party must become an independent party, which acts on the basis of its programmatic documents.

In asserting this, we do not admit even a thought of political isolation. The activity of the Estonian Communist Party must increasingly clearly be guided by what is fundamental for all communists—the values of Marxism that are common to all mankind, the new political thinking.

Secondly, the achievement of the goals of the Estonian Communist Party in many respects depends on the development of the present-day Soviet Union and the CPSU. We are going to meet the 28th CPSU Congress. The Estonian CP Central Committee believes that, having adopted a program for this congress and thus registered our independence, we will in any case send our

democratically elected representatives to the CPSU Congress. We will give them a mandate, based on our aspirations and our position: To stand for the transformation of the CPSU into an alliance of equal, sovereign communist parties, which adhere to common goals. The emergence of such an alliance would be a guarantee of our independence and stable development. A stable party requires a program expressing the common position of its members.

On the instruction of the February Conference of the Estonian Communist Party, the Central Committee formed a study group, whose membership included basically the communists speaking at the conference who attempted to find points of contiguity of the draft program documents that were discussed. The study group was given the task to develop a single draft program for a relatively centrist position, which would unite the communists of various nationalities trying to attain a democratic solution of the problems confronting our society. The group headed by Yak Soobik included Leonid Galkin, Yevgeniy Golikov, Boris Yulegin, Yuzef Lifshits, Nina Mikheyeva, Vladimir Myurk, Yaan Nappa, Endel Paap, Igor Poleshchuk, Yuri Raydla, Vladimir Skulachev, Sergey Smolyakov, Vyacheslav Suvorov, Eduard Tinn, and Eduard Cherevashko. The members of the study group proceeded not only from the programmatic documents presented at the conference and from additions introduced during their discussion in the rayons, but also took into account the materials published for the 28th CPSU Congress, first of all the progressive provisions of the platform of the CPSU Central Committee, as well as the "Democratic Platform in the CPSU." The study group proceeded from the fact that, during the composition of the new document, it is necessary, above all, to secure in it the presence of those principles that would make it possible to form the Estonian Communist Party in its new capacity as a party in which there are communists of diverse nationality, having excluded extremist-inclined circles. The Estonian Communist Party must offer its extremely radical variant for the way out of the crisis of Estonian society, assist in the creation of a new state status that is determined by the free will of the people of Estonia, and secure stability in international relations. The program for the reorganization of the Estonian Communist Party is not intended for a long period, it is aimed, above all, at the solution of the most immediate tasks which pursue society's way out of the crisis.

During the transition period, every party member decides, proceeding from what ideas of the political program and within the framework of what organizational structure he can act. During this period the operation of the CPSU Statute is not discontinued, which gives every present-day member of the party the right to make a choice, to find their position politically.

Of course, the personal political self-determination of every communist and the Estonian Communist Party as

a whole is the more difficult because it is taking place against the background of the stormy general political development.

The political life of Estonia is developing in the direction of a multi-party system. The formation of parties is now in the beginning stage, to a significant extent they arise on the basis of ideological constructions, and not on the ground of clearly realized political and economic interests of one social group or another. It is obvious, in the immediate future we will be witnesses of both the emergence of new movements and the unification and the division of existing ones; this will take place in proportion to how real interests will be formed. In this situation, the Estonian Communist Party will have to demonstrate through its practical activity that it is, unconditionally, a left-wing force, which represents the workers and their real interests.

In the daily political struggle, the Estonian Communist Party must dissociate itself from the right-wing forces which minimally take into consideration the principles of social justice. In so doing, cooperation is conceivable with the followers both of a liberal economic policy and free enterprise, but in questions of the well-being of the workers, social guarantees, and in regard to other similar questions, a clash of interests is in many respects inevitable.

In the leftist parties we see allies of the Estonian Communist Party that is undergoing renewal and we are ready for cooperation in regard to all questions that represent the common interest.

In inter-nationality relations, the Estonian Communist Party is searching for partners among the communist and workers' parties which have stood on the path of renewal, as well as among socialist, social-democratic and other forces.

During the period lying ahead, the Estonian Communist Party has two complicated tasks that are difficult to reconcile: The further dismantling of the present state-party administrative-command system and the building of a new Estonian Communist Party. The destructive and constructive principle require here a wise combination. Within the framework of the present-day Estonian Communist Party the opposition of forces is too great in order for it to be possible to continue the work successfully. For this reason, it is quite natural that the transformation of the Estonian Communist Party into a traditional political party will lead to dissociation and the detachment of formations which independently take part in political life. Today the future relations of the Estonian Communist Party with other groupings depend on the positions they will occupy. In so doing, the Estonian Communist Party, in questions of the independent statehood of Estonia and nationality stability remains in the fundamental position and does not see a possibility of concessions. At the same time, one should not exclude cooperation of various leftist left-centrist forces with the same tendencies, which, possibly, will

separate from the Estonian Communist Party. Here one needs to be flexible, and inter-party relation should not be unnecessarily dramatized.

In our view, the idea of the creation of a bloc of leftist forces deserves serious attention. Obviously, it will expedient, during the period of getting out of the economic crisis and the reorganization of the structure of the economy, to unite all the forces which oppose both barrack socialism and supreme power from the outside, monopoly in politics and in the economy, and social inequality. It is evident that, besides the Estonian Communist Party, there exist other political forces which believe that dependence on international big capital is no better than dependence on conservative central departments. This is also a goal which can unite.

In our ranks there are many honest people who prize the values common to all mankind and the principles of social justice for people. They are the future Estonian Communist Party. Our future is the young people, among whom the feeling of justice and the aspiration to freedom are developed. Together we will attain that the values will once again be honored which we, being the ruling party, buried—justice, freedom of creativity, and human rights. Proceeding from the new provisions, we must become firmly convinced of our daily acts. Self-purification, and not transformation into another party—this is the path of renewal of the Estonian Communist Party. History has shown that in a society, which has attained high efficiency and a high level of science and culture, humanistic values common to all mankind are becoming increasingly more disseminated. In this we see a new historical perspective for all left-wing forces, including for the renewed Estonian Communist Party.

Georgian Buro, Ministers Review Economic Situation

90US0632A Tbilisi ZARYA VOSTOKA in Russian
3 Feb 90 pp 1-2

[GRUZINFORM report: "The Fate of the Republic is in Our Hands"]

[Text] The past year of 1989 was filled with hopes and alarms, with confrontations and constructive dialogues. It was doubtless the most difficult year since the beginning of perestroika—difficult because the people ran head-on into a number of extremely pressing problems. The economic reform is proceeding with difficulty, amid great tension, and the social and political situation has worsened. Our republic experienced its first ever massive strikes, together with the heavy consequences and hitches in the economy that they entailed.

A joint, expanded session of the Buro of the Georgian Communist Party Central Committee and the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers was devoted to analyzing the economic situation that has taken shape in the past year and in the period of perestroika and to discussing urgent measures to stabilize the situation and to bring the republic's economy out of crisis.

Givi Gumbaridze, first secretary of the Georgian CP Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the Georgian SSR Supreme Soviet, opened the session.

Nodar Chitanava, chairman of the Georgian SSR Council of Ministers, Delivered a report.

Demur Dvalishvili, Georgian SSR minister of finance; Bakhva Lobzhanidze, chairman of the republic State Committee on Fuel and Energy; Bela Makashvili, Georgian SSR minister of light industry; Anatolii Kachmazov, chairman of the South Ossetian Oblast' Executive Committee; Lyudvig Gurtskaya, first vice-chairman of the republic State Agro-Industrial Committee; Damir Mandzhgaladze, chairman of the Georgian State Construction Committee's Industrial and Civil Construction Association; and Vazha Dzhindzhikhadze, Georgian SSR minister of trade, informed the session about the state of affairs in the branches under their jurisdiction and about ways of overcoming the lag.

Givi Gumbaridze summed up the results of the session.

V.I. Romanov, head of a sector of the CPSU Central Committee's Department of Party Construction and Personnel Work, participated in the work of the session.

In assessing the performance of the republic's economy in the past year, the speakers noted that the situation is improving extremely slowly. Not only was the republic unable, last year, to solve the unresolved problems inherited from the past, it also ran into additional difficulties caused by a whole series of unforeseen circumstances. They include not only natural catastrophes and immense losses of work time attributable to the increased level of activity in the republic's political life but also to the backlog of social problems.

Departing from the accustomed forms for the conduct of such events, the session took the form of a frank, constructive, at times impartial, but interested and honest dialogue. Time and again, the speakers had to respond to questions from both the Presidium and the hall. At times, the discussion got off the track. When one of the speakers gave far too much space to the work accomplished or went about looking for highly suspect "objective" causes, he was immediately reminded that more is required than just stating the problems—ways of solving them need also be found.

Here is an excerpt from Nodar Chitanava's report:

"The objective reality that has taken shape at present is a stern reminder that the republic's economy is experiencing a profound crisis, the likes of which it has doubtless not seen in its entire history. What are the sources and trends of this extremely unfavorable situation? An analysis of the economic complex's performance makes them clear. The increase in the volume of social production has slowed sharply, and its effectiveness and growth rate have dropped. This has resulted in a lag in the area of scientific and technical progress and that, in turn, has affected labor quality. Violations of

contractual discipline have become increasingly common. The situation that has taken shape in the agro-industrial complex is cause for great concern. Negative tendencies are on the rise in the investment area. Basic social problems are not being solved. They include the housing shortage and the lack of basic consumer goods. The republic's financial situation remains difficult, despite certain changes for the better."

The speaker backed his statements with figures and examples. In the period 1986-1989, the growth in produced national income amounted to 0.4 percent, instead of the 19.2 percent called for in the plan. In 1989 labor productivity showed a 0.4 percent drop in comparison with 1985, instead of the expected 16.4 percent rise. Material-intensiveness per unit of social product is growing, and economy measures are being neglected. Since the beginning of the five-year plan, the shortfall in output caused by violations of contractual discipline has amounted to 740 million rubles. The plan for state purchases of farm output has been fulfilled for just two of 11 basic products—wool and tea leaves. The scattering of funds across many projects is continuing in capital construction. At the same time, 645 million rubles in capital-investment money went unutilized. Last year alone, 388,000 square meters of housing failed to open to tenancy, including 126,800 sq. m. in Tbilisi. For the first three years of the five-year plan, profits were 895 million rubles below plan. True, 13 million rubles in above-plan profits were earned last year, but the overall situation remains unfavorable.

The speakers sometimes differed on a given subject, but one thought could be traced through all their remarks: The lessons that the republic has received have been instructive. But from time to time we still try to run the economy with directives—to make it a step-daughter of the organizational superstructure. But the dialectics of those relations are not as simple as some people might imagine. The economy functions according to objective laws. Whatever is at variance with those laws fails of its intended effect.

Excerpts from speeches by the participants in the session:

"In January, villages in various rayons received not a single liter of gasoline. How long can those villages be kept on starvation rations?"

"Strikes lead to no good. We pay lip service to the republic's economic independence, but where do we really stand on that question? People are tired of strikes and being idled. We need constant, businesslike contact with workers and farm employees; we need action, not appeals."

"People put their hopes in economic accountability. But insofar as economic accountability presupposes high rates of production and low expenditures, output quality will necessarily drop."

"Don't we draw on other people's experience too often and too readily in cases where speed and responsibility are what is needed? We need to be bolder and more resolute about acting on our own, counting on our own people and means. That's all the more important when there's a great goal ahead."

As the session proceeded, the expressions of alarm became increasingly distinct: The goal of economic independence was posed. But how to achieve it? The leadership's level of information and its interest in rectifying the situation are far from adequate today. A thoroughly substantiated and precisely coordinated plan of action is needed. What is most important of all today? Which measures should be carried out without delay?

An excerpt from Nodar Chitanava's report:

"We must complete the conclusion of delivery contracts in a very short time. Many enterprises do not have such contracts to this very day, however. In such conditions, there can be no serious talk of honoring one's contractual obligations. Questions of shifting to a more intensive-type production and strengthening discipline are in need of particular attention. As a result of last year's work-time losses, consumers and customers failed to receive more than 85 million rubles' worth of output. Transport—particularly rail transport—remains an urgent problem. Without a fundamental turnaround in that branch, it will also be impossible to effect changes in the functioning of the economy as a whole."

Rejoinder from the hall:

"Under perestroyka, the economy is taking on a social emphasis. The republic's social problems are continuing to worsen, however. The trade network is unable to provide even the bare necessities, and the cooperative movement is exacerbating the shortages and is causing justifiable dissatisfaction on the part of most honest working people."

The branch executives who spoke at the session had no easy time of it. Those present demanded a precise and concrete response to that rejoinder.

But what sort of response could there be if last year alone the retail-trade plan was underfulfilled by 165.7 million rubles and if the cooperative movement not only failed to fully satisfy the hopes we placed in it but has actually had a negative impact in a number of respects, and if the shadow economy conducts its shady business virtually in the open.

The fate of the republic is in our hands. That thought surfaced with increasing persistence in remarks from both the speaker's platform and the floor.

Excerpt from Givi Gumbaridze's speech:

"The Georgian CP Central Committee supports in every way possible the national movement that is forming in the republic. The consolidation of healthy national forces also enjoys all possible support. Today, when

fundamentally new directions in social life are forming on the waves of perestroyka, we see our task as one of devising, as events proceed, a unified joint strategy of action. In so doing, we will be jointly promoting a firm political foundation for a future Georgia. Each of us is aware of how complex the situation is and how easily it could worsen. Today, it's no longer enough to assess it correctly—we must act. Not emotions, but intelligence and goodwill must determine our actions and our every step."

Today, when perestroyka is entering the decisive phase, we must create the economic model that is most in keeping with our republic's real possibilities, with its traditions and culture. We will be committing a grave error before our future generations if we rely on theories and principles that are alien to us. Therefore, the consolidation of all healthy forces is needed today as never before. The time of changes that is now under way in the republic must be bolstered by positive processes in all walks of life.

Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum Held 21 February

Information Report

90US0647A Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 22 Feb 90 p 1

["Information Report on Kazakh CP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] The 19th Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee was held on 21 February. The following participated in its work: secretaries of party obkoms and chairmen of oblistpolkoms who are not members of the Central Committee, secretaries of the Alma-Ata Obkom, Gorkom and gorraykoms of the party, department heads at the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet and Kazakh SSR Council of Ministers, leaders of ministries and agencies in the republic, armed forces personnel, workers from the mass media, the higher party school and the apparatus of the Kazakh CP Central Committee.

The plenum examined the question "On the Draft Platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th Party Congress and Top Priority Tasks in Preparing for and Conducting the 27th Congress of the Kazakh CP and the Report-Election Campaign in the Republic Party Organization." N. A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party, gave a report on this question (The report is published in this issue).

The following participated in a discussion of the report: A. A. Kulibayev, first secretary of the Gurev Obkom; V. A. Dukhovnykh, senior smelter worker at the Ust-Kamenogorsk Titanium-Magnesium Combine, L. Ya. Chichenkova—secretary of the railroad junction party committee at the Semipalatinsk Station; Ye. F. Bashmakov, first secretary of the Karaganda Obkom; N. Sh.

Kabirov, deputy chairman of the Chimkent Oblispolkom; M. P. Dairov, second secretary of the Aktyubinsk Obkom; V. F. Shevchuk, driver crew leader at the Zhayrem Mining-Processing Combine in Dzhezkazgan Oblast; V. N. Gumenyuk, first secretary of the Borovskiy Raykom in Kustanay Oblast; Z. K. Nurkadilov, chairman of the Alma-Ata Gorispolkom; A. D. Borodin, first deputy minister of Kazakh SSR Public Education; V. G. Savchenko, first secretary of the Leninsk Gorkom, Kyzyl-Orda Oblast; A. M. Bogdanov, director of the Plant imeni V. V. Kuybyshev in Petropavlovsk; and Z. K. Kamalidenov, member of the armed forces.

The plenum passed a decree on this question.

The plenum examined organizational questions.

The plenum approved Kh. Sh. Takuov as chairman of the Party Control Commission at the Kazakh CP Central Committee and V. N. Shepel as head of the General Department of the Kazakh CP Central Committee.

G. A. Shipilov, sector head at the Party Building and Cadre Policy Department, CPSU Central Committee.

Nazarbayev Speech

90US0647B *Alma-Ata KAZAKHSTANSKAYA PRAVDA*
in Russian 22 Feb 90 p 1

[Report by N. A. Nazarbayev, first secretary of the Kazakh CP Central Committee, to the Plenum of the Kazakh CP Central Committee]

[Text] Comrades! The February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee was held in a difficult time for the country. Dissatisfaction with the course, pace and results of perestroika has become especially acute. The country is encountering a real danger of political instability and increasing conflicts between nationalities in many regions. These negative tendencies, deepened by tensions in the consumer goods market, the growth in crime and reductions in labor and production discipline pose the question: Is the CPSU capable of carrying out its vanguard role in deeds, not just in words, and of remaining a consolidating factor for all healthy forces in society?

The answer to this was given at the plenum by an open, fundamental discussion, permeated by general concern about the fate of the party and perestroika. The draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, based upon a critical analysis of the situation, has become a radical program document, marking a sharp turn in the history of the party and specifying a precise orientation towards a way out of the political, social and economic crisis.

I will say it directly: This document had a difficult birth. There was not a vestige of that good will, level headedness and exemplary unity that we have been so proud of in the past. However, the discord that splashed about and the openly manifested different trends of thought in approaches to solving problems are the best reflection of

the reality of the democratization of party life, of a new understanding of democratic centralism appropriate to perestroika.

Another characteristic feature of the plenum is that all its participants, in spite of the pluralism in their views, agreed on the main point—the need for decisive measures capable of putting the party in the vanguard of complex and multifaceted processes under way in our social organism and in their desire to stabilize the situation in the country. I want to especially stress that the discussion was not about forceful methods, “tightening the screws”, but about finding methods adequate to contemporary ideas of genuine socialism—humane and democratic.

This is why the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee gave top priority to a critical analysis of the situation in the party itself, clearly and unambiguously expressing its displeasure with the authoritarian bureaucratic system and the party-state form of power. The basic directions for party policy embodied in the draft to the pre-congress platform foresee a radical reform of the CPSU, the thorough democratization of party life and the transition to methods of political leadership.

Today, when discussing the tasks of the republic party organization in preparing for and conducting the 17th Kazakh CP Congress and the forthcoming report-election campaign, we should primarily concentrate attention upon these root questions in party renewal.

The Central Committee Bureau is starting from the fact that the rapidly changing conditions of public life in which it now has to work require fundamentally different, nontraditional forms of party activity. The party rejected a political monopoly and the constitutional guarantee of its special role in the country's political system. It expressed its readiness to exercise leadership through specific actions. In this regard it is quite obvious that the following party committee functions should be given top priority:

A program function, including the development of new ideas and concepts supported by the people;

A political function, realized through the election campaign struggle for the mandate of trust from voters, who are to elect members of the party and its adherents to organs of soviet power;

An organizational function, assuring the smooth operation of all levels of the party;

An ideological function, directed towards defending party positions and views under conditions of political pluralism and towards a critique of non-Marxist concepts of social development.

This is not the first time these priorities have been discussed. However, their practical realization is taking place very slowly and clearly lags behind the stormy politicalization of the masses. This is the basic reason

why the party, which initiated and articulated perestroika, gradually began to lose the vanguard position and initiative to its political opponents.

It cannot be denied that the basis for this inertia is the antidemocratic principles of intraparty life that have been cultivated for decades. The party itself essentially became hostage to an administrative-bureaucratic system that led to a hypertrophic statism, distorted the essence and intention of party organs' work, conferring on them the right to order all and everything and to usurp power literally from all spheres of society.

There is good reason for saying that habit is second nature. Having learned to believe in the strength of directives, many party committees still cannot focus themselves upon political methods of problem solving. They continue to persistently interfere in economic questions and in the affairs of soviets and attempt to unceremoniously dictate their will to public organizations.

Take, for example, the work of the Aktyubinsk Obkom. Judging from meeting agendas, economic questions are at the center of attention. The same approach is maintained at the Buro of the Pavlodar Obkom. Last year one-third of the questions it examined were within the direct competence of soviet and economic organs and had nothing in common with specific party duties. At the same time, the inability and lack of desire to work through communists elected to the soviets of people's deputies and through organizational sessions of the oblast soviet created a negative reaction among working people in the city.

Similar examples could be cited endlessly. Unfortunately, they are found in abundance in all oblast party organs in the republic.

Of course, there are no ready schemes for new relationships. They are worked out in practice. The problem today is to actively engage in this work and not to sit in the trenches, hoping that something will succeed and that everything will return to its old ways. Attempts to revive the old methods mean to consciously remove the party from its vanguard positions and to put it into a situation that is politically very unpopular and disadvantageous. Political realities present the party with a specific task—creating, in all state, economic and social structures, a reliable foothold of party members who are well organized and are working within the framework of Soviet laws.

The main direction for party renewal in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform is the democratization of intraparty life. We have to break up bureaucratic supercentralization and convert all levels of the party to self-management. Fundamentally important here are: the new status of union republic communist parties within the framework of a unified, multinationality CPSU, considerably expanding the participation of republic party organizations in solving vitally important

general party questions, compiling program documents, solving organizational, cadre and financial problems and developing interparty ties.

Together with its extensive rights, the new status of the republic communist party gives us considerable responsibilities, including political ones. In particular, there is the question of the Kazakh CP Central Committee writing its own platform.

In order to make this completely clear, I will say that in the opinion of the Central Committee Buro, the Kazakh Communist Party, devoted to the ideals and traditions of the Leninist party, and standing with it on common political, ideological and organizational positions and on the main strategic points, has no differences with the CPSU Central Committee platform. Our platform should give communists and all working people in the republic a clear picture of the prospects for perestroika in Kazakhstan and explain specific approaches to solving vital national-historical, social, cultural and economic problems.

If Central Committee members agree with this, then they should entrust Central Committee commissions to work on a draft platform so that at the next plenum, which is to be held in March, it can be examined and put up for general public discussion during preparations for the 17th Congress of the Kazakh Communist Party.

Continuing my thoughts about the pressing need to democratize intraparty life, I want to stress that primary party organizations should be given a central place in this work. It is no secret that the most chronic and dangerous "disease" of the party is the passivity and inertia of most of its members. It is now totally clear that we cannot make communists active if we do not maximally expand the rights of primary party organizations, which, incidentally, in some places are doing this on their own.

A study of the fruitful activity of individual party committees shows that the main factor of their successful work is close contact with lower level party units. This is why the Buro of the Kazakh CP Central Committee supported the discussion on the role and place of primary party organizations that has been taking place in the republic and decided to bring it up at the republic meeting with secretaries of primary organizations to be held on 2-3 March.

One of the many pressing problems I want to discuss is the creation of a republic council of secretaries of primary party organizations as an independent horizontal structure expressing the will and interests of the underlying cells of the party. Such a council could participate in the work of leading organs of the Kazakh Communist Party, provide alternative suggestions and documents and make co-reports. In other words, it could really implement the program for expanding the rights and independence of primary organizations set forth in the draft of the CPSU Central Committee platform.

If one looks at the actual situation it is easy to see that our declarations that primary organizations are the basis of the party and are direct participants in preparing decisions of congresses and plena are only empty talk. Proof of this is simply that our Central Committee has only two secretaries of primary party organizations. How can one talk about participation? Isn't it here that one can find the reasons for the gap between the Central Committee and the party "lower ranks?"

Primary party organizations should become a decisive force in the renewal of the party and in defending workers' interests. They must have their own specific program of action. They must be given complete freedom in admitting and expelling members, in selecting organizational structure, in setting the procedures and frequency of party meetings and in using part of the members' dues for their own needs. This will be timely and just.

At the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee and at the meeting of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev with first secretaries of party gorkoms, raykoms and primary party organizations—participants of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum—the opinion was expressed that it was necessary to conduct a vigorous report-election campaign prior to the 28th CPSU Congress. Some participants in the meeting and the plenum had a different suggestion—put off reports and elections in the party for the post-congress period. The Kazakh CP Central Committee also receives similar suggestions, with various reasons, from communists in the republic.

After having carefully weighed all "fors" and "against", the Central Committee Buro considers it advisable to have a report-election campaign on the eve of the 28th Congress. Why did we make this decision?

First of all, it is difficult to conduct a constructive discussion at the highest party forum if there is not a collective opinion and it is not enriched with suggestions from republic communists on the pressing problems of party life. These can be revealed only during report-election meetings, conferences and the Congress of the Kazakh Communist Party.

Secondly, and most importantly, the political situation in the republic and in the country as a whole has become so dynamic that the slightest lagging behind the processes taking place inevitably leads to the loss of initiative. The reformation of party organization activities and structural changes in the party apparatus cannot be put off until the end of the year. Now that we have in our hands the draft of a militant, offensive oriented program we cannot delay in its practical realization. Otherwise everything will go to pot and stay in the old ruts.

Therefore, the Central Committee Buro presents for your examination a suggestion to conduct the report-election meetings and conferences in February-March, rayon and city party conferences in March-April and

oblast conferences in April-May. It is suggested to hold the 17th Congress of the Kazakh Communist Party on 7 June of this year.

As you can see, time is very limited. Moreover, the report-election campaign in the party coincides with elections for Kazakh SSR people's deputies and the first organizational session of the republic Supreme Soviet. Party committees' work load will increase many fold. However, we must stand up under it, as the current political situation leaves us no other way.

Where should we focus our attention during the reports and elections?

First of all, it is necessary to investigate the reasons for the reduction in the authority of each specific electoral organ and party organization and to determine the degree of responsibility on the part of each party worker and communist. Such a principled and, I would say, strict discussion is very necessary. Without having in mind the concept "party purge" which became discredited during the years of repression, I nevertheless want to stress that CPSU members should not close their eyes to the passive, unprincipled position of those who only carry a party card in their pocket and who compromise the high calling of communists by taking up chauvinistic or nationalistic positions and who wink at various types of antisocialist elements. The situation in the party makes it necessary for us to separate ourselves ideologically and organizationally from these so-called "comrades", whose activities have long ago placed them outside the framework of the CPSU Charter.

It is fitting to recall V. I. Lenin's words that the party is a voluntary union that would inevitably fall apart, first ideologically, then materially, if it did not purge itself of members advocating anti-party views.

The second major task of the report-election campaign is to draw not only communists, but also non-party people into the discussion of the most urgent problems. The latter's participation in meetings and conferences would be very desirable. This especially means those who are constantly expressing dissatisfaction in labor collectives, raising questions at meetings. They are a basis for justifiable criticism of party organizations. It is very important to honestly name the reasons for these problems and attempt to find constructive approaches to their solution.

The new role for the CPSU also makes new demands upon the mechanism for forming its leading elected organs. It is necessary to put an end to the harmful practice of selecting members primarily on the basis of their official position. During reports and elections it is necessary to give communists the possibility of delegating to elected organs those whom they really trust—active fighters for perestroika, progressive workers and peasants enjoying high authority in their labor collectives and having serious political experience.

The Central Committee Buro thinks that this will become reality only if each communist and each primary party organization obtains the right to participate in the formation of elected organs at all levels, without exception. This right must be given to them so that they can not only nominate, but also elect delegates to oblast conferences and congresses by direct and secret ballot with more than one candidate. Elections to congresses could be on a territorial basis with single seat and multiseat electoral districts based upon rayon and city (without rayon divisions) party organizations.

Elections of delegates could be conducted directly in those primary party organizations where the number of CPSU members coincides with or exceeds the quota for representation.

You have been given a more detailed explanation of the Central Committee Buro's suggestions regarding this. I ask you to become acquainted with it and give your opinion. Possibly, other alternatives will arise during discussions. In general, this plan gives oblast party organizations full freedom. It is important to observe one condition—the elections should have more than one candidate and be secret and direct.

There should also be substantial reforms in the mechanism for forming party committees. The existing procedure for electing members and secretaries to raykoms, gorkoms, obkoms and the Central Committee are especially unpopular among rank and file communists. Party meetings, conferences and congresses should extensively discuss the question of direct election of secretaries. As concerns party committee members, in our view it would be proper if, in accordance with the set quota, raykom and gorkom members were elected directly by primary party organizations; obkom members by rayon and city organizations, and Kazakh CP Central Committee members by oblast conferences with subsequent approval of their authority by delegates of the appropriate conference or congress.

This nominating and electing procedure will probably put an end to the practice of forming party committees based upon people's official positions, increase the responsibility of elected officials to their party organizations and assure the supremacy of the elected organ over the apparatus.

The CPSU Central Committee draft platform forces us to think about the role of party control organs. As you know, in accordance with the 19th All-Union Party Conference and the decisions of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, an experiment is under way in the Alma-Ata Oblast party organization. Four control-review commissions have been formed in the four raykoms of the Alma-Ata Gorkom and Obkom. This is their second year of operation and they have already acquired experience. The Central Committee is receiving numerous suggestions about how to more effectively use the former commissions. There are also suggestions to retain the existing Review Commission of

the Kazakh Communist Party and the Party Control Commission at the central committee, giving the latter broader rights, including that of making final decisions on party penalties and readmitting people to the party. This would create duplication in the leadership of party organs. I think that plenum participants will give their opinion on this.

We receive many letters from communists who, with all justification, ask about eliminating the multilevel structure of party organizations and their apparatuses. However, there are various specific approaches to this problem. Some advise eliminating gorkoms in oblast centers that have rayon party organizations. Others ask to leave the gorkom, but to close down the raykoms. It hardly makes sense to advocate simply one position. After all, different regions have different conditions. Therefore, it is more reasonable to have a differentiated approach to choosing alternatives, taking into account specific circumstances and the opinions of communists and primary party organizations.

With regard to the apparatus of party organizations, as you know, the CPSU Central Committee draft platform affirms the vital need for the normal operation of any party committee. However, this same document also points that the apparatus should be strictly subordinated to the elected organ, have an optimal number of members, an improved structure and regularly renew its membership. Meeting these requirements requires much work.

Again, I will not dwell on the specifics of this question because there cannot be a single, universal scheme. Each obkom and raykom should approach this in a balanced and creative manner, taking advice from communists and active party members. It is also important that the party be self-supporting. This applies to party committees at all levels.

At the same time it would be mistaken to put primary importance upon the quantitative aspects. Today it is much more important to pay attention to the qualitative composition of apparatus workers. They are acutely in need of intellectual reinforcements capable of assuming leadership over public initiative and of directing it into constructive channels. The time is gone forever when the apparatus would serve as a voiceless executor, always ready to zealously carry out any command, but not able to defend its own opinion and convince others.

In concluding this theme I would like to touch upon, with complete clarity, a "painful" question to many. In the final account, party workers are also people and, like all people, nothing human is alien to them. When there is talk about radical changes in party life, everybody probably thinks of them in terms of his own fate, about what troubles await them in the immediate future. One can understand this.

I will say it outright—there are reasons for such thoughts. Any kind of cadre change is a painful process. In this case, if the suggested system for forming elected

party organs is approved, we have to be ready for very many to be deprived of their customary seats, which they obtained because of their other positions. There is nothing that can be done about this. However, having stated this bitter truth, I have to pose the question: Can we communists judge events only on the basis of personal interests? When it involves the future of the party, the country and perestroyka, can we be concerned about protecting personal welfare? I am confident that the answer is obvious to each of you. This says all. However, this does not mean that we should not be concerned about finding work for those released and treat them in a party manner, with comradely attention.

The local situation forces us to take a new approach to the report-election campaign and to organizing party work in the pre-congress period. It is very inauspicious. People are increasingly dissatisfied with the loss of momentum in socioeconomic development and the ensuing deterioration of their living standards.

A shortage of goods in daily demand, disorders in money circulation, inflation, labor conflicts and strikes have become reality. Immediate, energetic and efficient work is necessary to stabilise the situation.

A general evaluation of preliminary results for the current five-year plan and a comparison with the previous period easily convinces one that our situation is not so bad. The growth rate for the output of Group B products was one and a half times that of Group S (23 and 15 percent respectively). The production of consumer goods increased 1.4 fold and that of services 1.7.

Taking into account all financing sources, 32.2 million square meters of housing were built. This is 1.1 million meters more than in the 11th Five-Year Plan. More than 3 million people improved their housing conditions. More schools, preschool institutions, hospitals and outpatient clinics were built.

The consumption of meat and milk per person increased. Nevertheless, the economy's possibilities have not been realized. The growth in national income over the 4 year period was lower than intended. There is also a tendency towards declining growth rates in industrial production.

Twelve oblasts did not reach planned purchases of meat, eight did not reach them for milk and the republic failed to make the plan for grain procurement. The situation in the agrarian sector was discussed in detail at the conference of agricultural workers that adjourned a few days ago. Therefore, I do not think it necessary to dwell on this again.

The entire growth in capital investments utilized went to increasing the amount of unfinished construction. This sector has not introduced most projects ordered by the state nor has there been any increase in physical output.

There are many problems with the Housing-91 program. The most unsatisfactory situation is in Chimkent Oblast, where the line advanced by 48 percent, in Kzyl-Orda

Oblast it advanced 49 percent, in Aktyubinsk and Karaganda oblasts—52 percent and in East Kazakhstan Oblast it advanced 54 percent.

Several obkoms and oblispolkoms underestimate the importance of cooperative and individually built housing. They tolerate disruptions in construction plans and do not give the necessary support to cooperative and individual housing construction projects. Such practices should be decisively condemned and each such case given a sharp political evaluation.

As is stressed in the draft platform and in materials from the CPSU Central Committee February Plenum, increases in consumer goods production remain at the center of attention.

Today many goods in daily demand have disappeared from the store shelves and have become chronically scarce. There is increased speculation in them, something that increases social tensions and causes righteous indignation among workers. The measures taken are not giving the needed results. The amount of consumer goods per inhabitant of the republic is less than half the countrywide average and one-fourth that of the Baltic republics. In spite of this many economic managers, labor collectives party and soviet organs are not well engaged in questions of consumer good production.

How can one talk about party influence in Dzhezkazgan Oblast, where only 32 kopecks of consumer goods were produced per ruble of workers' and employees earnings! In Pavlodar Oblast the figure was 48 kopecks and in Kzyl-Orda Oblast it was 53 kopecks.

Today more than 20,000 types of consumer goods, including the simplest, are hauled in from outside the republic. This is 6 billion rubles' worth, or 40 percent of market stocks. At the same time targets for constructing consumer goods manufacturing facilities are not met. Only 7 out of 41 projects that were the subject of a special decree by the Kazakh CP Central Committee and the republic council of ministers were introduced. Under various pretexts the introduction of those remaining was put off for the 13th Five-Year Plan. One hundred fifteen modules at 30 projects have not been started at all. The situation is especially unsatisfactory in Karaganda, Kustanay and Uralsk oblasts. Nevertheless, no communists have been made to answer for this.

It is necessary to concentrate efforts on the reconstruction and technical reequipment of existing production capacity and to build specialist shops and affiliates to produce consumer goods at enterprises not specialized in them. There should be a general activation of conversion in the defense industries able to produce complex household products. There must also be an unwavering increase in the responsibility of communists and leaders of local economic organs in seeing that the markets of the simplest consumer goods are saturated.

There are still acute problems with imbalances in the consumer goods markets, the deterioration of the financial situation, monetary incomes continue to outpace consumption and monthly earnings are increasing faster than labor productivity. In 1989 the population's monetary incomes increased by 30 percent compared to 1985, wages and salaries increased by 31 percent. Expenditures increases by 28 percent, and expenditures for goods by only 21.2 percent. The public's unmet demand grew 2.1 fold, and unspent income increased 1.7 fold, almost the same factor as increases in the money supply. Last year alone it increased by more than a third.

Industrial production increased by only 17.3 percent in 4 years, agricultural production 12 percent and retail trade 18 percent. This makes clear the alarming condition of the republic's economy. It is necessary to put a halt to the increase in unearned money and the issuing of money in excess of available goods. Advocating the maximum use of reserves for the production of consumer goods, growth in the production of Group B goods and in services, there must be broader use of bonds, stocks and other commercial paper for housing sales to the public, stock trade in goods in high demand, layaway payments for future durables and to use other nontraditional forms of tying up "hot" money. It is necessary to support and help cooperatives directed towards producing consumer goods and services.

If, in the near future, we do not succeed in filling the consumer goods market with goods and services and in stabilizing the money supply, then the consequences for the Kazakh economy and its deformed structure, with its high capital intensiveness will be very serious and solutions to the crisis will be prolonged and difficult.

This is a broad field of activity for the Kazakh SSR Supreme Soviet, the republic council of ministers and newly formed local soviets, especially their executive organs. Using the communists working at them, party committees must actively influence the situation.

The work results in 1990 will be very important in implementing the programs for improving the health of the economy and financial system and in solving social problems. The targets for the extraction of petroleum for the production of mineral fertilizer, cement, bricks, precast ferroconcrete items and furniture were not fulfilled. There were declines in the production of various types of products and many consumer goods.

In spite of the reduction in annual plans for centrally financed capital investments and construction-installation work, the actual amount of work performed is less than during last January. Over the month only 6.5 percent of the annual volume of housing was introduced, in Karaganda, Aktyubinsk and Dzhambul oblasts this figure ranged from 2.3 to 3.7 percent.

The January plan for freight haulage on the railroads as also not met. Freight volume declined.

It is no exaggeration to say that the present situation is not comforting. Some party organization secretaries still continue to act like the directors of cities and rayons, assuming the burden of economic worries and forgetting about the political evaluation of failures. Others have viewed their loss of full powers in the economy as release from responsibilities and have assumed the role of recorders of events. They do not use party and political influence on management cadre in soviet and economic organs.

Losing no time, each oblast must determine priority directions and concentrate efforts on them. Special attention should be given to control over the fulfillment of state orders and contractual obligations for product deliveries, targets for consumer goods production and the organization of services, the introduction of housing and social service facilities, and improvements in food supplies.

The implementation of radical economic reforms is inextricably linked to a full rejection of the command-pressure form of management and to the transition to a planned market economy. Diverse forms of property, from state and cooperative to labor and individual, are now becoming normal. All this is in pursuit of the main goal—overcoming workers' alienation from the means of production and the land.

There must be a decisive change in the abnormal situation where enterprises, sovkhozes and construction trusts are converted to full cost accounting and self-financing, but there is not a trace of economic relations at shops, brigades and sections; command from "above" and leveling still blossom here. There must be a bolder approach to leasing production operations and entire enterprises to labor collectives and converting them to share and stock ownership. These questions await the most decisive actions from renewed local soviets.

I think that nobody has any illusions that preparations for the congresses of the CPSU and the Kazakh Communist Party will take place in an easy ideological environment. Every day there is increasing pressure from extremist elements and groups which, incidentally, are very capable of using the weight of current problems and the aggravated socioeconomic situation. It is no secret that even today some communists, not to speak of people who are not party members, are succumbing to destructive influences. Giving his evaluation of this, M. S. Gorbachev noted from the podium at the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee: "There are definite signs of confusion, defeatist and liquidationist attitudes. This is no lesser danger for the party and for the entire society."

It would be ridiculous and naive to assume that we have nothing with which to counteract this, although some of those "philosophers" with radical attitudes towards Marxism-Leninism are not opposed to making judgments about the supposed "crisis" of party ideology. If one wants to use this word seriously, then one should not

talk about a crisis of the ideology itself, but a crisis in ideology. We must ponder this.

First of all, party committees are only very slowly democratizing ideological work. Dogmatism still blooms. It lends a more winning appearance to unscientific speeches and writings by some populists who are hostile to the party. These are often grossly garbled, and, in compensation, are unusual in their form and polemical incandescence. In this regard it becomes comprehensible why, possessing such a powerful propaganda apparatus, we still are not able to gain an adequate advantage in the efficiency of ideological influence upon people. We conduct many meetings, political formations and exercises in the system of political and economic training, lectures, discussions and other such various measures. Is it really necessary to have so many? Perhaps the Leninist slogan "Better Fewer but Better" would be very fitting here.

Furthermore, it is no secret that most communists are not able to conduct a well argued dialogue on pressing questions. They lose out in discussions with all sorts of "well grounded" demagogues. This is becoming one of the most important ideological problems. However, where does one learn the difficult skills of political disputation? At first glance, we should not have any such difficulties. There is the higher party school, the house for political education, courses at obkoms, and finally, the powerful Institute for Party History. Who of our opponents has even one-hundredth of this ideological potential? However, we are not getting the necessary returns from it.

I especially want to say something about mass political work. Like a drop of water, it reflects the crisis of the present ideological forms. This is convincingly proven by the study of political work of party committees in Alma-Ata Oblast during the election campaign. Almost 80 percent of the communists asked gave a negative answer to the question: "Have there been changes in the methods of political activity in your party organization?" Is there any reason to be surprised that because it is not able to realize itself within the framework of the present ideological structures, the growing political activity of the masses is oriented towards spontaneous politicalized organizations? Some party committees cannot find the proper tone for dealing with them. Instead of a quiet dialogue they are always deflected into a harsh ideological struggle.

There is the special question of elections. We note with satisfaction that recently the public has become considerably more active in the electoral process. However, party committees, to say nothing of ideological institutes, are not responsible for this. They still do not have an exact understanding of the situation and people's attitude. Nor do they have the ability to find the proper solution to each specific situation. In other words, there is not enough political savvy, a very important quality.

Isn't this why some electoral districts in Alma-Ata, Pavlodar and Kustanay oblasts are seething with fear and concern about voters' opposition to local party and soviet organs? We should admit that there are imperfections in the Law on Election of Kazakh SSR People's Deputies. I have in mind Article 35 on pre-election conferences of voters.

Today we should admit that in many oblasts there are not precisely planned tactics for the election campaign. Some party workers are afraid to meet with the public where they live or to get into an open discussion on television or in the press. Representatives of the working class and rank and file kolkhoz farmers are not receiving the help they need. Groups to assist them have not been formed everywhere. In many electoral districts the public does not know its candidates or how their campaign platforms differ. It is asked where our numerous active agitators are, where the public-political centers are, even though there are hundreds of them.

At present, when the election campaign is entering a decisive phase, party committees must fight for their candidates and more completely utilize the broad possibilities of propaganda and agitation to support them.

Democratization and glasnost have brought to life new forms of social activism that require studying public opinion at a completely different level. The Central Committee Buro decided that it was necessary to set up, at party committees, a unified system of staff sociological services headed by the Kazakh CP Central Committee's Center for the Sociology of Political Processes. I think that without this it will be difficult for us to have effective political methods of work. I hope that the Central Committee Plenum will support this undertaking.

Party committees should direct the mass media to emphasize the pre-congress period. We are satisfied to note the big positive changes in their work that have taken place in recent years. Television and radio and republic, oblast and rayon newspapers have started to much more accurately cover subjects of importance to the public and to more deeply "dig" into problems of concern to people. The competence of editorial boards has increased considerably. Naturally, the public has an increased interest in the press. Since the price of words broadcast into the ether or printed in newspaper columns is immeasurably higher than it was a year or two ago, the responsibility for the consequences of any publication have become much more serious. In addition, I will say that we cannot escape "flaws" in the "fields" of journalism.

For example, under the guise of pluralism, LENINSKAYA SMENA published a letter from one Zhukov, who argued for Russian autonomy on the right bank of the Irtysh River. It is hard to believe that O. Yu. Nikanov, the editor of this respected newspaper for

young people, could not see the provocative nature of this remark, which was charged with considerable tension between nationalities.

I am far from thinking that at some time errors will disappear entirely. A journalist who is cautious is no longer a journalist, especially if he is engaged in a difficult and not always thankful task such as rooting out evils that have become rooted in society. However, chance is one thing, but quite another is intentional, so to speak programmed supercharging, of political passions. I will definitely say that in this latter case it is not worth relying upon any condescension to, let alone understanding towards, any editor on our part.

The present social tension determines all strategy and tactics in ideological work. Here, in our view, it is necessary to distinguish several fundamental factors.

In every party organization, labor collective and educational institution it is essential to determine precise, differentiated measures for ideologically influencing various social and professional groups. There should be maximum intensification of party influence where people live. It would be advisable to have centers for leisure and political information and ideological consultation points in all microrayons.

Perestroika in mass political work must begin with the training of those who directly carry it out with the masses. The party worker should be a noted figure at any meeting, display erudition, competence and ability to intelligibly talk to people.

Ideological work in youth environments should be turned into something special, vital and attractive, appropriate to the temperament of young people. We have still not recognized the very heavy political pressure upon young people today, how difficult it is for them to understand the flow of contradictory and frequently provocative information. This gives rise to nihilism, selfish opposition and the bravado of radical extremist slogans. Some people complain that contemporary young men and women do not want to listen to anybody, that they live in their own heads. It is not like this at all. At the Palace of Culture of the AKhBK [Not further identified] my meeting with young people of Alma-Ata lasted for 6 hours nonstop. It could have lasted until morning, so great was the audience's interest in an open, honest discussion.

In no case should we permit our children to be blind tools in the hands of separatists and political extremists of all shades. They should not sacrifice their fates to the deeply mercenary ambitions of such people. Therefore, no matter what, we must find a path to the hearts and reason of the younger generation and not leave it without support in this difficult period in the life of society.

The draft plan of the CPSU Central Committee's platform stresses that the future of perestroika and of our country depends to a great extent upon what happens in relations between nationalities. I think it is clear to

everyone that, if the peaceful, secure and good neighboring situation in which millions of people in Kazakhstan live and work is disrupted, then there can be no thought of any improvement in the economy or in public welfare. All our efforts in this area will go to pot and our concerns will not be about how to get shoes, clothes and food for people, but about how to extinguish the fires of hatred between nationalities.

This is why every day and every hour we have to be aware of all nationalities problems, large or small, and constantly have our hand on the pulse of relations between nationalities. This is all the more important because everything is not peaceful in our fraternal republics, as you well know. We should decisively reject both the "emissaries" who are not in accord with the peaceful life of our republic and our own "home grown" extremists, who think that with the democratization of society everything is permitted, including the disruption of our unity between nationalities.

Although I have said it many times, I do not think it excessive to repeat it: Genuine internationalism is proven only by concern for another people, for its needs and expectations. No appeals to national self-consciousness can justify putting one nationality ahead of others. Any national goals and aspirations, even those that seem the most righteous can be distorted by nationalism, if the methods of attaining them harm the interests of neighboring peoples.

The Kazakh CP Central Committee stands and will solidly stand for internationalism, and decisively advocates the equal rights of all nationalities and peoples in the republic. I want this approach to be an unalterable rule in our daily work with people.

Comrades, the draft to the Platform of the CPSU Central Committee has given the party and each communist a deep understanding of the essentials of the present political situation, and provided a new and better orientation for perestroika. It is now important to immediately expand political work in explaining the ideas in this program and to fully utilize our ideological potential.

I am confident that members of the Central Committee, who are accountable to the republic's communists, will set an example of active agitation of the masses that will be worthy of imitation. A great contribution to this task could and should be made by candidates for Kazakh SSR people's deputy in their numerous meetings with voters.

The decisions of the February Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee give a real chance of restoring the party's authority, strengthening the people's trust in it, and imbue people with confidence that, in spite of all the difficulties during the transition period, the ship of perestroika is on the correct course. We should not let this chance escape.

**Party Must Return to Traditions of Past, Says
Kazakh Commentator***18320028B*

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh of 2 Mar 90 carries on page 3 a 4000-word article by Oralkhan Bokeyev entitled "As For the Party." The article seeks to explain the party's loss of influence among the people and to propose a change of attitude and of approach if the party is to recover its authority. The problem, Bokeyev makes clear, is that from the early days of the revolution on the well-rounded and practical idealists of the past gave way before the rigid, the politically and socially illiterate, the paper-pushing

authoritarian bureaucrat, espousing a dead ideology (— paper-short Kazakhstan would be well supplied if it only had all that paper used to print the manifold ideological collections of former days—), with the result that not only have the Soviet people lost faith in the party, but the people of the world as well. To change this situation, Bokeyev emphasizes, and for the party to function in the new era of democracy and pluralism, the rigidity and aggressiveness of the past must be put aside and a new, well-rounded party officer in touch with his times, and with the people (bilingual in Kazakhstan) must be recruited and put in charge of developments. Otherwise, he states indirectly, the party may soon itself be relegated to the dust bin of history.

Belorussian Deputies Protest Claims On Lithuanian Territory

90P50008A

[Editorial Report] Vilnius EKHO LITVY in Russian on 12 April 1990 carries on page 3 a 100-word report stating that a group of newly elected deputies to the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet has sent a telegram to the president of the USSR in which they protest "the policy of exerting pressure upon Lithuania" and territorial claims upon Lithuania made in the name of the presidium of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet.

The deputies support "dialogue" and "mutual understanding" as the means to resolving current problems.

The telegram was signed by 18 deputies.

Stormy Belorussian Front Meeting Described

90UN1283A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 22 Feb 90 p 1

[Article by V. Zagorelskiy, UM-87 bulldozer operator at Construction Trust No. 21, Borisov: "Whom Do You Intend to Attack"?]

[Text] The other day, for the first time in my recollection, a political rally, organized by the Belorussian National Front (BNF), was held in our city of Borisov. I went to the rally: I wanted to understand what was still troubling the Belorussian National Front.

Many people had gathered there. Even A. Bondar, the first secretary of the Borisov Communist Party gorkom, and P. Petukh, the chairman of the gorispolkom attended. But when A. Bondar began to speak, those at the rally actually did not allow him to speak: they whistled, shouted, and stamped their feet. They listened more attentively to the speeches of the candidates for Belorussian SSR people's deputies. But among the schemers there were many voices demanding M.S. Gorbachev's resignation and there were attacks against the Party and demands of very different persuasion.

One can understand the people: they are tired of empty shelves in the grocery stores, the lack of necessary commodities, and unfulfilled promises... However, there were also plenty of irresponsible statements by the speakers from the BNF. I tried to object, I said that M. Gorbachev is the initiator of perestroika, he courageously undertook the dismantling of the command administrative system, and thanks to him glasnost has made its appearance and the democratization of society is under way. I remarked, by the way, that the people at the rally were dressed much better than during the "stagnant" period. And at this point shouts and whistling were heard again.

There's a fine example of pluralism for you.

Since I was not allowed to finish speaking at the rally, I want to do it through the newspaper. And I want to ask the participants in the rally a few questions.

First. Proceeding from the speeches that were heard, it appears that it is impossible for the Belorussian people to live a good life as part of the USSR. Why?

Second. A number of the speakers stated that if "life does not improve" within the next few days, they will assume the offensive. Against whom? And what might be the result of this "offensive"? More bloodshed? Are not NKAO, Baku, and Dushanbe enough for us?...

Our most complex problems cannot be solved in one stroke. It requires time, the consolidation of all forces, and persistent teamwork—then there will be plenty. A strict inventory and control over the distribution of the available resources in the republic is needed. Let the BNF go ahead and participate in this and help to expose profiteers, sycophants, and bootlickers. This would benefit perestroika.

Central Asian Muslim Chairman on Perestroika, People's Deputies

90US0602A Moscow OGONEK in Russian No 6, 3-10 Feb 90 pp 12-13

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy Mufti Mukhammad-Yusuf Mukhammad-Sodik, chairman of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, by OGONEK correspondent Alim Mirsayev: "Let Us Hear One Another Out"; for an interview with Mufti Mukhammad-Sodik on Islam and nationality issues, see pages 49-52 of JPRS series SOVIET UNION: POLITICAL AFFAIRS, JPRS-UPA-90-009, 23 Feb 90]

[Text] Mufti Mukhammad-Sodik, age 37, a native of Andizhan, was born in Bulagbasha, where his father was an imam in the mosque. After graduating from the Mir-Arab Medrese in Bukhara, the Islamic Institute imeni Imam of Bukhara in Tashkent, and the Liviiskiy Islamic University, he served as pro-rector and as rector of the Islamic Institute in Tashkent. He was elected chairman of the Spiritual Administration at a congress of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan in March 1989, and he was chosen by the people to become their Deputy.

[Correspondent] Esteemed Mufti, would you please tell us, if only briefly, about the activities of the Spiritual Administration of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

[Mukhammad-Sodik] The Spiritual Administration of Muslims was organized 45 years ago. It is assigned the task of guiding the religious activities of the Muslims living in Central Asia and Kazakhstan. Above all, it tries to satisfy the spiritual needs of Muslims and to foster their spiritual improvement individually. It is our duty to provide comprehensive assistance to the people of our

faith and to unite them in the struggle for equality, justice, compassion, and personal integrity.

We have established friendly relations with more than 80 religious organizations abroad. Our aim is to fortify the friendly relations between peoples and strengthen peace throughout the world.

At the current stage of glasnost and perestroyka, the Spiritual Administration plays an active role in public life. We are contributing to the struggle for peace, to improving the economic situation and ecological conditions, to eradicating drunkenness and alcoholism, and to ameliorating all aspects of our lives.

[Correspondent] What is the attitude of Islam to the problems, lifestyles, and religions of other nationalities?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] Islam does not have the spirit of nationalism that is sometimes ascribed to it amid the changes that are now emerging in the relations between peoples. Islam rewards people according to their piety and good works. In the Koran Allah has said: "O people! I have created you as men and women, and I have made you into peoples and tribes, so that you would know one another. The most noble of you before Allah is the one who is most pious. Truly, Allah knows and comprehends." Yes, it is so. The people belong to various peoples and nationalities, and to tribal groups big and small. And it is their duty to get to know and to cooperate with one another, to render assistance, and do good to one another on a reciprocal basis, and not to torment or kill one another. Yes, and their interest would be to act in this way if all men belonged to one people. It was, of course, not without reason that the all-powerful Allah created diverse peoples and tribes. Islam calls for good will and mutual understanding between peoples. It respects the traditions of all people so long as they are humane and directed at the good of mankind. Islamic scholars even consider traditions and customs to be one of the sources of the Shariat. When the Koran speaks of the peoples of the "Akhli kitab," it refers to those peoples in possession of the sacred texts—the Jews and the Christians. Islam has a special relationship with them. The Koran speaks with great respect of the prophets Moses and Jesus, as of the legacy of the Torah and the Bible. Reference is made also of Mary, the mother of Jesus. A Muslim who rejects any one of them is no longer a Muslim. The food of these peoples is not forbidden to Muslims. Muslims are permitted also to take their women as wives. As you say, it is not easy to elucidate all these aspects briefly and in detail. But I want to quote this passage from the Koran as an example: "And you will, of course, find out that the people who come closest in their love for believers are those who say, 'We are Christians.'"

[Correspondent] What do you think of perestroyka at the present stage within the context of events that have been taking place recently in our society?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] There can be no doubt that perestroyka has now entered on a crucial and difficult phase.

A majority of the people, I think, understand the necessity of perestroyka and glasnost for the future despite the fact that certain apparatchiks continue, I regret to say, to stir up memories of times that have irrevocably gone by. It is understandable that to restore an old building it is necessary first to do away with elements of it that have fallen into disuse. The Soviet people are participating with enthusiasm in destroying those elements of our society that have rotted and become obsolete. Now that the time has come to reconstruct and to build, however, difficulties have arisen. It would seem that we are not entirely prepared to undertake creative activity. We know how to make proposals and give advice, but to unite our efforts and direct our initiative into a single channel is something we have not yet managed to do. Many people who insist on their rights are often oblivious of their civic duties, and the progress of perestroyka, which is difficult enough, is further impeded. I should like to believe that this is a temporary phenomenon, and that everything will eventually work out.

The congresses of people's deputies, the work of the Supreme Soviet, and the burgeoning of democratization are heartening manifestations in the life of the entire society, including the followers of the various religions. Frankly speaking, believers have been regarded in our society as "second-class citizens" right up until the present time. Now they are regaining the rights that were lost and are actively participating in the life of society. Representatives of believers have for the first time become USSR people's deputies. It can even be said that the believers have gained more from perestroyka than any other segment of society. Believers desire with all their heart to be of use to their society. But their opportunities are limited. Why? you may ask. Because the existing legislation was worked out during years in which persecution for religious convictions assumed forms that were particularly cruel and monstrous. These trampled openly on the rights of believers. Religious organizations, for example, to this day are forbidden to engage in philanthropic activities. One way or another the time has come to get rid of this obviously obsolete law. Such a kind of "law-breaking" may be observed in many other kinds of situations. These absurdities can only be corrected by a new Law on the Freedom of Conscience.

[Correspondent] We know the sad statistics revealing the immense material and moral losses borne by our society because of thievery, embezzlement, prostitution, alcoholism, and drug addiction. What methods, in your opinion, should be used to combat these negative manifestations?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] The roots of these social ailments, I believe, lie in inadequate general education, and particularly a lack of spiritual upbringing. From the standpoint of Islam, man consists of flesh and spirit. The physical aspect of man is in need of education, too, but far more attention should be given to the education of the spiritual aspect. Otherwise, the results will be tragic.

Of particular importance in this regard is the role of the family. Unfortunately, many parents are lacking in education themselves. It is of the utmost importance to raise the level of moral education within the institutional system of public education. The mass media, together with the fields of literature, motion pictures, and the theater, and all institutions that are called upon to influence the minds and hearts of people, must meet their obligations with a high sense of responsibility. For the present they are not altogether successful in doing so. The mass media is overly preoccupied in striving for crass sensationalism. From day to day there are films shown on television that are filled with lascivious incidents and scenes depicting stealing and violence. The supply of video films is even worse than that. The repertoire of film theaters and video libraries is for the most part made up of films that propagandize either openly or by implication moral license, cynicism, cruelty, and power through the use of force. It is incomprehensible to me who would purchase, supply, or show these films. Meanwhile, there have been instances in which persons have been prosecuted for transporting with intent to show films with a religious orientation. So long as we are not fully engaged together in addressing the problem of education, the situation will continue to get worse.

While paying considerable attention to education, Islam provides for stringent punitive measures in the event of deviations from the norms of education or failure to conform to the canons of society.

A child is one of the greatest blessings bestowed on us by Allah the Most High. It is the sacred duty of parents to raise their child to be healthy, educated, and of high moral principles. Islam teaches parents to care for the education of children from their earliest years. It obliges parents to raise their children to be useful to society. In accordance with the teachings of Islam, it is the responsibility of parents to instill in their children respect for their elders, love for their neighbors, and compassion for those who are suffering; a sense of honesty, dignity, and other human qualities; and an attraction to learning and the possession of knowledge. These traits are intended to protect them from taking the wrong road.

As a member of the republic Extraordinary Commission to Combat Crime, I have had the occasion to familiarize myself in detail with many different aspects of this issue, and once again I have become convinced of the conclusions that we have reached. Priests have a major contribution to make to this struggle to combat the social ills mentioned, but their opportunities are limited. I receive many letters from persons in prison. Despite the interference of certain persons in positions of authority, we visit the jails, and we meet and converse with persons serving sentences. Many of them repent what they have done and sincerely desire to begin life anew, and they ask for religious literature. But how can we help them if we ourselves are deprived of religious literature? They ask

us also to make more appearances in the public media, but we do not have such opportunities, or if we do, very few of them.

[Correspondent] In connection with the nomination of candidates for the office of people's deputy, what do you think of the election campaign as it is developing in the country? Can the Muslim world within the USSR be effective in exerting an influence on the democratic process of forming local soviets and the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] The campaign for deputy seats in Uzbekistan, of course, is not going to be easy. With respect to Muslim participation in the elections, we are always on the side of justice, not only in the election campaign but in every respect. In some rayons believers are nominating Muslim priests as candidates for people's deputy, and this is perfectly legal. Our Spiritual Administration is issuing no special instructions of any kind on the elections. Let each person decide for himself.

[Correspondent] What is your personal viewpoint regarding the problems addressed at the second Congress of People's Deputies? How do you feel about the criticism directed at the deputies from the Central Asian republics, who, among others, were labeled the "silent majority" in the press? Is it true that your high degree of authority in Central Asia and Kazakhstan is going to have a crucial influence on the voters?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] The principal issue before the Congress is finding ways to revive the economy and the process of economic reform. But for some reason others seem to have been thinking until now that the Congress and its deputies and the Supreme Soviet were going to solve all the problems. The fact is that we pass resolutions and decrees that must be translated into action. I think the time has come to recognize that there is no magic box other than the Palace of Congresses and its conference chambers. Any resolution or decree that is passed calls for implementation, and to achieve this means working locally.

Congress regulations, of course, are important, as are rules governing the status of people's deputies. We came to realize at the first Congress how the absence of clear-cut regulations can complicate matters and how difficult it is for a deputy to carry out his mission.

The deputies from Central Asia believe that they could not function properly at the first Congress. There are many reasons for this, but the main one, in my opinion, is a lack of preparation. We did not constitute a coalition of deputies or any other kind of group. No one supposed that the Congress would turn out to be so disorderly or that the rostrum would be occupied by the person who shouted the loudest. Then there was the language barrier. Our deputies from Uzbekistan were also accused of being passive. But I think time will tell just how much truth there is to these accusations. In any event, let our actions be judged by results.

I have no intention of using my authority for the purposes of undue constraint. Let each person act in accordance with his personal conviction. But when it is a matter of irrational behavior, then it is up to the society as a whole to act.

[Correspondent] With regard to the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh: In the absence of a political solution, we will not touch upon the controversial subject of whose side the truth is on—the side of the Armenians or that of the Azeris. But blood is being shed in Nagorno-Karabakh, for which both sides are at fault. How do feel about a situation in which people are trying to settle political differences by terrorist tactics. Can Muslim leaders in this case be influential in reaching a peaceful solution of this problem? Can they undertake a peace-keeping mission?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] The problem of Nagorno-Karabakh is unique, and it is one that is most difficult. Its roots go very deep. Each side believes that it has proof—historical, archaeological, and so on—that this territory rightfully belongs to Armenia or to Azerbaijan.

The problem is unique also in that all segments of the population, from the simplest laborers on up to the first secretaries of the respective republic central committees, are united in their claims against one another, including the believers and their religious leaders. Of course, this further complicates the matter. With regard to the resolution of political differences by the threat of force, I am categorically opposed to it. Violence cannot lead to agreement in any kind of situation. I think that in order to achieve an in-depth understanding of the essential conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, it is necessary to study the circumstances of this confrontation carefully and provide a fair political assessment of what has happened.

Muslim leaders can and should play a peacekeeping role and influence the peaceful resolution of this problem. We acted in this way in Central Asia, for example, when events took place in Fergana. We should like to see the clergy in the Transcaucasus also take an active role. But to do so requires good will on the part of believing Christians as well as on the part of Muslims.

[Correspondent] The experience of the countries of Eastern Europe has shown that it is possible to build socialism without postulating the "leading role of the party." Do you believe that, if the CPSU suffers defeat in the elections, soviets without communists can cope with the crisis in the USSR? Or are you still inclined to believe that the ruling party will succeed in leading the country out of such difficult circumstances?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] That is a difficult question. As a religious spokesman I should not respond to such a question. But as a citizen of my country I can say that now is the appropriate time to debate such subjects. We have already engaged in a good deal of controversy without any useful result. Meanwhile, day after day, the economic situation, and with it the people's welfare, is deteriorating, and new problems are mounting one on

top of another. We believers have our own background of experience in relations with the regime. But who can guarantee that "soviets without communists" will be able to cope with all the difficulties? The USSR is unique in its composition and presupposes a special approach to things. The main thing is that we have yet to succeed in creating a legal state. In the existing situation anything could happen, and God forbid that the "Old Guard" realize its dream of returning to former times! Various regions of the country are approaching these problems differently, often in a self-centered way, and the level of understanding issues varies.

[Correspondent] As head of the Muslims of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, could you be of assistance in having the soldiers who were captured in Afghanistan return home?

[Mukhammed-Sodik] The Soviet military captives in Afghanistan are a source of anguish. Because of mistakes that have been made, individuals are suffering, those close to them are suffering, and the people as a whole are suffering. On behalf of mothers who shed tears and continue to suffer in the absence of their children, I am ready to undertake this good work. I have submitted a list of military captives to Abdullah Umar Hasef Zazdan, head of the World Islamic League, which is located in Saudi Arabia. The head of the Muslim organization in Libya, Mohammed Akhmad Sharif, has also expressed his willingness to render assistance in this humanitarian effort. Even the prominent Afghan political figure Abdul Hakim Tabili has joined in it.

I should think that through these joint efforts we will be able to reach an accord with the Afghan mujaheddin.

[Correspondent] At this point it would appear appropriate to ask to what degree perestroika has furthered the development of international relations between Muslims in the USSR and representatives of this religion in other regions of the world.

[Mukhammed-Sodik] In accordance with our religious traditions, Muslims are required periodically to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, for example. This is, of course, a routine trip out of the country for which we are obliged to apply to the authorities for permission. They think up a variety of reasons for refusing our request, which in themselves are so naive that one might think they were dealing with children. In the beginning they used to say that we had not established diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, planes of the Chinese People's Republic—which does not have diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia—have been transporting thousands of Muslims to airports at Jidda, and not only during periods of religious holidays. The opinion exists that it is impossible to travel to a country with which there are no diplomatic relations. Fourteen persons, however, have visited Saudi Arabia, and many travel to Israel. This year when I was in Jordan, I personally took part in greeting pilgrims from the occupied Arab territories and seeing them off to the hajj. As you may imagine, several thousand pilgrims were setting out at one time.

Previously, it was possible to cite the period of stagnation and a shortcoming in terms of democracy, but how can these refusals be explained today in the period of perestroika and glasnost? The USSR has signed all international agreements on human rights, including the Vienna accords. Even 90 people from the recently registered sect of Krishna devotees were allowed to make a pilgrimage to places they consider sacred. I appealed to the authorities in the hope of gaining permission for us as well, but by way of an answer I was got a new excuse—a shortage of hard currency. I felt obliged to state that what we need is not currency but simply permission to make a pilgrimage. The decision on the matter is in the hands of an exclusive circle, and it appears that without the intervention of M. S. Gorbachev it will not be decided in our favor.

Practically speaking, this matter should be submitted to the proper state organizations and officials. We ourselves cannot understand the reason for refusal. As is well known, the hajj constitutes one of five fundamental tenets of Islam. It is obligatory for each Muslim who has the funds and the opportunity to complete. As an annual meeting or congress of Muslims, the hajj represents a kind of yardstick by which to measure the state of relations in each country towards Muslims—the extent of freedom and the well-being of Muslims. For this reason there is something like a competition over the question of what country will send the most pilgrims. There are countries that send from 150,000 to 160,000 pilgrims, and even more. Each year a special honor roll is published in which we invariably occupy last place. Fourteen persons! This year there were a total of 31 persons. From Central Asia and Kazakhstan, an area in which there are millions of followers of Islam and hundreds of great scholars, there were a total of three or four persons. And there were two people in all from Uzbekistan.

The positive changes that have taken place in religious life are undoubtedly a source of joy and satisfaction to us. But, as you can see, there are still sufficient grounds for misunderstanding and there is unfinished work to be done. As a rule, things at the center go along fairly well, but the picture gets worse as one gets farther away from the center. There are still people, if you can believe it, who hold to the opinion: "No matter what laws may be promulgated, in my district I am the law." As for my personal opinion, I do not share the mood of extreme pessimism. What I have said earlier simply demonstrates once again that we need to pass as soon as possible a Law of Freedom of Conscience. I am firmly convinced that perestroika will go on to overcome these obstacles in its path.

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Estonian SSR Local Leaders on Ethnic Relations
90UN1232A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA in Russian 8 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by L. Sher: "It is Necessary to Start From Below"]

[Text] How to reduce tensions in interethnic relations, how to reduce the fears of the non-Estonian part of the population. In a few words, one can describe in this way the content of detailed discussions that took place in Tallinn on 6 March within the framework of a permanently functioning seminar of representatives of local self-government who are concerned with questions of interethnic relations.

But to be more specific, the discussion covered the most varied problems. For example, implementation of the Estonian SSR law on language. And the more that representatives of various departments stressed the necessity of understanding, good will, and desire, the clearer it became for me, personally, that policy cannot be built on this alone and that the law on language, lacking reliable material support, is increasingly coming to resemble not a state regulatory act but rather a very correct and necessary but, nevertheless, still purely political declaration.

I will try to substantiate this with evidence. All the speakers noted the unsatisfactory course of the law's implementation. Despite all efforts, things are also not good with regard to study literature and study materials. In the absence of competition in the form of a state system of language instruction, even one requiring payment, various kinds of cooperatives are looting us, having jacked payments up sky-high both for taking classes and for textbooks and study aids. And the cooperatives should not be blamed for this. A gap has been left for them and therefore it is would be stupid if they did not immediately fill it. As formerly, the situation is also bad with regard to Estonian language teachers, even for non-Estonian state schools, and this can also be said in some cases about the quality of teaching in "independent" courses. And even if ... even if somebody living in Narva, let us say, has completed intensive or ordinary courses, but there is no language environment surrounding him, I can stake my neck on it that, after several months, everything he has learned will have been shaken out of his memory. And so, you will not get far on desire and good will alone. A precise, long-term plan is needed. In this connection, the most important conclusion reached by the participants in the seminar was that it is necessary to create this program "from below." Only after working out programs in local areas—and these will be different everywhere depending upon specific conditions—will it be possible to determine where there is a need for the government of the republic to get involved.

A second, actively discussed topic was the situation with regard to Russian and other foreign-language study. Most important here is the training of teaching personnel for these schools who are drawn from local young people

that are adapted to the cultural and ethnographic environment of Estonia. It is clear that, for now and in the foreseeable future, it makes not sense to open up study in the Russian language for all specialties at institutions of higher learning. One apparent solution is to transform preparatory sections into year-long courses for the mastery of the Estonian language by graduates of foreign language schools; a second one is, with republic sponsorship, to send local young people to institutions of higher learning outside Estonia's borders. Unfortunately, the already rather large number of national cultural societies are still devoting too little attention to the problem of education and, indeed, they are precisely the ones who are called upon to help in determining the content of study and to concern themselves with creating alternative study institutions. For the present, a majority of the societies and official institutions that are concerned with the problems of non-estonian population have selected Tallinn as a center for their work and their activities are clearly insufficient outside the limits of the capital.

With the participation of a group of members of a commission that has been established for negotiations with all-union organs, there was discussion at the seminar of topics that could become a subject of negotiations in Moscow. USSR People's Deputy G. Golubkov summed up the results of this discussion as follows: There are a great number of problems, but two groups of the most substantial ones can be defined. The first is domestic problems, that is interrelationships within the republic whose solution does not require the sanction of USSR central organs. The principle one here is the quickest possible passage of a law on citizenship, which will give all residents of Estonia assurance of the fact that their civil rights will not be violated. The second consists of external problems. Here there are two main ones. First, the conditions of remigration of those who do not wish to remain in an independent Estonia, even if there will be very few such. It is necessary that damages to them from remigration be minimal. The second problem is connected with the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the territory of Estonia. It is clear this will not be done with a single stroke. The process of troop withdrawal is tied to the resolution of extremely complex defense-strategy and everyday problems. Most probably, this will take place in stages. This means that it is necessary to reach agreement on the status of troops that will remain for the time-being within the territory of Estonia and on their interrelationships with local organs of power and to create normal conditions for the lives of the families of military personnel.

Discussion will be continued at the next session of the seminar.

Estonian Union of Working Women Formed

90UN1232B Tallinn MOLODEZH ESTONII in
Russian 6 Mar 90 pp 1, 4

[Article by I. Ristmyagi: "Comrade Ladies"; followed by text of a declaration on the establishment of the union]

[Text] The organizational conference of the Union of Working Women of Estonia took place last Saturday in Tallinn.

I was not a delegate to this conference, only a guest. And, nevertheless, it was with difficulty that I restrained myself, so as not to vote on one or another proposal—the questions discussed there were so close and painful. I was overcome (fortunately, rarely) by another desire as well—to remind a speaker who had departed far from the subject of the discussion of the time limit. Lest my silent participation in the conference serve as an excuse for the ironic title of this report, trust me that this is rather my own irony, although an completely specific situation served as the reason for it: one of the meeting's co-chairwomen, Lyudmila Khoreva, who tried, incidentally not without success, throughout the entire long day to maintain a benevolent atmosphere in the hall, in its first minutes called the agenda for the conference to the attention of the ladies. Certain comrades were insulted and immediately sent notes to the stage: We request, they said, that you not call us ladies. Many, however, wanted to remain ladies. So as not to insult anyone, the chairwomen, in a kind, feminine way, used both these forms of address in dealing with the audience and the speakers.

Before moving on to the essence of the problems raised at the conference, I can not deny myself the pleasure of making still another lyrical detour. The reason for it was given to me by ... General Aksinin. By virtue of my work, I had more than once had occasion to be present at various meetings, negotiations, and meetings where the comrade general spoke, spoke always severely, demanding, and accusatorially. At the women's conference, General Aksinin was very gallant and even permitted himself an graceful pun about love and faithfulness, as symbolized by the splendid carnations that he presented to the organizing ladies. Our other political figures—V. Yarovoy, M. Lysenko, and V. Rudyak—kept their opening addresses in the same key.

And now, let us get down to business and try together with the participants in the conference to answer three questions: What encouraged these women, who for most part work at enterprises of the OSTK [United Council of Labor Collectives], to establish their own social organization? Why specifically their own, and not one within the framework of the Association of Estonian Women? Finally, what does this organization intend to concern itself with?

In her short but substantive address, L. Polishchuk noted very accurately, I think, that we, women, have experienced a heavy moral and psychological fatigue in recent times—from a dual burden (at work and at home), endless shortages, ever lengthening lines, etc. (each of us could add substantially to this list). And the main discomfort in our life, which is not easy even without this, comes from the instability of the political situation in the republic. Illnesses, stress, and divorces have become more frequent, especially in mixed marriages. L.

Polishchuk considers that the situation of the families of military personnel is our common shame—added to a lack of housing, there have now also been difficulties with work, with children's institutions, coupons and cards. Having proclaimed our right to health protection, the government is not providing us with necessary children's doctors, hospitals, and preventive diagnostic equipment. And republic authorities, in a struggle with all-union enterprises, are raising all sorts of barriers in the realization of modest social programs. Here is an example: The plant imeni Kh. Pegelman rented a plot of land in a rural locality from a military unit for construction of a family dispensary. This was several years ago, and that is why one of the parties to the agreement was a military unit and not the rural soviet. But now, in times much closer to us, the rural soviet has denied the plant its request to build a holiday hotel on its land.

And further L. Polishchuk said: "We have actively functioning within the republic the Association of Women of Estonia, with which we have much in common, especially on a social plane. But we part ways in our approaches to the future of Estonia. We are for an Estonian SSR as a part of a renewed Soviet federation. However, we will strive for collaboration on all questions where our positions coincide."

And now, I will cite you words from the address by the director of School No. 19 in Tallinn, G. Sapog: "As formerly, we women, are standing apart from active political activity and, meanwhile, the men are not only engaged in debates about yesterday and the today, but also are ready to guarantee our future after their own fashion, I fear, as if have no say in this."

If one is to believe the ancient Greek writer of comedies, Aristophanes, in ancient times the women of Greece gave a good lesson to unwise men who had been drawn into endless wars. I am not calling on all of us to follow the example of Lysistrata, but you will agree the school director is right: As long as destructive political battles continue, solution of elementary social problems will be pushed farther and farther into the future, problems which even today, with all the poverty of the state budget, could somehow be alleviated if there was a desire to concern ourselves with them. Incidentally, it was precisely this desire that brought 480 delegates to the organizational conference.

G. Sapog naturally devoted her address primarily to the problems of the Russian school within the republic. This is a pressing problem both for the women's organizational conference and for other social organizations that represent the republic's Russian-speaking population, because, as G. Sapog stressed, the new Estonian SSR education minister has proposed that the teachers of these schools themselves find a solution to the situation. And it is a rather complicated one: overcrowded school spaces and insufficient teachers in the technical disciplines, of the Estonian language, of aesthetic studies. Teachers and parents are concerned about the futures of ninth-class graduates, especially girls. The republic's

technical schools offer very few specialties for them in the Russian language, and indeed on the basis of secondary school alone, after the ninth class, there is essentially nowhere to go. Children from Russian schools have few opportunities to realize their artistic or musical inclinations—there are no societies, studios, or appropriate directors. At least let the children suffer as little as possible while their parents occupy themselves with politics—G. Sapog insistently pursued her idea, and proposed that an OSTK fund be established for the aesthetic education of children.

It has turned out that all of us know hopelessly little about social pedagogics, although the entire pathology of our society can be observed within the environment of the child (from the address of the director of the pioneer camp imeni Romashkin, L. Remova). Neither the school nor the family have learned to give children the happiness of relationships, and without this there are so many tragically lonely adolescents, so many broken futures, and even voluntarily terminated lives. L. Remova proposed the creation of a pedagogical sector under the union of women.

Evidently, problems of social pedagogics are knocking ever more loudly at the dilapidated door of our popular education just as soon as psychologists were introduced in the schools at a one-third rate [po 1/3 stavki]. But such parsimony will not give anything; what is needed are normal, fully valued and compensated work by child psychologists, rooms for psychological unburdening, telephone hotlines. For the present, there is no point in waiting for help from the state. Hope lies in joint efforts by enterprises. This is from the address by the chairman of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet commission for questions of the labor and everyday lives of women and for the protection of motherhood and childhood, A. Ingerman. I will not talk now about the other problems of women she raised—employment on the night shift and in harmful kinds of production, having practically no money during the three-year maternity leave, etc. A. Ingerman is a candidate deputy to the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet and, I hope, we will have another opportunity before the elections to meet with her on the pages of our newspaper.

Before moving on to the next package of proposals made by the delegates, I want to note that men in fact do not want to give us an opportunity to feel ourselves as we really are—women, the keepers of the hearth, if I may use a lofty phrase. The next lady—and this was the teacher Ayme Piyrslu, who spoke about our bitter lives in which there is so much politics and so little morality—had not succeeded in stepping down from the tribune when comrade Kogan rose against her. I would even somewhat agree with the situation in the republic as he harshly outlined it and even with the fact that even we, women, cannot avoid political struggle, but his attack on women who share a different position shocked even me (I remind you that, because of my work, I get involved in political squabbles). As I was also shocked by the address of comrade Tamara Chernavtseva from Tartu, who tried

to explain to those present the sources of Estonian nationalism and called for not squandering smiles so lavishly, for not extending flowers to representatives of other social movements. And, in general, for not making compromises. Here I agree with my professional colleague, a staff correspondent with MOLODEZHKA, Abgustina Gerber, a deputy candidate from the Union of Women of Estonia, who stated in her hurried address (time was pressing because comrade Chernavtseva, in particular, took approximately twice her allotted time) that precisely what is necessary is to meet one another half way, to present flowers and smiles, and to support sensible compromises—otherwise we will not survive. I will add for my own part that the latter is dictated not only by today's situation, but by all the preceding history of mankind.

For the time-being, Ye. Kogan has not interrupted us and I had intended to tell about another package of proposals heard at the conference. But my time limit (i.e. the space allotted to me in the paper) is also running out. Therefore, I will say only that E. Ivanova, a jurist, justly incidentally, criticized women for the fact that they do not know how to make use of the legal rights they have been given and proposed the creation a legal sector within the Union of Working Women (STZh). The delegate from Narva, Noskova (excuse me, but they did not introduce her by first name) spoke very clearly about the unacceptable working conditions of working women and introduced a very specific proposal. Here it is appropriate for me to move on to the concluding part of my report and to say that a Union of Working Women of Estonia was created at the conference and that its Charter was approved and a declaration was passed, which we are printing below. It is, as it were, a draft program for the Union of Working Women, which will be approved after two months. And, until then, all proposals may be sent to the follow address: Tallinn, ul. Killustiku, 3, for the STZh.

And finally. The Society of Slavic Cultures, with its small concert program, reminded us of our roots. Thanks to it for the concert and for all those pleasant and useful meetings which it has conducted during the year of its existence.

DECLARATION on the Creation of a Union of the Working Women of the Estonian SSR

We, representatives of labor collectives and social organizations and private individuals, recognizing the need to join our forces in the complex social and political situation that has developed, declare the creation of a Union of the Working Women of the Estonian SSR.

In our activities, we consider it necessary to be guided by universal human principles and set ourselves the following goals:

1. Humanization of society and the spiritual and harmonious development of the individual.

2. Defense of the woman's social rights in production and day-to-day life. Provision of social assistance to young families and those with many children and which are poorly provided for, pensioners, and invalids, collaboration with the charitable community.

3. Concern for the health of mother and child.

4. Radical change in the system of school education and the development of social pedagogics.

5. A protective attitude toward nature.

We consider that any movement, party, or organization has a right to exist if its activities are linked with a concern for man.

We are prepared to collaborate with all state organizations, social organizations, and movements that share our views.

We are for equal rights for all people, irrespective of their nationality, origin, and type of occupation.

We are for an Estonian SSR within a renewed Soviet federation.

New Kazakh Language Law Must Address Real Ethnic Inequalities

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[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata SOTSIALISTIK QAZAQSTAN in Kazakh of 4 Feb 90 carries on page 3 a 1000-word article on the new KaSSR Law on Language which went into force on 1 Jan entitled "Putting the Law to Work." A. Garkavets chief of the Russian Language and Sociological Linguistics Division of the Kazakh SSR Academy of Sciences Linguistics Institute, doctor of philological sciences, member of the Commission for Drawing up A State Program on Language, stresses the importance of language for the culture, well-being and national existence of any ethnic group. He also stresses the scope of the problems which must now be addressed by the new law. He shows, for example, that while there are 6.5 million Kazakhs in the republic, and a similar if somewhat smaller number of Russians, 6.2 millions, the situation in the schools is altogether different with 2,021,598 children receiving instruction in Russian and only 923,990 in Kazakh. Even other Turkic nationalities are doing better than the Kazakhs in this regard since there are 332,000 Uzbeks in the republic and 60,103 Uzbek children receiving instruction in Uzbek, although most of the smaller republic nationalities are neglected as well. Thus, Garkavets concludes, major inequalities exist, and evidence of long term neglect, which will have to be righted by the new law as its various provisions are put into effect over the next 10 years, from 1990. To this end, he shows, party, academic and other institutions are now drawing up detailed plans to guide the changes which are to take place. This will result in a "State Program for Developing the Kazakh Language and the Languages of Other Nationalities in the Kazakh SSR during the Period Up Until the Year 2000." Garkavets

details some specific areas of discussion as the debate goes on, with particular concern now being expressed not only for the rights of the Russian and other Slavic minorities, but for the rights of speakers of even more neglected minor languages of the republic.

Birth Control Latest in Series of Efforts to Decimate Kazakhs

183200284

[Editorial Report] Alma-Ata QAZAQ ADEBIYETI in Kazakh of 26 Jan 90 carries on page 7 a 3000-word article by Otebay Qanakhin entitled "Limiting Children, or Limiting Kazakhs? In the article Qanakhin takes serious issue with those claiming (in connection with a recent television program, and articles appearing in the Kazakh press) that the Kazakhs are a large nationality with "too many children" and that the time has come to limit the numbers of children being born in response to the serious ecological and other dangers affecting the Kazakh SSR, including an acute shortage of goods and services. To prove that the opposite is in fact the truth, Qanakhin shows through an historical survey reaching back to the 1916 Kazakh uprising, that the current emphasis on family planning is nothing more than still another attempt to destroy the Kazakhs as a people. He catalogues, for example, how Kazakhs suffered major losses during that revolt, directed again Russian colonialism, still more during the era of revolution and civil war, and perhaps 4 millions during the forced collectivization of the late 1920s and early 1930s. When the 66,000 who were killed or died during the purges of 1936-1938 are added, and the half million lost during World War II, Kazakh numbers declined or were at best stagnant for half a century and have only begun to recover.

This recovery is only right, Qarakhin stresses, not only in view of past demographic disasters, and potential new ones in the many environmental crises, shortages, and other problems of the present, including recent official efforts to limit the size of Kazakh families, but also on account of the dilution of the population of the republic by large numbers of migrants brought into the republic, willingly or unwillingly, by Soviet authorities. Today there are 7 million Kazakhs and Kazakhs are a minority in their own republic. There should in fact now be 30 million Kazakhs, such has been the long-term demographic impact of population losses since 1916. The world and Soviet authorities should now leave the Kazakhs alone and let them get on with their task of providing for national survival, and not seek to injure them further in the name of family planning.

According to Qarakhin, whereas Kazakh women produced 321 births per thousand women in the 1960s, the figure has fallen to only 210 per thousand women today. He calls upon Kazakh women to live up to their obligations as women and mothers, and for those Kazakhs supporting family planning to stop turning their backs on their people and their heritage as Kazakhs. He also calls

upon Soviet authorities to cease short-changing the Kazakh SSR with centrally or regionally controlled industries (93 percent), profits which flow by and large out of the republic, leaving pollution and squalor behind, grossly mis-managed republic agriculture which can no longer provide the abundance of high quality food it did before the Soviet period (one reason for high republic infant mortality, he suggests), poor or non-existent health and educational facilities and environmental disasters inflicted upon the Kazakhs in the name of centrally planned cotton monoculture or national defense (nuclear testing).

Rukh Faction Proposes New Organization

90UN1637B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in Ukrainian 30 Mar 90 p 3

[Letter to the editors, published under the rubric "Letter With Commentary," by D. Pyasetsky, M. Hyrich, M. Pyrih, Ya. Hevko, and P. Kolesnikov, delegates to the Constituent Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika, members of the Committee to Form a Movement of the Peoples of the Ukraine for Perestroika, Ternopol Oblast: "Another Rukh?"]

[Text] Less than a year has passed since establishment of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroika, and yet one can already see with the naked eye complex processes which are taking place within the organization. The impression is created that Rukh has existed and functioned in its present form for the benefit of certain members of the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Union] and for their election campaigning. And in certain instances it has operated contrary to logic and common sense. That is, it has long since become clear to us delegates to the Constituent Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement that Rukh activities are not in conformity with the demands and expectations of the majority of the peoples of the Ukraine, which are indeed fervently for perestroika and the establishment of a sovereign Ukraine within the framework of the Soviet Union. To what are we being called and led by the noisiest and most aggressive of the so-called Rukh activists, who indeed profess a quite different philosophy, for they belong to openly antidemocratic organizations such as UKhS? Unfortunately in their arrogant bustle they are exploiting the sacred religious feelings of religious believers, both Catholics and Russian Orthodox.

God is the same for all, and today, on the eve of a civilized and computerized third millennium, only people who hate other people can organize such "crusades." Exploiting people's trust and support, however, they are endeavoring to reach a position of supreme authority at all costs.

All of us Ukrainians, both western and eastern, should remember who we are and whose grandchildren and great-grandchildren we are. Our famed forebears Taras—Bulba and Shevchenko—never bowed down to Roman, to Catholic, or to any other gods. They were able

to respect people of other nations and other faiths, but they were also able to stand up for their own faith and honor when this was necessary. To what kind of extremes have we now been driven, where we supposedly in the name of the triumph of justice and, as if in the name of the Almighty, we are sowing religious enmity, which can lead to irreparable consequences? All of us today are sufficiently well educated, thanks to Soviet rule, to know that the most savage and bitter conflicts take place in the domain of religious belief. It is to somebody's advantage fatally to split up brother Ukrainians, to break up into bits our much-suffering Ukraine for centuries on end.... To whose advantage is this?

To whose tune are the UKhS people singing their "disgraceful" song of mass political rally?

History teaches us differently, however: there have been examples, and more than one, where churches, even in dark times of illiteracy and lack of decent means of communication, found ground for peace and cooperation.

For this is the way it should be: the divine word calls upon us not to strive toward enmity but toward rebirth, consolidation and, finally, toward peace, which is one of the most important things in our nuclear age. In the name of what ideal and what higher interests of the people do the supporters of the Ukrainian Catholic Church trample the sacred feelings of the faithful of the Russian Orthodox Church, viciously insult priests, force their way into churches, trample holy relics and, finally, the main question: why are these wrongful actions being perpetrated under the banner of Rukh and also allegedly in the name of the people?

We all know that a crowd or mob is not the same as the people. For a civilized society there exist other methods of restoration of rights and justice.

Therefore we, delegates to the Constituent Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroyka, appeal to all the peoples of the Soviet Ukraine who consider the Ukraine their homeland, to establish a fundamentally new, genuinely popular organization—a Movement of the Peoples of the Ukraine for Perestroyka. In the new organization representatives of all strata, nationalities and regions shall have equal rights and representation, which, and this should be emphasized, was not observed at the Rukh Congress, which to a certain extent led to the cataclysms which have occurred. For representation, for example, with these incomprehensible figures: 250 delegates from Kiev, and six from the Crimea(?), cannot be considered fair and democratic.

We, representatives of the western oblasts, are of the conviction that only in an equal unity of all parts of our Ukrainian land, only within a Union of Free Soviet Republics can our sovereign Ukraine flourish and become reborn. We are also of the conviction that the majority of people to whom our land is truly dear think likewise.

We ask all persons residing in the Ukraine to express their view regarding establishment of a Movement of the Peoples of the Ukraine for Perestroyka and to support our initiative.

Respectfully, D. Pyasetskyy, M. Hyrich, M. Pyrih, Ya. Hevko, P. Kolesnikov, delegates to the Constituent Congress of the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroyka, members of the Committee to Establish a Movement of the Peoples of the Ukraine for Perestroyka.

Editor's Note: We have here a complex, unexpected turn of events. But is it really so unexpected? The editor's mail, especially in recent months, has been a fairly sensitive barometer measuring the intensity of our political passions. And for quite some time now the mail has indicated troubling currents not only within society as a whole but also within the ranks of Rukh. But could one have predicted such a turn of events?

To judge from the mass political rally atmosphere as well as from what we are told by the authors of the above letter, the situation within the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Perestroyka is presently indeed uncertain. The slightest manifestation of extremism, nationalism, and anarchism in the present situation does not promote perestroyka, and particularly does not foster democratization of society. If Rukh is truly popular, as it should be, would it not be better to take a look and ask: whom and whose interests is it representing? Are all the leaders carrying out the congress guidelines, and how are they implementing them? And, finally, why is it that persons have turned up in key positions who, judging from their actions, are pursuing their own ambitions rather than the people's interests?

On the other hand is this proposal, by a group of Rukh delegates, to split up the already-existing Rukh organization really beneficial? Would it not be better for the organization's leaders to think about and take into consideration thoughts such as those expressed by the authors of this letter from Ternopol? And the authors unquestionably have valid cause. However, we are merely presenting this suggestion for consideration by our readers.

Poltava Deputies Elect Leadership

90UN1637A Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 30 Mar 90 p 3

[News brief by H. Hrin: "Leaders Named"]

[Text] A session of the newly-elected oblast Soviet of People's Deputies was held yesterday, 29 March, in Poltava, at which organizational matters were addressed in particular.

Five names were placed in nomination for the secret balloting to elect the chairman of the oblast Soviet of Deputies. Elected with a majority of votes was USSR

People's Deputy O. Myakota, first secretary of the Poltava Oblast Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party.

M. Zhdan, who has been serving as head of the party oblast committee department of party organizational and cadre work, was elected deputy chairman of the oblast Soviet.

Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy I. Hopey, former chairman of the executive committee of the oblast Soviet of People's Deputies, was elected chairman of the Poltava Oblast Executive Committee at this session.

Lvov's Political Atmosphere Described

90UN1236A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 2

[Article by S. Romanyuk: "Flag Over City Hall: It Should Symbolize a Unity of Democratic Forces Rather Than a 'Changing of the Guard'"]

[Text] Lvov. 8 Market Square. A yellow-and-blue flag over the entrance-way. A corridor. Two modest-sized rooms. Here one saw tables and chairs placed, in all probability, without need from one of the neighboring offices. Telephones ringing off their hooks without stop. It is to this place, to the organizational center of Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroika] that the threads lead from all the rayons of Lvov Oblast, as well as from the entire Western Ukraine.

One person who does not wish Rukh well stated the following:

"There, under that yellow-and-blue flag, they are preparing a threat to the Soviet regime. Moreover, it should be noted that they are absolutely free in their actions, even though they are only a few steps away from the gorispolkom!"

That is true. Across the street is the renowned city hall, the city mayor's office, as they say nowadays in Lvov. Right alongside is the building of the party obkom and oblispolkom. Located nearby is the Ukrainian Komsomol Oblast Committee. There are hundreds of rooms, tables, and offices. There are hundreds of functionaries, among whom are quite a few intelligent and talented organizers engaged these days in the same activity as the people at the RUKh Headquarters—in the struggle for power.

I want to be correctly understood. These remarks, subjective in their essence, have been written for the sole purpose of analyzing the general political situation in this region, to predict its development, and to make conjectures about the emergence of a new phenomenon in the Ukraine's political life. Let's call this phenomenon the Lvov Opposition within the republic-level parliament. It does no good to anticipate events, arranging or setting up signs of polarity. Time will do all of this best.

Any kind of forecast or prognosis stems from an analysis of the past and the present, but policy without a forecast is a dangerous matter. Therefore, let's turn to the recent past.

I repeat once more the following, already quite well-worn postulate: the party initiated perestroika. It does no good to nitpick as to which precise forces of the CPSU decided on this step—that's quite obvious. The party proclaimed glasnost and the democratization of society; it stopped professing and imposing upon the masses the division of society into "enemies" and "friends" of the people. A political pluralism was legalized instead of a pluralism in everyday matters and in matters of "taste." Returning to Lvov from their Siberian "wanderings" were Vyacheslav Chornovil, the Goryn brothers, Ivan Gel, and Stepan Khmara, whereas Levko Lukyanenko and Oles Shevchenko returned to Kiev. Some of them had served time for 5 or even 25 years. Time and again they were compelled to renounce their own opinions. The system was like that. Probably, and even most likely, we would consider their way of looking at the world to be erroneous, but we should not force them to think one way and not another. In the final analysis, each state has its own attitude toward those persons who "think differently," and each nation deserves that history which it has.

Two years ago there was a campaign in Lvov to expel the Goryn brothers and Chornovil from the USSR. This was a relapse and last gasp of a moribund policy, which finally expired. But it enhanced even more the halo effect around these names.

Of course, not everyone professed the attitudes of the "new political leaders." That was one of the reasons which impelled the latter toward a certain reorientation. And so the UKhS [Ukrainian Helsinki Union] emerged; it placed the functions of defending human rights at the head of its platform. But even this "signboard" did not allow the new structure to become a mass structure, taking into account the interests of various strata of the population. Despite its quite extensive popularity in the Western region, the UKhS has essentially remained a limited type of organization, whereas the growing public activity of broad strata of the population has been demanding new political structures.

The city of Lvov has witnessed the rise of dozens of new organizations claiming to express the aspirations of certain forces. Their spectrum is extremely broad—ranging from the Society for the Ukrainian Language and the Lvov Association, which base their activities primarily on the ideas of reviving the national or ethnic culture, to the Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth, which demands the rehabilitation of the nationalistic movement dating from the wartime and postwar years, as well as the creation of an independent Ukrainian state outside of the USSR.

The autumn of last year witnessed the Rukh's constituent congress. This organization is based primarily on

the "Lvov ideas," uniting all these forces under a single organizational roof but not claiming ideological leadership over them. And within a few months after this event, on 18 November of last year, 43 informal organizations decided to found the Ukrainian Democratic Bloc in order to coordinate joint activity in the upcoming elections.

We should also attribute to the prehistory of the present-day political struggle the massed offensive waged by the radicals on the initial draft of the Election Law. Two alternative documents were put forth; and a significant portion of their statutes were included in the law as finally approved. They made it much more democratic and allowed all those enjoying the voters' support to attain seats as peoples' deputies virtually without encountering any bureaucratic obstacles. This considerably simplified the task of the DBU [Ukrainian Democratic Bloc] and even exceeded the expectations of its leaders. At least in the Galician region.

"We expected to be pressed more tightly by the apparatus," I was told by Taras Pakholyuk, chief of the DBU's organization division in Lvov Oblast. "Therefore, we prepared several candidates for each electoral district."

Let me add the following statement: Two months ago the DBU nominated its own candidates from all the districts to run for the Supreme Soviet and the oblast soviets. And only a few of the local soviets were able to successfully resist the democratic bloc's intensified pressure. According to the estimates of the DBU leaders, the bloc in Lvov Oblast stands to obtain as many as 80 percent of the seats in the Ukrainian Parliament and only slightly less in the oblast Soviet. As to the local organs of power, the struggle here will be waged equally against the "anti-bloc" forces and the "independent" candidates.

Of course, the figures cited above could be termed "unobjective." Who is capable of verifying them? They were developed from a unique kind of rating of the candidates' popularity as shown during the nominating process. A significant portion of the Rukh Regional Council, the UKhS, the Committee for the Defense of the Ukrainian Catholic Church, as well as the SNUM [Association of Independent Ukrainian Youth], Memorial, and the Lvov Association received "votes of confidence" by wide majorities in several collectives and various districts. They will have to cudgel their brains to decide where to stand for the actual election. And the recent political prisoner V. Chornovil was nominated by 16 enterprises and organizations in Shevchenkivskiy Rayon alone.

Just what is so attractive about the ideas of the Democratic Bloc in the Western Ukraine? Let me quote from its election manifesto:

"What have four and a half years of perestroika in the Ukraine brought us? The showy demonstration of 1 May 1986 in Kiev at a time when the cloud of nuclear radioactivity from Chernobyl covered the Ukraine. A substitution of rubber clubs for political and ideological

discussions.... In proceeding to the elections, we proclaim the following: No to retaining or restoring the old system, No...to the dictates of the ruling ideology and to dictatorship from the Center.... We advocate genuine political and economic sovereignty for the Ukraine...equitable forms of property ownership—state, cooperative, individual, shareholding, private, mixed or combined-type...."

Let me note, by the way, that a considerable portion of these demands has also been reflected in the election platform of the Ukrainian CP Central Committee and that of the Lvov Party Obkom.

A declaration is a declaration. It has been approved by all the structures included within the DBU. (Among them, by the way, the only traditional one is the Lvov Komsomol Gorkom). But each of them has reserved the right for itself the right to treat the declaration in accordance with its own political platform. In my opinion, it is precisely this circumstance which allows the DBU to have wide room to maneuver in; its tactics are more flexible and less vulnerable than the position taken by the formal structures.

The Ukrainian Helsinki Union represents some extremely radical forces. And, although nowadays the UKhS is undergoing considerable organizational difficulties (they are even beginning to talk about a split), its authority, especially in the western region, is still quite great. What is it doing to maintain this position?

V. Chornovil, a member of the UKhS Ispolkom, has stated the following: "I would call our position a program for national salvation. Its key principle is placing our wager on our own forces and the republic's full economic independence. There should be no kind of state ownership of property; economic life ought to be "de-ideologized." The chief method whereby the Ukraine interacts economically with other regions should be shipping goods on principles of parity and based on the world price index. Agriculture must be converted to the farmer-cooperative path of development...."

The political actions of Lvov's Memorial group are increasing. It has been conducting quite fruitful work in this region. I requested Ye. Gryniv, its board chairman, to tell us about their election platform. Here is what he said:

"Whereas the All-Union Memorial Organization has set as its task the rehabilitation of specific persons, we regard this problem somewhat more broadly. We advocate the rehabilitation of political organizations and tendencies."

...And so the wagers have been staked. What lies ahead?

The opposition groups have been outlined and nominated. And it would hardly be worthwhile to seek out the

sources and essence of the election programs and promises. The program of the Ukrainian CP Obkom is progressive and realistic. To my way of thinking, with regard to many components it surpasses the declarative platform of the DBU. But people have stopped believing the bureaucratic apparatus, which is associated with a party that, in turn, has become fused with the state.

There is only one solution, and that is to once again ask ourselves the following question: "What is to be done?" and attempt to answer it. After a great many years, we must begin all over again. But first we must acknowledge the reality—Yes, we do have a multi-party system. De facto. There will no longer be a monopoly of power in any political structure.

The established system, the reliable mechanism for "expressing the will" during the years of stagnation and earlier have fallen into the Lethe of oblivion. New times have arrived. It may be that we are approaching the most difficult lesson in our history, covered with the bitterness of mistrust. It must be undergone and lived through, for to stray from the democratic path in this situation is hardly possible.

These notes were prepared for the press long before the elections and for various reasons were not published earlier. My forecast has been confirmed for the most part. Moreover, the positions of the DBU proved to be stronger than its leaders had assumed, despite the split introduced into the bloc by the Lvov Strike Committee. In 24 districts sure victories have already been won by 18 candidates from the DBU for seats in the republic-level Supreme Soviet. Among them are Vyacheslav Chernovil, the Goryn brothers, Orest Vlokh, chairman of the NRU Kray Soviet, the writer Ivan Drach, and other political leaders of the Lvov group. There is a continuing struggle in the remaining eight districts. Furthermore, in five of them both aspirants are from the Democratic Bloc, and only in three is it theoretically possible for another candidate to gain the victory!

The difficult search for compromises is approaching, but it is only by such a path that we can approach genuine democracy.

Clergy Take Over Lvov Mayor's Office

90UN1569B Kiev RADYANSKA UKRAYINA in
Ukrainian 25 Mar 90 p 3

[Article by RADYANSKA UKRAYINA correspondent O. Telenchi: "Ten Days That Shook... The Executive Committee"]

[Text] *A group of Russian Orthodox priests seized the office of the first deputy chairman of the Lvov City Executive Committee and declared a hunger strike.*

The season of Lent which is currently in progress usually constitutes for the clergy and the laity a period of

meditation and removal from mundane concerns. This year the ancient tradition has been honored in the breach. Soon after completion of the first phase of work by a quadripartite joint commission of churchmen, the purpose of which is to normalize relations between Russian Orthodox and Greek Catholics, and which unfortunately has yet to achieve results, a declaration of protest was sent to the chairman of the city executive committee. It was signed by members of the Council of the Lvov Stavropihiyske Brotherhood, by Russian Orthodox priests, and by members of the laity. Here is an exact quote from the declaration: "Commission members visited and made a verbal appeal to comrade B. D. Kotyk, chairman of the city executive committee, with the request that the executive committee make an effort to help settle the conflict. The commission received assurances from the chairman of the city executive committee that every effort would be made to normalize interconfessional relations. But at the same time as the commission was being given the assurances by the head of city government, the courtyard of the Cathedral of Saint George was filled with Greek Catholics...."

"Our declaration is a protest by the Russian Orthodox citizens of Lvov against the inaction and terrible indifference on the part of the Lvov City Executive Committee, which has become a seedbed of illegality in the situation which has arisen.

"The authorities, and you personally, Bohdan Dmytrovysh, have stated in response to our numerous appeals and declarations that there is at the present time no law for settling such conflicts. The commission has provided such a law, But the executive committee remains silent. One has the impression that what you want is conflict, not tranquillity or resolution of conflict. In submitting this protest, we Russian Orthodox residents of Lvov, who are today without rights and in a state of servitude, hereby declare a hunger strike on the premises of your office."

The hunger strike, which is in its 10th day now, is highly symbolic, since the priests are being spelled daily. Nor can this action be called picketing, for the law clearly defines arbitrary seizure of government offices. It is difficult even to imagine how events would have developed if the priests had in fact occupied the mayor's office on the eve of the second round of elections. But circumstances were such that at that time technicians were installing computers in the mayor's office, and Bohdan Dmytrovysh invited the delegation into the office of his first deputy, I. M. Pantsyuk, where they lit a candle. And in order that the flame from that candle not cause an interconfessional "conflagration," city executive committee officials decided not to call in law enforcement agencies, in the hopes that the Lord God would instruct the priests that it is not right to respond to force with force. The hunger strike on the premises of the city executive committee is no less uncivilized than the picketing of Saint George's Church.

At first Ivan Mykolayovych Pantsyuk, gathering all his willpower and self-control, endeavored to work in his office in the presence of the uninvited guests. If they had quietly fasted, perhaps peaceful coexistence between the parties would have continued right up to the present time. But the priests are constantly visited by laypeople with emotions whipped up by the dramatic situation. Therefore Pantsyuk was forced to ask a colleague to let him share his quarters.

What does the city's mayor, Ukrainian SSR People's Deputy B. Kotyk, have to say about the situation?

"In the course of this last year accusations have been leveled at me as the mayor, in turn by the Greek

Catholics and the Russian Orthodox. The Greek Catholics claim that the city authorities are doing nothing to return the churches to them. The Russian Orthodox accuse me of going along with the Greek Catholics and of being disinclined to protect their churches. Both sides demand decisive actions. I want to state to religious believers and members of the clergy as well as to the citizens of Lvov that as long as I am heading the city soviet, as long as no violence occurs as regards religious affairs, force will not be used. I appeal to the citizens of Lvov—Russian Orthodox and Greek Catholics—to halt this confrontation and to observe law and order. New democratic bodies will soon be formed, which will address the religious situation."

USSR, Western Crime Statistics Compared

90UN1124A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 9,
Feb 90 p 10

[Interview with Igor Ivanovich Karpets, director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Law and Order, by Marina Mulina: "Igor Karpets: 'Cruelty Engenders Only Cruelty'"]

[Text] Now director of the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Law and Order, Igor Ivanovich Karpets worked for many years in criminal investigation. As a practician he unmasked criminals. As a scholar he has attempted to understand who he is dealing with, to conceptualize crime in this country. He was the first practician to defend a doctoral dissertation on the problems of punishment. He has been nominated for people's deputy of the RSFSR.

[Mulina] Igor Ivanovich, I have come to you with a thought that is seditious for our times: Is the outburst of crime in our country as great as many believe?

[Karpets] That's amusing. There was a time when something else was considered seditious. When in the 1960s I expressed the opinion in the magazine SOVETSKOYE GOSUDARSTVO I PRAVO that crime is a logical and inevitable phenomenon for socialism, it was perceived like lightning out of a clear blue sky, slander against our order. After all, it was written in the party program that there can be no place in a society building communism for legal violations or crime. I had to go explain at the CPSU Central Committee. But that's a separate story. What did you want to know about specifically?

[Mulina] Well, for example, how does our national crime look in comparison with crime abroad?

[Karpets] In general, one must treat any comparisons with caution. Nevertheless, if you insist... Scholars use the concept of a "crime index." This is the number of crimes per 10,000 or 100,000 population. In various countries this is calculated differently, including in the calculation either the total population or only those who bear criminal responsibility. So that according to the index for 100,000 population the difference with other countries is colossal. In the USSR there are 650-700 crimes, in Japan, which we always consider a standard, over 1,300, in the USA over 5,000, in West Germany—even more. Until recently only one country was lower than us in this respect—East Germany. But in all the other socialist countries, it was also higher than ours.

In the USSR and the USA about the same number of murders are reported—15,000-18,000 per year. But we have always boasted that the nature of murder among us is different. There the streets are more dangerous because that is where violent attacks are committed, and so on. Up to now our murders have been committed primarily in the context of daily life. It makes you wonder, how glorious a picture is it for our society when people murder within their own family?

Furthermore, in the USSR of late about 2 million crimes have been reported a year, 2.5 million in 1989. But in the USA it is 15-17 million. Although, American specialists say that this is approximately half of what actually occurs. I don't think we have such an enormous percentage of unreported crimes as in the USA.

[Mulina] However, if I understand correctly, recently our index has begun to rise at a greater pace, in connection with which a broad campaign against crime has been unveiled?

[Karpets] No, the overall number of crimes committed is climbing steadily. The number of crimes for every 100,000 population so far remains practically unchanged. That is, for a long time the index has been virtually identical.

[Mulina] But one contradicts the other.

[Karpets] Not at all. It's just that the country's overall population is growing.

[Mulina] This is a revelation for me. But that changes a lot.

[Karpets] Certainly.

[Mulina] Why aren't these figures cited, why aren't they discussed?

[Karpets] It's just that very little attention gets paid to them. But I have to say, you cannot approach crime or its index from the standpoint of averages. There are regions in our country where the index for adolescent crime, for example, differs in a proportion of 1 to 23. In general, we must not hide behind cited figures, inasmuch as the structure and nature of crime has changed in an untoward direction. Within the overall figure the number of serious crimes has burgeoned. Ordinary extortion has spilled over into racketeering. Never before have we had such dangerous forms of crime. I say this both as a scholar and as a practicion who headed up the country's criminal investigation, through whose hands an enormous quantity of cases passed over many years, and who saw and knew the tendencies.

In general this period of social upheaval and economic disaster have contributed quite naturally to the rise in crime. We must view matters soberly: the crime index is going to get worse.

[Mulina] Undoubtedly we have to treat what is going on soberly. There's no point in public awareness steeping itself in new myths in place of the old. And it seems to me that such a danger does exist today.

[Karpets] Yes, right now, for example, we are screaming about organized crime. But I see political speculation as well in those outcries. There is the feeling that it absolutely has to be coming from the very very top. But as Western experience demonstrates, as does our own reality by the way, it can be limited to specific social strata. An obvious criminogenic system where organized

crime has woven its nest here is trade. Crime reacts very sensitively to any economic incongruity. An example. If you please. By letting the development of cooperatives loose on the will of the waves we provoked negative tendencies. After all, what is the extortion that has blossomed so lushly among us? If you like, it is also a kind of elemental protest against the unjust enrichment of a specific group of people. You will forgive me, but a girl who has graduated from law school would earn 140 rubles a month in our institute, but if she joined a cooperative she would get at least 8,000 for three months. For what? I'm not opposed to cooperation, God forbid, it's a progressive form. But we have a way of turning it into a sacred cow. Once again we are going to have to summon up our courage and demonstrate the necessity for control, after all, the mafia is raking it in there.

[Mulina] When I was talking about myths, I was mostly concerned about something else. At one time we actively discussed the necessity for humanizing the lawkeeping system, which is directly connected with the humanization of society as a whole. However, soon after the mass media were filled with terrifying mind-boggling MVD reports containing figures on the growth of crime. The Supreme Soviet formed special commissions, a war against crime was declared—and the talk about humanization died down and then stopped altogether. Meanwhile, from the data you've cited it's evident that "crime" in our society is to a significant degree the fruit of fantasy cleverly buttressed by numbers.

[Karpets] I have the sense that we are still going to have to go back to our national history to understand what is going on right now. Scholars who attempted to study criminology did not come to good ends. Professor A. S. Shlyapnikov, the director of an analogous institute created in the 1930s, for example, served more than 10 years. The news about the opening of our institute in 1963 was received abroad with colossal interest. However the philosophers, and the sociologists and jurists after them, continued to intone: crime is an outlived phenomenon, we do not have nor could there be any causes for it. So that we were forced to approach domestic problems with a bludgeon. There was a reigning formula: we must liquidate crime and its sources. But how could we liquidate all the contradictions of society? Without liquidating society itself, that is. And so when, with this understanding of crime, the numbers rose significantly in 1965-66, it provoked great alarm; resolutions were passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers on intensifying the war against crime, as was a Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet which increased the punishment for hooliganism. To this day there is a feeling that the lawkeeping organs constitute a system that is supposed to lower crime. What came out of that in the final analysis? Party and soviet leaders called in police chiefs, public prosecutors, even judges, and shouted at them: why are you letting crime rise? As if they were making the crime themselves. Horrible political slogans

(We must liquidate this; we must deal with that) led to a tragic thing: people were pushed to abuse. How else can you lower crime when it is objectively growing? It is quite possible to "liquidate" hooliganism without opening a single criminal case, by transferring everything to administrative practice. But after all, that's nothing but eyewash. Similar measures led to the fact that in 1967-68—in report figures—crime went down sharply. And the fiftieth anniversary of the revolution was greeted by good indicators.

[Mulina] By the way, now, after this last noisy campaign, the figures have also gone down somewhat.

[Karpets] I'm not about to cite any analogies. I want to talk about something else. In the fight against crime no extraordinary measures in and of themselves are going to work. It's a very complicated phenomenon with roots in all the contradictions that permeate our society at its concrete stage of development. Everyone already understands this intellectually. Criminology has begun to be taught in the VUZs. Five people, including myself, have even received state prizes for creating the theoretical foundations for Soviet criminology. Now the USSR belongs to all international societies involved with this problem.

But the habit of campaigns, of banking on law, on the force of repressions, remains. And we are once again fighting, striking blows, taking extraordinary measures....

[Mulina] A stream of letters has been coming into our editorial office on this wave: this country's laws, people say, are too soft.

[Karpets] This is how we always argue: either make them tougher or make them more humane. It's possible to do both. I think that humanization must come about through the application of a broader spectrum of measures unrelated to incarceration for those who have committed crimes that do not pose any particular danger to those around them. That is always correct, no matter what the circumstances. We must take into account life's difficult circumstances, which, unfortunately, have become the rule for us. Economic issues cannot be resolved only with the help of prisons. Like during those years when people got five years for a stolen ear of corn. What, are we now supposed to go back to something like that because we've destroyed our economy? We have to understand that if we're going to imprison people like that, then we're going to accumulate nothing but enemies of Soviet power. Where we need to be tougher is with respect to those who commit serious crimes. Moreover, our legislation is harsh enough, and the punishment measures for serious crimes are wholly sufficient. Up to 10 or 15 years of incarceration. There, by the way, in this regard a discussion about the death sentence has also come up. There is an organization called International Amnesty. Almost every day I receive two or three letters from its representatives. They are asking me to approach the legislative organs with a proposal to repeal the death

sentence. But the letters I get from Soviet citizens demand that we shoot everyone, hang everyone. Almost no country in Western Europe has the death penalty. Shortly before the recent events, East Germany abolished it. In the USA only a few states have it. Only socialist countries retain the death sentence. Although I don't think there's any way we could repeal it here given public opinion.

[Mulina] West Germany, where the crime rate is so high, doesn't have it either?

[Karpets] That's right. Nor does Italy, the Mafia's homeland. I've studied this problem on a scholarly level. And this is what I'll say: in 1947, under Stalin, the death penalty was also abolished here, we didn't have it until 1951. We had to show international society the humanity of our society. But neither the number of murders nor the number of other serious crimes increased during that period, it even decreased. As soon as we reinstated the death penalty, the number of these crimes increased.

[Mulina] Do you see a relationship here?

[Karpets] I see an objective fact, a refutation of the certainty that all we have to do is introduce the cudgel and everything will be okay. The reality is different: they introduced the cudgel and it got worse. That means that crime still possesses specific objective laws. And however great a role our legal measures play, it is still secondary, supporting. First of all we must solve the problems of society that engender crime. World criminology has been talking about this for three hundred years.

[Mulina] Nonetheless, today an image has been created of actively changing lawkeeping organs. To what extent does this correspond to reality?

[Karpets] Judges and public prosecutors now receive raised—almost doubled—salaries. The issue of whether or not to raise police pay is also being resolved. But if we do not simultaneously raise our demands on personnel, do not replace those who need to be driven out of the lawkeeping system, we'll only be spending more money and not getting anything out of it. Personnel qualifications have to be raised, they need to be instructed in new methods. We need professionals. We need to think about a system of training and retraining—and I don't mean getting by with accelerated courses, in general I don't believe in that kind of "universal education." Second, we are seriously behind in technology. Recently I was in the USA and I can compare: we're on the level of the 18th century in comparison with what I saw there. In order to rise to this new level, we need to join Interpol. We must know what modern police and lawkeeping organs have and determine what we most need. There are instances when people detained for committing serious crimes are brought to the department of internal affairs, and simultaneously a car drives up to the building belonging to the criminals or, more precisely, to their accomplices, with eavesdropping devices. And

when the detainee says that something is hidden somewhere, criminal investigation or the BKhSS [Administration for Combating Embezzlement of Socialist Property and Speculation] goes to the indicated spot and there's nothing there. The criminals are better equipped than we are. The whole world uses video technology in conducting investigations to strengthen evidence. But not us...

[Mulina] But that threatens to violate the rights of the individual.

[Karpets] Those things must be strengthened legislatively. The law—not instructions, not statutes—must cover everything, including extraordinary measures, separately in peace time and war. Only then can we count on people's safety.

Supreme Soviet Deputy On Court System Changes

90UN1202A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA in Russian No 3, Feb 90 (signed to press 25 Jan 90) pp 16-17

[Interview with A. Oborin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Improving Criminal Legislation by special correspondent M. Tkachenko: "Major Step On The Path To Rule-Of-Law State"]

[Text] As we know, the USSR Supreme Soviet recently adopted new Basic Principles of USSR and Union Republic Legislation on the Judicial System. It is noteworthy that in the overall atmosphere of heated debate at the Supreme Soviet's second session, not one of the 397 Deputies present voted against the new principles. Among other things, the basic principles' articles call for the creation of specialized courts, the participation of defense representatives from the moment of detention, arrest, or bringing of charges, the hearing of criminal cases involving especially grave crimes by a court of jurors (a collegium of people's assessors), and so on.

Our special correspondent M. Tkachenko asked A. Oborin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Subcommittee on Improving Criminal Legislation and Chairman of the Kozmodemyanskiy City People's Court, to tell about this and other legislative acts of the USSR Supreme Soviet in more detail.

[Oborin] The Basic Principles on the Judicial System cannot be viewed apart from other laws adopted at the session. They are but a part of a "single package" that includes a Law on Liability for Contempt of Court and a Law on the Procedure for Appealing to the Courts Unlawful Actions by State Administrative Agencies and Officials That Infringe on Citizens' Rights. And three months earlier, the Supreme Soviet passed a Law on the Status of Judges in the USSR. All of them, supplementing each other and making each other more concrete, have substantially advanced our court system on the path to the creation of a rule-of-law state.

[Correspondent] Anatoliy Vasilyevich, the Basic Principles stipulate that courts of jurors are to be introduced only in those instances where the death penalty or deprivation of freedom for a term of more than 10 years are applicable. Why?

[Oborin] Maximum use of the court of jurors must be made only in cases that constitute extremely tragic situations or that affect the supreme interests of society. The question of the supreme penalty and its complexity are well known—what can be more valuable than human life? If the defendant does not admit guilt, he can demand a court of jurors.

[Correspondent] Do you foresee broader use of courts of jurors as the legal reform is implemented?

[Oborin] I don't think they will come into widespread use. Cases that do not constitute some special urgency will be heard within the framework of the existing judicial system. Moreover, looking ahead, we will most likely submit a proposal for amending the Constitution, so that certain categories of cases can be heard by a single judge. As a professional judge, I can say that, for example, in cases involving dissolution of marriage, this is even preferable in some instances. This is a common phenomenon, and other countries employ this practice.

[Correspondent] Will all citizens under the new law have the right to a defense lawyer at an early stage of the investigation, or are there some stipulations and restrictions here too?

[Oborin] We wrote in the law that the defense lawyer must participate in the case from the moment of the defendant's detention or arrest, and in all stages of the judicial investigation thereafter. After all, today, for example, the defense lawyer basically becomes involved in a case whose investigation is already completed. But imagine that he is with the defendant from the very outset of the process. On one hand, this is very good: It is a guarantee that the defendant will have legal protection and that the investigators will use only legal investigative methods. On the other hand, many legal issues will arise. For example, who will pay for this work, and how? Where is a defense lawyer going to be found if this action takes place at night? Some of them, it seems to me, are quite comfortable with the previous practice, and they do not want to meet with the accused in the early stages.

[Correspondent] Indeed, how will defense lawyers be paid? For example, can two people, one of whom is financially secure and the other of lesser means, count on an equal degree of justice?

[Oborin] In my view, the state must see to it that citizens are provided with legal protection. We must guarantee, regardless of people's financial situations, equal protection and equal opportunity for all who find themselves in the criminal law sphere. I think that funds for this must be found in the state budget.

[Correspondent] It is doubtful that the state budget has the wherewithal to provide all citizens with a competent defense. That's one point. Second, do we have enough defense lawyers to implement this provision of the law?

[Oborin] It is indeed true that in some areas, especially remote areas, we will encounter a situation in which it will be very difficult to provide a defendant with a defense lawyer. I think that these questions will be resolved in the new Law on the Defense Lawyer, the draft of which our committee already has.

[Correspondent] It will probably be necessary to enlist hundreds of new professionals in the field.

[Oborin] Without a doubt. We are faced with this task, and we cannot walk away from it.

[Correspondent] Could you comment on the provision of the Basic Principles on creating specialized courts?

[Oborin] Here we have introduced the term "compositions [sostavy] of courts specializing in the hearing of certain specific categories of cases." These include domestic, patent, and other courts. This will not be some sort of detached structure with a distinct framework, powers, and responsibilities. There will simply be special compositions [sostavy] within this structure. For example, I am a court chairman and, at the same time, I hear cases involving minors. Other judges also specialize. In the future, this picture might change. For instance, an economic court might arise on the basis of the present arbitration system. All this is a matter of time, and it cannot be rushed. As we deal with many problems, I don't think that everything that has sprouted in other countries will take root in the Soviet Union. When borrowing, we must compare the things to be borrowed with the traditions that exist in our country.

[Correspondent] When it was considering the draft law on the judicial system, the Supreme Soviet rejected a proposal from USSR General Procurator A. Sukharev that the draft law be amended with a provision on procurators' powers. Yet oversight of the observance of legality markedly reduces the number of miscarriages of justice. Why was that proposal rejected?

[Oborin] First, he was too late—the law had already been adopted. Second, I would say that we did not curtail the procurator's powers but clarified them. Why did this happen? In the procurator's understanding, he exercises oversight directly in the process of the hearing of specific civilian and criminal cases. But in the current Article No. 16 of the Basic Principles, this is worded as follows: The General Procurator and the procurators subordinate to him participate in the hearing of cases in the courts on the basis of and in accordance with the procedure established by USSR and union republic legislation. The old version said that the General Procurator and the procurators subordinate to him take part in hearing cases in the courts and exercise oversight of the legality and validity of the courts' verdicts, sentences, rulings and resolutions. It is very difficult to be objective when you

simultaneously defend, indict, exercise investigative oversight, sanction arrest, and so on. In a trial, it is the judge who must be master. But after he has rendered a decision, the appropriate procurators can appeal to a higher court, up to and including a plenary session of the USSR Supreme Court.

[Correspondent] How do you see the practical implementation of the Law on Liability for Contempt of Court? What guarantees of judges' immunity are provided? According to reports from various parts of the country, judges are often threatened by accomplices of a defendant who remain at large and who try to force him to take a certain decision.

[Oborin] Protection of judges is to be effected on a universal basis. If a judge complains that he is being threatened, the appropriate agencies are to conduct an investigation, institute criminal proceedings, and obtain evidence, after which the criminal is to stand trial on a universal basis. We included in the new law an article stating that threats to assassinate a judge or to destroy his property, or a threat against his relatives, including by telephone, entails punishment up to and including deprivation of freedom.

[Correspondent] You already observed that the adoption of the package of laws regulating the courts' activities represents a major step in the direction of the establishment of a rule-of-law state in the USSR. What subsequent steps will be taken in this direction?

[Oborin] It seems to me that we have to restructure the entire system of mutual relations among law-enforcement agencies. The USSR Supreme Soviet has already laid the groundwork for such a perestroyka. We must create a system in which no single agency—be it the procuracy, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, or the State Security Committee (they engage in a certain amount of competition)—stands above another. They must be in a situation that rules out abuses. We think that, in adopting the new Laws on the Supreme Court and the Procuracy, we will be able to put these relations on an equal footing. We will single out the court in the special power structure and confer appropriate powers on the remaining law-enforcement agencies.

[Correspondent] How do you assess the recently concluded Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies?

[Oborin] In my opinion, it proceeded normally. A healthy polarization of forces took place at it through the Deputies' psychological emancipation. The chief service of the first congress was the creation of a standing Supreme Soviet. And our parliament has proved not bad at all, despite certain pessimistic predictions. In my opinion, the Supreme Soviet today is even more democratic and progressive than the congress itself.

As for the Second Congress of People's Deputies, it adopted a number of specific decisions that advance

perestroyka by clearing the obstructions of the past from its path. And once again, much of this is thanks to the Supreme Soviet.

First and foremost, the government's economic recovery program was adopted. And although many prominent Deputies with economic expertise advocated significantly more radical steps in effecting economic changes and the immediate introduction of a market system, I think that the measures proposed by the government are more suitable for our situation. We are coming to the ever-firmer conclusion that we cannot effect drastic leaps today, especially in view of the fact that world experience demonstrates that they have little prospect of success. It is also important that the congress entrusted the Supreme Soviet with refining and adopting laws on property, land, and the socialist enterprise.

I also think that the Deputies committees set up at the first congress have also done a good job, on the whole. A clear-cut political assessment was given to the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact and to the events in Tbilisi.

[Correspondent] The Congress of People's Deputies continued the Supreme Soviet's line aimed at creating a rule-of-law state in the USSR—above all, it would seem, by the creation of the Constitutional Oversight Committee. However, many Deputies, it seemed to me, remained unsatisfied. Views were expressed to the effect that this is premature at this time and that there is no pressing need for its existence in the first place.

[Oborin] We were remiss in not creating that institution at the dawn of Soviet rule. The Constitutional Oversight Committee could have long since served as a barrier to the repressions and to arbitrary rule. But I think that the Deputies were right in not voting for the status initially proposed for the committee. Now a compromise amendment has been submitted, under which the Law on Constitutional Oversight will take effect on January 1, 1990, and will concern primarily the setting of departmental norms and the protection of human rights, and that it will not extend to republic Constitutions. And this situation will remain in effect until we either adopt a new basic law for the country on the basis of the Constitutions drawn up by the union and autonomous republics, or a special article in the union Constitution on the national and state structure of the USSR, one that would eliminate all tensions between the center and the republics.

It's true that I, like many other members of the Supreme Soviet Legislation, Legality, and Law and Order Committee, deeply regret the fact that Sergey Sergeyevich Alekseyev, a great scholar and wonderful person, is leaving us. He is undoubtedly a find for the kind of body the Constitutional Oversight Committee will be.

[Correspondent] What can you, as a professional, say about the reports by V. Bakatin and A. Sukharev on organized crime?

[Oborin] The minister, of course, presented a detailed picture of what is taking place in our country in this sphere and submitted constructive proposals as to how law-enforcement agencies and society in general must combat crime. The General Procurator's report seemed to me abstract.

First of all, I want to point out that—and this was emphasized in both reports—a certain psychological breakthrough has occurred in our society recently. Two years ago, for example, I noticed—including first-hand, as a judge—a universal disrespect for law-enforcement agencies. Society was even inclined to defend criminals. But now it has embraced law-enforcement agencies and actively helps them combat negative phenomena in our life.

It is very important that the Congress of USSR People's Deputies' resolution instructs the USSR Council of Ministers to channel additional funds, including through conversion, to reequipping the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the State Security Committee, and the Procuracy. This is a significant decision, because although good things were also said in the past, no equipment ever materialized. A new, more exacting approach will also be taken to personnel in law enforcement agencies.

In addition, the Supreme Soviet is creating a special committee to combat organized crime. It will have access to all research and current information on this problem, and it will be granted considerable powers. The new committee will work to untie all the knots and all the conflicts between law and policy. That's one thing. Second, the committee has the right to hear testimony from any official in any sphere and to call on [vykhodit na] top state leaders. The inception of this parliamentary committee signals the future extinction of the interim anticrime committees, which, strictly speaking, were set up as transitional bodies, pending the creation of a broad, nationwide program for combating crime.

The committees are also discussing the question of an independent investigative agency. It may prove expedient to make it directly subordinate to the Supreme Soviet. In addition, the new draft Law on the Militia provides for its division into federal and municipal branches. The federal branch would handle criminal investigations and crimes involving theft of socialist property, be subordinate to no one at the local level, and have direct recourse [vozmozhnost pryamo vykhodit na] to the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs. The second branch would deal with local problems and the maintenance of public order. At present we are drafting new basic principles of criminal and criminal-procedure legislation, and considering the possibility of legalizing eavesdropping on telephone conversations and concealed videotaping with a court's consent, as well as the submission of materials so obtained as evidence in a trial. All this will, it seems, substantially promote the fight against organized crime. But no matter what we say about this, of course, it must not be forgotten that it is result of our distorted economic relations, inflation, and

empty shelves. Therefore, in combating these phenomena, the law must go hand in hand with profound reforms aimed at renewing our entire life.

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Fighting Crime in 'Shadow Economy'

Criminal Methods Reported

90UN1178A Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* in Russian No 10, Mar 90 p 18

[Article by A. Dolgova, head of General Criminology Problems Sector under All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Law and Order: "The Criminal Stew is Bubbling"]

[Text] I am a criminologist. And criminology, as you are aware, is a science about crime, its motivations and ways of combatting it. I must approach economic problems by way of crime. And even though crime is a phenomenon born of the conditions of social life, it is also capable of having an inverse effect on the conditions which gave rise to it, including economic conditions. Therefore the struggle against crime is at the same time a way of solving problems of an economic nature, and providing the proper economic conditions to carry on that struggle.

Over the past two decades crime has clearly become more profit-oriented in nature; more and more crimes are being committed for the purpose of obtaining cash, an easy living or personal enrichment. Crime has become more and more highly organized.

The "peak" in reported economic crimes was in 1986-87. In those years 282,800 and 279,000 crimes, respectively, were reported. During that same period 306,600 and 302,300 individuals were prosecuted. However, in 1988 (the data from last year have not yet been processed), if we can believe the statistics, there was a marked decrease in crime. What does this mean? Overall improvement in the situation? I do not believe that that is the case.

Analysis of data from various regions indicates that there is no justification for such an optimistic assessment. It becomes clear that the greatest drop in economic crime figures occurred in regions with a great deal of social tension, areas where various types of conflicts are flaring: Transcaucasia and the Baltic republics. That is to say, this figure is actually declining due to the fact that as a result of the general disorder in those regions a large number of crimes are going unnoticed by law enforcement organs and auditing services.

The data gathered lead one to the obvious conclusion that destabilization is to the advantage of underground businessmen. It is indicative that there was a very sharp decline in the number of heads of organizations, enterprises and other production facilities who were found to be involved with criminal activities. In Armenia, for example, this figure decreased by a factor of 14.5 from 1987 to 1988; in Azerbaijan the decrease was by a factor of 10.7, in Estonia a factor of four, in Lithuania a factor of 10.5, and in Latvia a factor of 11.3.

Number of Economic Crimes Reported					
Union Republics	Total			Decrease (-) or Increase (+) in Percent Compared to 1987	
	1987	1988	1989	1988	1989
RSFSR	160,361	151,825	146,215	-5.3	-8.8
Ukrainian SSR	34,739	33,555	33,144	-3.4	-4.6
Belorussian SSR	9,887	9,727	9,810	-1.6	-0.8
Uzbek SSR	18,684	16,898	17,295	-9.6	-7.4
Kazakh SSR	21,021	20,344	20,360	-3.2	-3.1
Georgian SSR	6,017	6,061	5,825	+0.7	-3.2
Azerbaijan SSR	5,427	4,686	4,632	-13.7	-14.6
Lithuanian SSR	3,095	2,820	2,688	-8.9	-13.2
Moldavian SSR	2,776	2,550	2,453	-8.1	-11.6
Latvian SSR	2,165	2,145	1,765	-0.9	-18.5
Kirghiz SSR	3,060	3,070	3,198	+0.3	+4.5
Tajik SSR	3,178	2,882	2,947	-9.3	-7.3
Armenian SSR	2,856	1,836	2,039	-35.7	-28.6
Turkmen SSR	2,616	2,260	2,345	-13.6	-10.4
Estonian SSR	1,049	698	757	-33.5	-27.8

It should be noted that the specific nature of crime in the economy reflects the interconnection between various areas of society and crime in those areas. Thus, criminal cases indicate that the accumulation of huge amounts of valuables in the hands of a few people gives rise to specific socioeconomic interests. Theft of state property is more and more often accompanied by smuggling, currency crimes and more serious state crimes. The need to protect stolen property and to protect oneself from exposure and punishment makes the crime bosses resort to violence, help from corrupt individuals and generalized criminal activity.

Crime is the result of social, economic and political conditions, but it is also capable of having an inverse effect. At the present time it is impossible to assess any aspect of our lives without taking its effects into account.

Let me give you just one example. Today all of us are concerned by the growing social and economic divisions in our society. Yes, differences in levels of material wealth are a natural phenomenon. But nowadays what we are seeing is not the natural differentiation which occurs under socialism and which is the result of differences in the labor contribution made by various members of society, but rather a differentiation in which at one extreme there are individuals who possess tremendous wealth earned by dishonest means, while on the other extreme there are honest people who have labored for the good of our country for many years yet live at or below the poverty level.

In the 1982-89 period surveys of members of various social groups were conducted in various regions of the RSFSR, Moldavian SSR and Kirghiz SSR for the purpose of analyzing the relationship between real income and the actual material wealth of workers in heavy industry, trade and consumer services. The majority of those surveyed in 12 regions ascribed the existence of two polarized groups of rich and poor individuals, firstly, to differences in income and, to a far lesser degree, to differences in income. Secondly, they cited violations of the principles of distribution on the basis of labor, reduced monitoring of labor output indicators and outright criminal activity.

In the opinion of one-half of those surveyed (and even more in some regions) the substantially better material prosperity of individuals known to them personally was due to the fact that those individuals had access to valuable goods through their work. The second most common reason was that they were "necessary people" who received gifts or had various types of services performed free as part of a mutual understanding. Between four and 17 percent of citizens who had not taken part in criminal activity in the various regions pointed to crime as the reason for this substantially improved material prosperity, while 12-19 percent of those previously convicted of crimes did so.

These figures do not contradict the facts which we have today based on the findings of monitoring and law-enforcement organs. In recent decades the use of public property for private ends has become epidemic. Some enterprises and organizations only appear to be state-owned; in fact they are owned, used and administered by groups of shady businessmen who exploit the people who

work there, forcing out honest workers and replacing them with their accomplices. I am not exaggerating. Here is one example: an investigation found that 30 stores out of 32 in the Avtomattorg System in Kiev were infected with economic crime. And there are many similar cases. Monitoring organs found cases of defrauding customers through official policy alone at 40-60 percent of the trade enterprises they inspected in various regions of the country.

This situation is creating chaos in the economic mechanism of trade, serious failings in the system of material and social provision for trade workers, poor technical outfitting of trade enterprises and much more. For decades the trade system has been selecting only those workers who can "survive" under these conditions. And the ones who survived are those who overcame difficulties, bought off higher-level officials, supplier representatives and others, and learned to derive personal benefit.

Criminal activities develop according to this pattern: first money is accumulated at the lower levels through petty theft, defrauding of customers and other tricks, then between one-third and one-half of this money "goes upstairs" in the form of bribes to buy changes in plans or ensure supply of high-demand items, or to cover up cases of missing items, consumer fraud and retention of compromised individuals when these cases are discovered, or to encourage "loyal" individuals. This disorder and chaos heat up the criminal stew and are to the economic advantage of certain social groups, who do everything they can to hinder progressive change.

We should have a very clear perception of the present-day social structure of society and the nature of various groups' economic interests and needs in order to develop a mechanism for combatting crime. Some of those groups are the result of the long-term functioning of an organized system. Of course, I by no means mean to categorize all trade system workers as corrupt out of hand.

I would like to note that the idea of a connection between our country's economic situation and crime is now being championed by many economists. Yet are they always consistent? For example, some give the impression that the sources of the worsening economic situation during the "stagnation period" lay solely with a failure in economic policy and the former theoretical concepts of our present economic mechanism, and that failures today are almost exclusively the result of mafia intrigues. These kinds of shifts of opinion hamper an understanding of the situation. What is needed in our assessments is balance.

Criminology exposes only those links in the cause and effect chain which are closest to crime. True, in contrast to economics, sociology and social psychology it encompasses all the diverse factors which provide fertile soil for crimes. Therefore today we need the closest possible ties

between economists and criminologists. We must conduct a joint expert analysis of economic, social and other planned transformations and assess the political consequences of putting them into practice. We must provide criminological protection for the economy so that it will be an inseparable part of the overall business mechanism, foreseeing the possibility of using innovations for personal gain, and hence helping find effective counter-measures.

Crime Figures Listed

90UN1178B Moscow *EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN* in Russian No 10, Mar 90 p 18

[Article by B. Vasilyev: "Embezzlement in the Economy: Facts and Figures"]

[Text]—In 1989 the share of economic crimes as a component of the total number of crimes committed in our country rose by 10 percent. A total of 257,485 such crimes were reported. A total of 81,228 cases of embezzlement of state or public property were reported, i.e. cases involving misappropriation or unlawful conversion and abuse of official powers: 45,410 cases of speculation, 4,292 cases of bribery and 38,920 cases of petty theft.

—It was noteworthy that over 15 percent of all major thefts were discovered in the trade system, approximately eight percent in the service sector and a little over six percent in the construction industry. A total of 13,541 enterprise administrators and 7,062 accounting personnel were convicted.

—Most typical was a case tried in July of last year by the Kemerovo Oblast People's Court involving thefts by a group of workers from Kiselevsk Motor Vehicle Transport Enterprise. There over a period of almost four years bookkeepers Ovsiyannikova and Vasilchenko and senior cashier Kolybikhina inflated the figures reported to salary-issuing authorities regarding the amount of salary due drivers, thus pocketing 73,000 rubles for themselves. The embezzlers were sentenced to various prison terms.

—There has been virtually no decrease in the total number of speculation cases. Speculation causes great harm to the state economy. Last year various goods and valuables worth a total of approximately nine million rubles were confiscated from speculators. Speculation in spare parts for automobiles has become particularly widespread lately. For example, militiamen caught a certain F., a Tula resident, who had "earned" 7,000 rubles in this way. A criminal gang active in Kuybyshev Oblast was operating on a much larger scale. Almost 200,000 rubles worth of property was confiscated from the gang's members and inventoried.

—Last year the staff of services to prevent embezzlement of socialist property and speculation greatly stepped up their efforts to combat bribery. Whereas in

November only 247 such cases were reported, this number rose to 326 in December.

—Some success has been achieved in regard to solving crimes connected with the embezzlement of fuels and lubricants. Out of 2,223 cases, 759 were discovered at petroleum product production and storage facilities, and 546 at motor vehicle transport enterprises. Damage amounting to over one million rubles was done to the country's economy.

—Last year a total of 1,214 cases of illegal currency transactions were reported, and approximately 32,000 crimes were prevented in the field of business transactions.

MVD Official Answers Readers on Juvenile Crime

90UN1322A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 25 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by A. Bakayev, MVD USSR chief specialist at the Department for Juvenile and Youth Crime Prevention: "Children, Crime and the Law"]

[Text] A. Bakayev, MVD USSR chief specialist at the Department for Juvenile and Youth Crime Prevention, responds to readers' questions received by telephone. Today we are publishing the answers to the most interesting questions.

"Has the number of crimes committed by juveniles increased?" asked B. Buntseyev from Kalinin Oblast, I. Mozolkova from Arkhangelsk and A. Moiseenko of Sukhumi.

[Bakayev] In 1989, 224,000 crimes were committed by juveniles or with their participation, which is 21 percent more than the year before. But for the past five years, juvenile crime has increased on the whole by one-third!

"You can and you should make the punishment applied to juveniles more severe!" according to K. Litvinov of Moscow, V. Kozalenko of Nikolaev and A. Kryuchenkov from Liepaya.

[Bakayev] Which method will lead to the desired result—severity or humanization of relations with law-violators? Judge for yourselves. Last year 212,000 juveniles were involved in crimes. But we have only a little over 27,000 in the corrective labor camps. The rest, of course, are at large. The majority of those who committed minor crimes and were not deprived of their freedom have proven by their subsequent behavior the effectiveness of the humane approach. However, there are also those who interpret humaneness as impunity—13 percent decided to commit crimes again. The fact of the matter is that, while putting the principle of humanization into practice, we failed to provide organized support. You see, these juveniles need special conditions for re-education; they need an individual approach. And what do we have? Lofty figures on the number of

mentors and social education. But there are not enough special schools. And those we do have require reforms...

"Does difficulty in finding a job reflect on the increased crime rate?" ask B. Tsarkov of Moscow and S. Sitnikov of Elektrostal.

[Bakayev] Yes it's true; it's hard for a young person to find work right now. Even under the "new management conditions" the enterprises do not find all labor to their advantage by far. And with juveniles, all the more so. The wages are so low that it makes no sense to work. And what does this lead to? Crime among young people 16-18 years of age, not employed at socially-useful labor, has grown by 33 percent. Therefore we are forced to get involved with finding people jobs—although that is not the militia's job either. Juvenile Affairs inspectors are calling on the enterprises together with their wards. And the ministry, along with other agencies, is preparing proposals on introducing amendments to labor legislation, which would have an effect on the existing situation...

"What to do in one's free time is a problem for many juveniles. Does this not have an effect on crime?" ask A. Khutorov from Tolyatti, N. Laptev of Angarsk and A. Smirnov of Moscow.

[Bakayev] The search for amusement is undoubtedly among the factors leading to the rise in law-violations. Most of the "free" interest groups and sections lead a life of poverty. Local Soviets, unfortunately, have never had the capability of supporting them properly. The general cultural situation also has an effect. The need for cultural establishments and facilities in which amateur youth associations may work is satisfied by one-third. It's impossible to get to an interesting exhibit or buy a good book. The paid interest groups and sections which have appeared are not solving the problem either. How many parents have the means to pay 15 to 30 rubles per month? As a result, more than half the wardship inspections on juvenile affairs—267,000(!)—show that they seek their own entertainment in their free time.

On the one hand, of course, it is difficult to relate these concerns to police business. Should we organize technical creativity societies at our crime laboratories? But on the other—we would not be able to get along without our contribution here either. And so, right now, the police are setting up clubs for juveniles in many cities. I'll give you one example: It was organized by N. Anurov, inspector on juvenile affairs at the 132nd Militia Department in Moscow. Under his leadership, more than 600 kids are taking part in a sports club.

"Video salons are becoming more and more popular. Is there not a better way for young people to occupy their leisure time?" ask A. Overchik of Severodonetsk and N. Kareyev of Moscow.

[Bakayev] In the present form, of course, that is true. Thus far video films are as a rule uncontrolled. Violence and pornography are not going to come off the screens.

And meanwhile the average viewers have been and still are adolescents 8-15 years old. This is why, in my opinion, the outburst of violence among young people last year is no coincidence—rapes have increased by 12 percent and murders by 50. There are concrete examples.

Two juveniles from Kiev, having become saturated with the “delights” of the Western way of life, set out for...Iran, after robbing their parents and mugging a passer-by. In Neryungri, a 14-year-old school pupil, after each pornographic film viewing, would go out onto the street in search of victims. He is charged with several rapes—of five to ten-year-old girls.

Without a doubt, unorganized leisure time, unemployment and warped educational work are among the far from complete list of factors having a negative effect on crime. Here one must also mention family trouble, a lack of coordination among institutions and organizations responsible for upbringing, and shortcomings in the activities of law-enforcement organs...

It would seem that the picture is clear. But the fact of the matter is, that we have been trying to solve the aforementioned problems for many years, and juvenile crime has continued to grow. Just what is the matter? In my view, the readers of *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* themselves have provided the answer. For example, A. Khutorov of Tolyatti, who by the way works with juveniles himself, believes that the problem lies with parental irresponsibility, and with those who get paid to educate the upcoming generation. And 19-year old A. Bespokoyev of Leningrad is certain: Just give young people greater independence, let them feel their own strength, and a lot will change for the better. “In school,” says Aleksey, “Everyone is explaining how we should live. But at the same time they are thinking primarily of themselves!” And why not? It’s hard not to agree with that. Only, before asking about the result of education, one must create conditions for the educator that would give him an interest in the outcome! Everything must be changed so that mama could raise her children, and so that a teacher would not have to be occupied with 40 students at once, but with each one individually. The system of training cadres for working with children must be re-examined from the bottom-up.

And then the educational system will not be working for itself, but for results. Then the slogan, “All the Best—for the Children,” will cease being only a slogan.

As for the militia? Unfortunately, it will have its work to do for some time to come. And it will carry out its tasks: including preventive measures.

Procedures for Selection of RSFSR Judges Detailed

90UN1203A Moscow SOVETSKAYA YUSTITSIYA in Russian No 3, Feb 90 pp 5-7

[Interview with A. Dementyev, director of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice Personnel Administration: “A.

Dementyev, Director of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice Personnel Administration, Answers Readers’ Questions”]

[Text] After changes had been made in Article 152 of the USSR Constitution related to procedures for selection and term of service of judges, the USSR Supreme Soviet passed very important regulatory acts: the USSR and Union Republics Basic Law on Legal Procedures and the laws “On Responsibility for Contempt of Court” and “On the Status of Judges in the USSR”; the Regulations on Professional Attestation of Judges were passed and professional qualifications were established for judges of USSR and union republic courts. The Ukases of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium dated December 6, 1989, approved the Rules for Convening and Conducting Conferences of RSFSR Court Judges and for Selecting and Organizing Activities of Judge Qualification Boards, as well as the text of the oaths to be sworn by RSFSR court judges and people’s jurors and the order of swearing them in. In drafting the Law on RSFSR Legal Procedures, much work still lies ahead.

[Question] Albert Nikolayevich, was there an effort to canvas the opinion of judges before the ukases were passed?

[Dementyev] Of course there was. For instance, the draft law “On the Status of Judges in the USSR” was discussed locally and, besides, the RSFSR Ministry of Justice independently solicited judges’ proposals which were subsequently passed on to the USSR Supreme Court. However, there was no broad discussion. And the draft documents passed by the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium were prepared on extremely short notice. But we hope that the draft law on the RSFSR legal procedures will be published in advance, allowing us to take into account all the comments and proposals of those who will be directly affected by it.

[Question] And now say a few words about an issue that concerns greatly judges in our readership. I mean the one of awarding them professional classification grades.

[Dementyev] This is indeed a task entailing more than purely secretarial work. The problem is not just that of paying a supplement to salaries, even though it is not so small, starting at R50 for Grade 5 and rising to R180 for the highest professional grade. To be frank, I personally do not like the idea of dividing judges into grades: they are not military ranks or the class ranks of Prosecutor’s Office employees. But a law is a law: it has been passed and now has to be implemented.

I do not want to recount the Regulations on Professional Attestation of Judges in its entirety; let me just mention the main points which have been drafted jointly by the RSFSR Supreme Court and our ministry.

Clearly, the classification grade is a measure of the level of professional skill of the judge, his experience and

professional qualities; it must objectively reflect the personal contribution of the judge in the administration of justice.

When deciding what professional grade to award a judge, special attention must be paid to evaluating the quality of his work. We must take into account whether or not the judge was censured for disciplinary or other reasons, whether or not confirmed complaints about rudeness, tactless behavior and violations of court ethics were filed against him or whether or not instances of wrongful conviction, delay and other gross violations of law or due process rules occurred.

Experience in court is an important factor bearing on the decision what professional grade to awarded a judge, but according to Article 19 of USSR law "On the Status of Judges in the USSR" professional competence of judges must also be taken into account.

Professional grades should encourage judges to improve their professional skills in hope of raising their professional grades in the future. This is why we should not regard judges awarded Grades 5 or 4 as second-rate. This is only the assessment of their qualifications in the present, whereas experience and skill can be learned, as long as there is a will to acquire that knowledge, to improve oneself, to be a judge and not a functionary in the justice system.

[Question] Let us say, for instance, a person has just been elected judge, but has years of experience in criminal investigations, at the prosecutor's office or another legal and related field. Should this be taken into account when grades are awarded?

[Dementyev] We are trying to stress that it should not be limited to years of experience. It is no secret that one may work 10 or 15 years as a judge without ever reaching the peak of the profession. The level of knowledge and ability to apply it in practice remain most important. The grades are awarded for **professional qualifications**, not for seniority. But let us not fall into another extreme: the level of professionalism is clearly tied to experience.

[Question] Could you give us more exact criteria for awarding specific grades?

[Dementyev] In other words, dot all the i's and give concrete recommendations? I am certain some on qualification boards would view this as a disguised attempt to interfere. This is not the problem, of course. The problem is that it is hard to define a framework for strict regulation. And is it needed at all? Time and again, there will be an actual human being being evaluated, with all that is particular to him, including his shortcomings and mistakes; even similar mistakes may be assessed differently.

I trust the wisdom of the qualification boards which we have selected. They are made up of judges for whom objectivity is a professional skill.

The work of qualification boards has only just begun. Obviously, corrections will be made in it along the way. But one thing can be stated definitively: the standard of administration of justice and quality of personnel unfortunately remain too low to permit the overwhelming majority of judges at oblast courts to aspire to Grade 2, and of people's judges, to Grade 3. Of course it is nice to be kind and no one is happy spoiling relations with colleagues, but I dare say that the approach here must be statesmanlike and not narrow-minded, and certainly not guided by career considerations.

[Question] Can a qualification board refuse to award a qualification grade to a judge?

[Dementyev] Let us go back to the law. Article 8 of the Regulations on Professional Attestation of Judges approved by the USSR Supreme Court resolution dated November 2, 1989, states that depending on the level of professional knowledge (note that this criterium is once again given precedence), seniority, experience and position of the judge, the qualifying board must make one of the following determinations: to award a professional grade, to raise the existing grade or to retain the previously awarded grade. The board has no right to deny a professional grade to any judge.

[Question] Does this mean that the decision of the board on awarding professional grades is final?

[Dementyev] Here, unfortunately, we encounter a certain lack of precision in the definitions. Indeed, the Regulations on Professional Attestation of Judges state that the qualification board decides what professional grades to award to judges. The Regulations on Professional Grades of USSR and Union Republic Court Judges, also passed by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium on November 2, 1989, state that professional grades are to be awarded to judges by the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, the presidiums of the supreme soviets of union and autonomous republics and executive and administrative bodies of kray, oblast, city and district soviets.

So, the final decision on awarding professional grades should be made by the the soviet which selects the judges. This is quite logical.

[Question] So, qualification boards will make decisions which could be subsequently reversed?

[Dementyev] Why draw this conclusion? First, let me repeat that we trust in the objective and balanced approach of the qualification boards themselves. Second, in all the cases, the views of the boards will always be taken into account. Finally, Article 10 of the Rules for Convening and Conducting Conferences of RSFSR Court Judges and for Selecting and Organizing Activities of Judge Qualification Boards of RSFSR courts state that the boards can review their decisions based on a joint appeal by the RSFSR Minister of Justice and Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court. In any

case, I am certain that the right solution will be found and agreement will be reached.

[Question] There are many questions related to the upcoming selection of judges. First, why is it being held this year, why not let judges complete their current term, i.e., serve until 1992?

[Dementyev] Let us be precise: the term of Supreme Court judges in the autonomous republics expires this year, in 1990. But I understand the question.

Let us go back to the year 1988. The USSR Supreme Soviet changed and amended the USSR Constitution. The new text of Article 152 defined a different procedure for selecting judges: they would be selected by the relevant soviets and their term in office would be extended to 10 years. Both points are solid guarantees of independence for judges, something they needed very badly. These regulations came into effect as early as December 14, 1988, and since then some 600 judges have been selected in the RSFSR. It would have been logical to select all the other ones at once, but only a year and a half had passed since the previous elections, the nation was getting ready to vote for USSR people's deputies, basic documents of legal reform were not ready and the new status of judges in the USSR was not yet defined. These were probably the reasons why the USSR Supreme Soviet, in its resolution dated December 1, 1988, "On the Order of Coming into Effect of the USSR Law 'On Changes and Amendments to the USSR Constitution (Basic Law)'", required judges and people's jurors elected previously to stay in office until new courts were elected in accordance with the new rules.

Now, when all the necessary conditions have been met and new soviets are set to convene in March, it would be wrong to delay selecting judges any longer, denying to the majority of them the protection of the above-mentioned guarantees.

[Question] When exactly will the term in office expire for judges elected in 1987—in March or in April, and on what day?

[Dementyev] Such a day cannot be fixed for the entire RSFSR. All the previous elections were the same for all judges. Even if a judge were elected several months prior to the general elections, he would still have to run at the same time as everyone else. Current elections are not general elections. Those who were elected under the new rules will not have to run again. (This was specially stated in the USSR Supreme Soviet resolution dated November 13, 1989, defining the order of implementation of the Basic Law on the Court Procedures.) It should be mentioned that the first sessions of the new soviets will not be held simultaneously all over the RSFSR. This is why I repeat that there can be no fixed date on which the term in office expires for the judges of all autonomous republics, krais, oblasts, autonomous oblasts and districts. Their terms will end when each particular soviet selects the new court.

[Question] Let us imagine a putative situation: a judge serving at a people's court has not been recommended for re-election, but there is no new judge yet. Can that judge continue to perform his duties until the new judge is chosen?

[Dementyev] No, he cannot. The day the soviet selects the new people's court for the oblast, the term of all judges who were not reappointed come to an end. This applies to judges of higher courts, too.

[Question] The following question was raised in letters: let us say a judge wants to continue to work in that capacity while the head of the department of justice refuses to nominate him for re-election. What can be done?

[Dementyev] On January 19, 1990, the ministry board, while discussing the preparations for the elections, looked into this particular issue. According to Article 322 of the Basic Law on the Legal Procedures, nomination of candidates for judges is handled by justice bodies. According to the established practice, all candidacies, especially those of working judges, are discussed in great detail and opinions of the collectives of people's courts and of the heads and members of oblast courts are taken into account. Before the 1987 elections, the practice existed of discussing candidates at joint meetings of the justice department board and the presidium of the oblast court. So, the possibility of a department head not being objective is practically nil. However, it is sometimes hard to convince a person that, in the interests of the business as well as his own, he should change his field of endeavor. For such a person, the opinion of his fellow judges may prove more convincing. Even though the law does not provide for this contingency, the letter of instructions sent by the ministry to local heads of justice departments stated that in cases when judges insist on nominating themselves the issue should be remanded for consideration to the judge qualification board.

[Question] What is the position of the Ministry of Justice regarding female judges who will be on maternity leave or taking time off to care for their babies at the time of elections?

[Dementyev] This is a complex issue. On the one hand, the term of an elected office is coming to an end. Should the judge be nominated for re-election, even though there may be a wait of 2 or 3 years before she could start work? And what if the court has only one or very few judges? What juror would want to leave his main job for so long, and is it practical, anyway? On the other hand, who would dare reproach a female judge for wanting to have and raise a child, and why should she be at a disadvantage compared to other mothers? This is why the following decision was made: if a female judge who performs her duties satisfactorily is unable to resume work in the near future, she may be offered, with her consent, another job—such as notary public or at the defenders' board—and not recommended for re-election, even though she can remain on the staff of the

court until her legal maternity leave is over. By then, it will be clear how the issue of her future employment will be resolved. It will be up to the justice department to decide.

[Question] Who could aspire to the office of judge? In particular, what kind of employment qualifies as legal-related work?

[Dementyev] The above-mentioned letter of the RSFSR Ministry of Justice provides the following explanations: in short, it is work on the staff of a court, a body or an office of justice, in positions requiring specialists with higher or special legal degrees (including the position of court executor, court session clerk, etc.); work at other law-enforcement agencies, bodies of state power and state administration, party, union and other public organizations if directly related to law enforcement and legal rights and protection of rights and legitimate interests of citizens and requiring knowledge in a legal field and ability to apply it in practice. In controversial cases, the issue of whether or not a work experience can be considered work in the legal field will be decided by the judge qualification board.

[Question] The law states that the judge cannot be less than 25 years of age. Are there any other age-related restrictions?

[Dementyev] You mean, of course, persons of near-retirement and retirement age. What can be said about it? The profession of judge is a special one. Like no other it requires not only professional expertise but also life experience and wisdom which come only with age. Taking into account the young age of judges elected in 1987, the goal of preserving the professional core of the judge corps becomes especially relevant. So what if a judge will not be able to complete his 10-year term? His experience and knowledge are needed now for the task of administering justice. This is why the ministry board ruled it inadmissible not to nominate judges for reelection based purely on age. Moreover, in special cases working retirees can be nominated if they meet three requirements: high professional skill and moral qualities, ability and desire to pass experience on to younger judges and good health.

[Question] How will the selection of judges take place?

[Dementyev] This will depend on individual soviets. We will issue recommendations on the makeup of new courts (as is well-known, they will be sent under the signature of the RSFSR Minister of Justice and the Chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Court) in early March, so that people's deputies have time to read them in advance, even before the session opens. According to the currently established order, nominees for judges will be invited to come before a meeting of the permanent commission on socialist justice and then introduced to the deputies at the session. One would expect that the procedure will be amended and perfected in the future.

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Moscow Criminal Investigation Chief Interviewed

90UN1225A Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY in Russian No 11, 17-23 Mar 90 p 7

[Interview with A. Yegorov, Moscow Criminal Investigation chief, by correspondents A. Bulanov and A. Petrov: "Concerns of Today's Detective: 54,474 Crimes Were Committed in Moscow in 1989"]

[Text] *The years of "voluntarism" gave way to "stagnation", and then to "acceleration" and "perestroyka". All along, crime continued to thrive and now it seems to have become especially widespread. Can we, not the criminals, be safe on our streets? This was the subject our correspondents A. Bulanov and A. Petrov raised with A. Yegorov, chief of Moscow Criminal Investigations (MUR).*

[Correspondent] The MUR department for combatting organized crime has over 100 employees, while rayon sections have no such departments at all. Is it another case of monopoly?

[Yegorov] The MUR has a department for combatting organized crime, while the RUVD [Regional Administration for Internal Affairs] has special groups made up of UGRO [State Administration for Investigative Operations] and OBKhSS [Department for Fight Against Theft of Socialist Property and Speculation] employees. Results show that this solution is useful. It has nothing to do with monopoly.

[Correspondent] What results in particular?

[Yegorov] On March 6 alone, four groups of extortionists were arrested, ones who are called racketeers in the Western manner. There was a shootout.

In addition, we have made major strikes against the Lyubertsy and the Solntsevo gangs.

[Correspondent] How did they react?

[Yegorov] They were surprised. Last year, they went so far as to ignore the police. This is not the case today, and it will never be so again.

[Correspondent] What is your attitude toward anonymous reports? In some situations people can not sign their complaints.

[Yegorov] There are different kinds of anonymous complaints. When we get letters or calls warning us of an impending hit, we take action. What else can we do? Naturally, that type of information is never disregarded.

[Correspondent] Who gets arrested most in Moscow: traders, taxi drivers, athletes or students?

[Yegorov] Last year in Moscow, 28,301 people were charged with committing crimes, of which only 529 were students. Taxi drivers added a share to that number. Criminal investigations do not deal with trade. This is

the duty of the OBKhSS. However, traders themselves are often victims of crime. Usually, it is burglary, robbery and larceny.

Drifters constitute a milieu that is more rife with crime. Last year, they committed 7,500 crimes, or twice as many as in 1988. To lead unconstrained life, they need funds.

Visitors also cause trouble. They committed 4,700 crimes. This is a 70 percent increase over 1988.

[Correspondent] Are there attempts to suborn UGRO employees?

[Yegorov] Of course. As with everybody else. Fortunately, bribe-taking is a very rare transgression among us. Even though we too have our bad apples. Recently, we have caught one worker who was betraying us.

[Correspondent] Crime is on the rise and criminals are getting bolder. Could you suggest clear and effective ways to check this process?

[Yegorov] First of all, we must avoid a repetition of 1987, when a law, without being rescinded, was no longer enforced. I refer to Article 209 of the RSFSR Penal Code, the one on parasites of whom we have tens of thousands. There were 2,600 criminal cases of gross parasitism brought in in 1980, 2,800 in 1981, 3,375 in 1983, 3,700 in 1984, 169 in 1987, 52 in 1988 and 86 in 1989. I know for a fact that at one court, district patrolmen were told not to bring in such cases any more. But the law has not been rescinded. The penal procedures code must be changed. I primarily mean the need to allow as evidence tape, photographic and video recordings obtained in the course of investigations.

[Correspondent] Some people maintain that it would be a blow against democracy. Do you agree?

[Yegorov] No. The police is concerned only with those who commit crimes. They are not interested in the private lives of citizens.

We desperately need bank and financial controls over income. Instead, we have secrecy of deposits, which benefits only those who want to hide the source of their income. Financial entities must be independent and report only to local soviets.

[Correspondent] Are there still "traditional" criminal specialties, such as safe-crackers, pickpockets or armed robbers?

[Yegorov] Their time is long passed. They have been replaced by new types, but with similar specialties: extortionists, hijackers, muggers and apartment robbers.

[Correspondent] Are there conventions of criminals and do they have elected bodies?

[Yegorov] There have been gatherings, but I have never heard of one taking place in Moscow. As to elected bodies, a command system is in operation among them, not a democratic one.

[Correspondent] Are there Lanskis, Al Capones, Genoveses and other godfathers emerging in Moscow?

[Yegorov] We have major criminal gangs which have their own leaders, but to call them godfathers would be to flatter them, even though in degree of cynicism, they could compete with the Sicilian bandits. One of them, for instance, hired a force of deaf-mute bodyguards, so that they could not testify.

[Correspondent] Were your employees involved in the events of February 25, i.e., during the rally sponsored by the "Democratic Russia" election block?

[Yegorov] On the eve on that day, Muscovites literally clogged our telephone lines with questions about robberies, pogroms and assaults. Naturally, the MUR was on full alert. Incidentally, 70 percent of crimes which had nothing to do with the rally were also solved that day.

[Correspondent] The number of criminal gangs coming from other republics is on the rise in Moscow. Is this true?

[Yegorov] Political instability in southern regions causes people to migrate. The inflow naturally contains some criminal elements. Last year, as I have already mentioned, 4,700 out-of-towners were arrested. And here is a more recent example: on February 3 a woman was killed in Savastopolskiy Rayon of Moscow, and on February 4 a man was hospitalized there with stabbing wounds. A group of four Kuybyshev residents was arrested for these crimes. This is just one example.

[Correspondent] Which crimes worry the MUR most?

[Yegorov] The same ones that worry other Muscovites. The lion's share goes to thefts, especially apartment robberies (5,000 were committed in 1989) and other thefts of personal property (5,000 thefts from a total of some 20,000 were from motor vehicles). Last year, crime showed its true, brutal face: thefts with violence have increased. Robberies and muggings amounted to 4,073, or a 2.8 time rise over 1980.

[Correspondent] If you were asked to gather compromising information on people, what would you do?

[Yegorov] In all my years of working for the MUR, I have never been asked to do anything similar. The MUR has never kept files on citizens.

[Correspondent] Does the KGB help or hamper you in your work? Judging by the size of their buildings, the KGB and the GUV D [Main Administration for Internal Affairs] are much busier.

[Yegorov] The KGB never hampers us but, on the contrary, actively helps us combat organized crime. We

are currently investigating a series of crimes committed by one gang. Once it is liquidated, we will be able to tell ARGUMENTY I FAKTY readers more about it.

[Correspondent] Do you need party committees and political supervisors?

[Yegorov] If a multiparty system takes root in this country, the police will naturally be depoliticized. It must only obey the law.

Illegal Deals Between Co-ops, Western Firms Described

90UN1276B Moscow SOVETSKAYA TORGOVLYA in Russian 17 Mar 90 p 4

[Article by S. Polevoy: "Under the Wing of ANT"]

[Text] A regular meeting between journalists and the leaders of the Moscow gorispolkom's Main Administration for Internal Affairs (GUVd) opened in an unusual manner. On an enormous table, as if in the State depository, were symbols of royal wealth: rings, diamond pendants, bracelets, chains, and watches—there were more than 90 gold articles! And nearby there were U.S. dollars, deutsche marks, and Soviet money in bank bundles, hunting knives, pistols, and assault rifles.

All of these things—with a total value of approximately 3.5 million rubles—were confiscated from nine members of a criminal conspiracy. Four of them were managers at the Moscow cooperatives Treugolnik, Master, Planeta, and Pavlin, and the others were employees at State enterprises. One of them was the manager of a scientific center.

Here is how the ball of yarn began to unwind. One summer night near the Izmaylovo hotel complex, a cooperative society chairman, who had a foreign-made pistol with live ammunition in his possession, was arrested. Four hundred thousand rubles was discovered in his car. This led to the initiation of a criminal case, which subsequently gained widespread notoriety. The development of native Mafiosos and the work of the Moscow Criminal Investigation Department and of the GUVd's department for combating the embezzlement of socialist property and speculation (BKHS) occurred simultaneously. All of this was long before the sensational report on the complement with tanks, which was operating behind the cordon.

The following was related by P. S. Bogdanov, deputy minister of internal affairs and the manager of the Moscow gorispolkom's GUVd:

—The accused managed to obtain advances of about 7 million rubles from Moscow banks under the cover of ANT-3, one of the subsidiaries of the much-talked-about ANT State cooperative concern.

According to counterfeit documents, video equipment and computers would be purchased abroad with this money. However, a follow-up showed that not a single

agreement on the delivery of this sort of equipment had been reached with Western firms. Where did this money go? The currency on loan from the state was used to buy gold and precious stones.

I will cite an example of one criminal plot. An agency with access abroad signed a contract to sell cultural items for a sum of 2.25 million dollars. Suddenly, for unknown reasons, the contract was cancelled and the rights to further negotiations were given to ANT. A new contract was signed, according to which the Western partners now paid 1.75 million dollars for the same items. The State lost 500 thousand dollars on this deal alone. What happened to the rest of the money. It is not particularly difficult to answer that question.

Pyotr Stepanovich Bogdanov continued,—I fully agree with the statement of I. K. Polozkov, first secretary of the Krasnodarskiy CPSU kraykom, regarding the exorbitant nature of the ANT concern. And to tell the truth, there has never before been anything like this in our country. ANT, exclusively and without customs control, has exported everything from foodstuffs to aircraft engines. They were given the green light for all of this. The items were exported by train and military transport aircraft.

Judging from the scope of the operation and from the opposition that we encountered while working on this case, I am convinced that a well-organized mafia is operating in our country.

It is well-known to the GUVd workers that there is an elaborate system of economic machinations at the concern. There was also a special group of guards consisting of approximately 100 men. The investigation of the case has been completed and it will be brought before the Moscow municipal court in the near future.

Belorussian SSR MVD Official on Illegal Weapon Arsenals

90UN1276A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA in Russian 18 Feb 90 p 4

[Interview with militia Major V. N. Loginov, chief of the Belorussian SSR MVD permit system, conducted by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondent S. Lyapich: "Illegal Arms"]

[Text] A Competent Interlocutor

Officials at the Oktyabrskiy Rayon department of internal affairs in Grodno still remember the day, when risking their lives, they disarmed a drunk criminal. How much longer will illegal weapons pose a constant threat to people's lives? By what means are criminal arsenals stocked? How can they be curtailed? We asked militia Major V. N. Loginov, chief of the Belorussian SSR MVD permit system to comment on this situation.

[Loginov] First a few statistics, today 113 thousand citizens of the republic possess weapons for personal

use—these are registered guns, so to speak. It cannot be denied, where there is a will, there is a way... And hence, during the last three years, 79 crimes have been committed using sporting guns. Illegal weapons were used in 46 cases. During these same three years, 10 thousand unregistered guns were confiscated from the population.

In autumn last year, the republic's MVD conducted an operation called "Arsenal". As a result, 244 weapons were handed over voluntarily and 521 guns were confiscated for illegal possession. During the investigation of a criminal case, two Shpagin submachine guns, a foreign-made service rifle with a telescopic sight, a smallbore rifle, a spare rifled barrel for a smoothbore gun, and three thousand rounds of ammunition were discovered in the possession of one citizen alone, A.R. Zhilyanin from the village Slizhino, Logoyskiy Rayon. I remember a notorious incident in Slutsk, where V.Ye. Trepanovich, a resident of Slutsk, threw a live grenade, which injured 13 people. He was armed during military training along with N.A. Zenkovich. And so, the latter kept his arsenal in the garage, from which two shells for a small-caliber field gun and ammunition for an assault rifle and machine gun were confiscated.

[Correspondent] Valentin Nikolayevich, recently reports have appeared concerning the arrests of armed racketeers. How is this dangerous element of society arming itself?

[Loginov] Everything that lies in temptation's way, is not safeguarded, etc., falls into the hands of dishonest people. Four small-caliber rifles, 1200 rounds of ammunition, and a dummy assault rifle were stolen from the Tulgovichi Secondary School, Khoynikskiy Rayon.

Taking advantage of the absence of a guard, criminals broke through a brick wall at Vocational Training School 106 in the Baran settlement near Orsha and armed themselves with assault rifles. Fortunately, they were dummy assault rifles, but this was more than enough to create psychological pressure. A similar incident occurred also at one of the schools in Ivanovskiy Rayon.

As we see, the criminal world does not dawdle. And let us not forget about the arsenals of the last war. Valtery and Tulskiy Tokareva automatic pistols and others are still in use. And the case such as the one, in which three Makarov pistols, six grenades, ten primers, and more than 2,500 rounds of ammunition were found missing at the ordnance depot of one of the military units, is, as the saying goes, certainly difficult to swallow.

[Correspondent] Where does the responsibility lie for such criminal negligence?

[Loginov] In the last three years, approximately 100 officials have had administrative proceedings instituted against them. For the present, the safekeeping of weapons at many vocational training schools and secondary schools is at a very low standard. Alas, the Ministry of Public Education has responded nominally to our instructions. Is it really incomprehensible that it is

impossible to appoint a militiaman to look after every school! Real work with the people is required.

[Correspondent] But you must agree, Valentin Nikolayevich, the situation is nevertheless complicated. Life is becoming more dangerous. It is no coincidence that many people are seriously suggesting that we arm ourselves, since the militia is not able to guarantee our safety. They say, it is time to sell weapons...

[Loginov] You know, it cuts both ways. First of all, there are so very many illegal arsenals already, to whom would weapons be sold? Cooperatives, shock workers, war veterans?... By selling arms, we would inevitably push some citizens toward mob law, which is totally incompatible with the norms of a legal state. I would remind you that sporting guns were sold freely until 1975, all one had to do was show a hunting license. During these same years, up to 120 crimes a year were committed using firearms. Therefore my response is unambiguous: the sale of weapons must not be allowed...

Baku Gorkom Chief on Restoring Order

90US0793A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIY in Russian
28 Mar 90 p 2

[Interview with Rufat Agayevich Agayev, Baku party gorkom first secretary, by unidentified AZERINFORM correspondent: "Justifying People's Expectations"]

[Text] The personality of the Baku city party committee [gorkom] first secretary and his work have always been the focus of attention among the workers and all the inhabitants of our republic's capital. Rufat Agayevich Agayev has now been leading the party gorkom for 2 months. We present today an interview that he gave to an AZERINFORM correspondent.

[AZERINFORM] Rufat Agayevich, you became the head of the city party organization in a time that is very complicated for Baku and, incidentally, for the entire country. There is, naturally, interest in you. Perhaps you could tell us something about yourself.

[Agayev] Let me say immediately that there is nothing special about my biography. Like most Soviet people I have trod an ordinary path through life. I advanced from rank-and-file worker to the general director of an industrial association. I gave production 20 years. Before I transferred to party work I headed the republic trade union organization. I am married. There, as the cadre people say, is the "whole kit and caboodle."

To be frank, my election as the leader of a major party organization like the Baku organization was unexpected. I had to weigh many things and consider it carefully. For it is clear that major responsibility is laid on the first secretary of the party gorkom, the more so at this present time. Unfortunately, Baku's prestige has faded recently. It is, of course, painful to see this. The people of Baku are

emotional about their native city and want to work and live better, and take pride in their hospitable nature and remain accessible to all.

[AZERINFORM] In fact there are very many problems in the city, and perhaps the Moscow important of them is restoring order and discipline.

[Agayev] You are right. Much has been lost in the city. Because there has also been a crime wave, and honest people has felt that they are unprotected and that the law enforcement agencies are unable to carry out their duty in providing protection for the citizens. An extraordinary plenum of the party gorkom will be devoted to an analysis of events in Baku and specific steps to extricate ourselves from the crisis situation. Questions relating to the personal responsibility of leaders in party, soviet, and law enforcement organs for failure to take prompt steps to cut short the illegal actions and normalize the situation in the city have been considered in the gorkom bureau and the Baku city executive committee [gorispolkom]. The resolution was published. It is important to recognize mistakes and draw the proper conclusions. We are now also taking other steps to stabilize the situation in the city, enable the Russian-speaking population to return to the city, and establish a normal work rhythm for the Baku enterprises.

This, of course, is not the work just of a single day. But as soon even the first steps were taken to improve the situation, once again, almost as if at someone's malevolent will, there was renewed tension in the Azeri and Armenian populated points at the border. Note that the provocations and sabotage on the railroads and the bandit attacks by Armenian militants on Azeri villages took place immediately after the USSR Supreme Soviet session that adopted the resolution on dealing with the dangerous crisis in relations between our two peoples. Is this not a direct challenge to the country's highest organs of state power and to all the people of Azerbaijan?

It is obvious that certain forces in Azerbaijan who are trying to exacerbate the conflict are most displeased about the positive changes taking place in our republic. We are also worried about the fact that particular all-union organs are not taking effective steps to cut short the criminal and provocative actions of the Armenian militants. In this connection, as you know, communists in Baku city have issued an appeal to the USSR President and CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev in which they make a decisive protest against the attacks by Armenian militants on 24 and 25 March, and demand that the guilty parties be immediately found and punished.

I would also like to add that the Baku gorkom and all communists in the city see their duty here in helping the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and the republic government to protect the legitimate rights and interests of the people of Azerbaijan and the republic's sovereignty. We do not want violence and are

prepared to support any measures aimed at eliminating the tension and restoring traditional good-neighborliness.

[AZERINFORM] No matter how acute the problems of which we have just been talking may be, there are also others just as important: Baku is suffering from a shortage of housing and social projects and the ecological situation is critical... In solving these questions it is very important for the city party organization to employ the right tactics and strategy. Have you formed a concept for the work of the party gorkom in this present very complicated and contradictory situation?

[Agayev] Obviously it is somewhat premature to be talking about a firm concept for gorkom activity overall, but I can share some thoughts with you. Let me refer to the fact that the republic and its capital and the entire Azeri people today find themselves at a critical stage. But of course, there must be a painstaking analysis of the causes leading to the sociopolitical crisis and the drama of the night of 20 January. But it is already possible to assert with boldness that this was in part the result of mistakes made in recent years both by the party committees and by the soviet organs. There was an effect from the unsuitable style of work typical of the years of stagnation, when incorrect decisions were sometimes reached, and there was uncertainty and, if you like, a lack of understanding of the consequences of the hasty steps that were presented to the people as a manifestation of wisdom and party perspicacity. And today it must be candidly admitted that the party gorkom and its bureau have not studied the entire complexity of the present moment and have failed to cope with the situation, and, worst of all, have played the role of a person trying to sail without a paddle on the stormy waves of actions by what are virtually uncontrollable masses. The party aktiv and the city's communists have not been armed with a clearly delineated line for action in such an emergency situation.

What can I say. The anger of the people is justified; for more than 2 years they have been looking for an objective assessment of the criminal encroachments on the territorial integrity of our republic. However, it is hardly possible to solve the problem with ringing slogans and strikes, whose consequences are being felt even today.

Just take the housing problem. The waiting list for apartments in Baku now consists of almost 70,000 families, and more than 30,000 people are huddled together in dilapidated and emergency housing, and through the Baku gorsipolkom there has been a shortfall of about 400,000 square meters of housing since the start of the five-year plan. And with the arrival of the refugees the position has become even worse. What is the solution? The problem with the resettlers must be resolved as quickly as possible. Up to now very little has been done to help them with housing or to find work for them. This work is now being galvanized. In the small town of Shuraabad in Apsheron a settlement is to be set up for some of the refugees who have settled in the city. The forces of the Main Administration for Baku Housing and

other construction organizations in the city, and also of the ministries and departments, will be employed to build housing for them. Of course, it is difficult to operate on two fronts. The material-technical base is weak. The most energetic efforts are therefore now being made to bring the No 4 Housing Construction Combine into operation as soon as possible.

Or take the "Zdorovye" ["Health"] program. Essentially it is impossible today to talk about the normal organization of treatment and prophylactic work in the city if we take into account the fact that we are short 10,000 hospital beds and polyclinics able to cope with a shift patient-throughput of 20,000. And premises of 80 percent of medical establishments do not meet the sanitation standards. Here, we have not eliminated the gross omissions in the construction of new housing complexes, where construction is done virtually without any kind of medical facilities. I have focused here on only two of our burning problems, but there are many more.

[AZERINFORM] Excuse me, Rufat Agayevich, but in what you have been saying the "leitmotif" of the manager can be clearly seen. But what is the party approach to solving these urgent problems?

[Agayev] I do not quite agree with that interpretation. For what was it that led to the crisis in the party? I think that it was largely the ignorance of party workers about the life of the labor collectives and their problems, and a reluctance to face up to the working man and his needs. And what is it that is now hampering the party organs from being at the sharp end of events and from leading and directing the masses? It is first and foremost the fact that they are lagging behind the processes taking place in society. The habit of waiting for instructions from above and of hoping for ready-made recipes to solve all our social ills is still alive in many people. Life has shown that this position is a losing one. The leading role of the party cannot be affirmed just by an article in the constitution. It is recognized through concrete actions. And where there is no effective result there is inevitably disillusionment and loss of faith in ideals. For it would be stupid to offer only some emotional outburst as the explanation for the fact that about 7,000 communists in the city party organization have handed in their party cards.

During the course of the debate in the city about the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress, sober thoughts were expressed about the role of the party and errors and omissions in the party organizations were revealed. And I hold with the proposals that contain an appeal to rid both the party and the party apparatus of people who have done nothing for the people. The party has drawn down the fire of criticism on itself, and this criticism is largely justified. It is now very important to restore people's trust, and here it is impossible to get by without a radical breakthrough in the work of the primary party organizations. Today what is needed is not a meek "primary party organization" that is totally obedient to the will of

higher organs, but a combative party organization as spokesman for the party organism.

The main thing is to be able to listen to the voice of rank-and-file communists and to the voice of the masses, and skillfully direct them in order to strengthen the sovereignty of the republic and its independence, and for the sake of national revival and flourishing. At one enterprise recently a worker with many years of seniority asked me this: does the Baku party organization have what might be called national interests? I have been asked similar questions in other places. Let me repeat my answer here: yes, it does have national interests. How so? We see them in the strengthening of the ranks of the city party organization and its independence, in the training of national party cadres, which combines high political qualities with the best features of the Azeri people. Moreover, we want to revive the historical and cultural lineament of ancient Baku and its best popular traditions and customs, and study the history of our native city and give back to its streets their original names, and name streets after the worthy sons and daughters of our people, and take other steps. How can any of this cut across all-union and party interests and the interests of representatives of other nations living in the city? It is another matter that we party workers must seek out new and effective forms for the revival of the Baku's national lineament and strengthen its rich international traditions.

In conclusion let me say that communists and the party organizations look to the future with great optimism and are doing active work to eliminate the deformations in internal party life and insure the power of the party masses. It is here that we see one of the main directions of activity by the party organization on the eve of the upcoming accountability-and-election campaign, the 32nd Azerbaijan Communist Party Congress, and the 28th CPSU Congress.

[AZERINFORM] Thank you for the interview.

Working Group Member Comments on Draft Press Law Points of Contention

90US0655B Moscow *VECHERNAYA MOSKVA* in Russian 24 Feb 90 p 3

[Article by M. Fedotov, member of the Working Group on the Draft Press Law, candidate for RSFSR People's Deputy for the Sverdlovsk Territorial Electoral District: "An Alternative to Freedom?"]

[Text] To be free or not be free in the country—this is the center of the discussion about the press law. This does not mean only the mass media. Where the press is repressed, the virus of totalitarianism easily develops, cults appear, ideas about good and evil are turned inside out. Then the press ceases to be a mirror in which society can take an inventory of itself and see its wrinkles every morning. It is transformed into a slate upon which any ruling and directing force can daily write, at its own discretion, a gloomy or a sanguine picture.

Only a free press guarantees to each individual the right to information—up to date, reliable and full, and not what was fed to us, for example, about Chernobyl. Only it creates the possibility for people not only to have a publication close to their own inclination, but also to express their opinion in it or to create it with their own hands. Finally, a free press is the least painful way to political pluralism.

However, perhaps I am trying to break down an open door? Does not the very first article of the draft state that the press is free and that censorship is not allowed? Yes, it does have this provision, written from an initiator's draft. However, will it make much sense if the USSR Supreme Soviet approves the alternative renditions of the sixth and forty-second articles, something the anonymous "group of people's deputies recommended? USSR People's Deputy N. Fedorov, the leader of our working group, was right when, from the speaker's podium in the parliament, he displayed a text of the draft with the first article crossed out. The modest, almost unnoticed "semicorrections" completely negate the democratic content of the future law, turning freedom into a fiction.

From where do the proposed alternatives originate? From the concepts of the draft itself, which was prepared in the bowels of the apparatus, passed by the highest authorities, but which was rejected "by 90 percent" of the people's deputies. This document from the time of perestroika turned out to be surprisingly similar to its predecessor from the time of stagnation: Two-thirds of its article were almost a word for word copy of the text that disappeared into oblivion in the spring of 1976 and that also had a suspicious genealogy. This previous draft was a close relative to the Czechoslovakian and Romanian laws on the press from the time of Anton Novotny and Nicolae Ceausescu.

Now something specific about the alternative rendition of Article 6. Its essential feature is its exclusion of citizens from the list of subjects given the right to found their own mass media. The main reasons are known: First of all, we do not need our own home grown Springers; secondly, wheeler-dealers in the shadow economy will buy up all the paper and monopolize the press.

However, what is to hinder these wheeler-dealers in the shadowy economy from combining into a cooperative or even a public organization (for example, a "Money Lovers' Club") and, on a collective basis, found their own newspaper? The alternative rendition fully allows this situation.

Attempts to buy up all the paper will hardly succeed (where have you seen typographic paper for sale openly?). The draft law properly contains these provisions: To register a publication it is, in particular, necessary to provide information about sources of financing. This means that only resources stated in declarations of income can be used.

Now something about the dangers of the monopolization of the press. The Springer firm is practically a do-nothing compared to our domestic concentration of press, radio and television in the same hands.

A recognition of citizens' rights to found their own newspaper will be a blow against this fairly threadbare monopoly. This will open a path from pluralism of opinion and glasnost to freedom of the word and pluralism of information. Citizens' initiative inevitably leads to the appearance of many publications which accurately reflect the viewpoints of various categories of readers and which provide their own interpretations of events.

Incidentally, such newspapers already exist. The only free press of past decades, carrying into the kitchens of Moscow the truth about the tragic past, the phantasmagoric present and the catastrophic future, has now received "de facto" recognition. While previously the EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA, for example, existed "de jure" only as evidence for the criminally punishable "dissemination of intentionally false fabrications injurious to the Soviet state and public order", now it has simply ceased to exist "de jure." It is as if this and other such newspapers, together with their editors, publishers and authors have been conditionally and prematurely freed from serving their sentence.

Samizdat is multiplying and thriving on the wave of civil society's rebirth. It is not officially registered by anybody, but it is not forbidden. Of course, it has very modest printing equipment (if this is what one could call copy machines, printers, personal computers and typewriters). Having escaped the sword of Damocles of criminal law, it has fallen into the sphere of administrative responsibility. The militia stops its distributors and fines them for doing business in an "unauthorized place", confiscating copies of the publication. Because of regular losses of copies, the distributors have to raise prices, thereby making themselves open to charges of speculation. Of course, the problem is easily solved: Set up racks for selling newspapers and organize their distribution through Soyuzpechat. However, this means the formal recognition of the informal press; many leaders are afraid of even thinking about that.

By getting samizdat out of a confusing legal situation, our society will not only enhance its prestige, but also take a step towards the law-governed state. PRAVDA will be on an equal footing with VECHERKA and EKSPRESS-KHRONIKA. Although their starting conditions will be far from equal, they will have to compete for readers and advertisers by being accurate, fast and talented. Those who are better will naturally increase their readership and profits. Those who cannot will not. If you can't swim, then learn, or sit on the shore.

Rendered equal before the law, party, public, agency, collective and individual mass media will be equally responsible for abuses of press freedom. If it violates rules or uses its pages to reveal state secrets, to call for

the violent overthrow of the state, to advocate war, national or religious intolerance, a publisher will be liable to possible confiscation or destruction of its print run, to temporary shutdown or material losses. Any sanctions will be under objective court control. If a press organ violates the law it will act against itself and its freedom.

The alternative rendition of Article 42 is also directed towards protecting procedures that have been around for decades. It gives founders and publishers the right to directly interfere in the work of the editorial board, requiring preliminary agreement about materials and reporting, preventing their publication, and deleting some passages. How is this better than a censor, solemnly forbidden in the first article of the draft? Nothing will prevent the founder or publisher from entrusting the exercise of his "control authority" to some specialized institution—thus giving rise to special censorship agency.

Of course, the founder (but certainly not the publisher or publishing house) should have definite rights to influence the activities of the mass media organ he has founded. According to the draft, he will approve the program of activities and the editorial charter. I think that it would be good if the law provided the possibility of signing contracts between the founder and the editors. These three documents should fix the rights and responsibilities of the parties. It is quite obvious that these rights will differ substantially in each specific instance. The charter of LITERATURNAYA GAZETA will not have many features in common with that of SOVERSHENNO SEKRETN.

Probably, there will be attempts to put the idea of preliminary censorship into the editorial charter, arguing from the "He who pays, calls the tune." However, it must not be forgotten that the law entrusts responsibility for content upon the editorial board and its manager. In other words, the principle "Who writes and signs is responsible" is operative here. Therefore, the founder, freed from responsibility for content, has no moral or any other right to guide the hand of the editor.

The alternative rendition involves only two articles of the draft law; however, it completely changes the essence of the entire document. It suggests an alternative to freedom—the lack of freedom.

Leningrad TV Investigative Reporter on Techniques for Obtaining Information

90US0597A Moscow SOBESEDNIK in Russian No 7, Feb 90 p 10

[Article by Maria Frolovicheva: "Alexander Nevzorov: 'I Belonged To Only One Party...'"]

[Text] *The program "600 Seconds", which was established by Alexander Nevzorov at the Leningrad TV, is becoming more and more popular (provided the people can receive it, of course). He is very much the same both*

on the screen and in real life. His answers to questions are like a slap. He is not afraid to cut the ground from under his own seat. For him there is neither time nor possibility to weigh the pros and cons. The number of his ill-wishers is growing along with his popularity

[Nevzorov] Our program daily affects the dignity of at least 5-6 citizens. But it would be a great mistake to consider me a fighter. If a person finds himself in a room with bed-bugs and does not have any remedy against them, he starts to exterminate them out of disgust and not because he strives to eliminate them forever. We won't be able to expose them all. Instead of one scoundrel taken away due to our efforts, ten others, more impudent and corrupted, but more cautious, will come.

[SOBESEDNIK] Sasha, in your work all too often you take risks. Have you ever hired guards?

[Nevzorov] That would be absolutely meaningless. Even a company of submachine-gunners wouldn't be capable of defending me against professionals; if some amateurs happen to threaten me, I am sure I'll defend myself.

[SOBESEDNIK] In summer 1989, there was an attempt to boycott market profiteers in Leningrad. As far as I know, in spite of the appeal of your program to buy nothing at markets on the weekend, the 100% boycott failed.

[Nevzorov] Yes, This failure was arranged for us. Leningrad Ispolkom and the Central Board of Trade promised to organize the trade, at least on these days, just to demonstrate that the precedent is possible...and betrayed us, having shown how perfect is the system of creating shortages. Everything was done not to let a single tomato into the state sales.

[SOBESEDNIK] A question which interests practically everyone: How do you manage to penetrate locked doors?

[Nevzorov] My favorite tactic is when the car, with its light on, is rushing 100-110 km/hour through the gate-keeper's office. As a rule, they have no time to ask for your documents and where you are going. In this case, the significant thing is to get into the territory, don't worry how to get out. Guards with carbines may then stand at the exit, fire, and do whatever they want. I would not care any more, because the cassette would be already taken from the camera and hidden somewhere by some of my colleagues. I would already have the video materials.

[SOBESEDNIK] In your city the Party leadership has been changed. What do you think about the First Secretary of the Obkom Gidasov?

[Nevzorov] Gidasov is a very peculiar man. I saw him first when he came to the TV studio to meet with Leningrad TV journalists. He was conversing quite peacefully, coherently, and amusingly, and then the talk turned to the Smolny, where the Leningrad Obkom is

located, and Boris Veniaminovich, instead of a traditional term 'apparat' for personnel, used an expression 'the working people of the Smolny'. He was immediately prompted to use 'hard workers of the Party' or 'laborers of the obkom'. But I was watching him and noticed sparks in his eyes, also characteristic of myself. Then I understood that it was not an incidental slip of his tongue. Gidaspov is not bewitched by the communist phraseology. It is striking to discover that the secretary of the obkom has read books and is capable of sane thinking. I should say directly and honestly, that I did not like that man with lively ideas and a strong personality. But I should do justice to him, nevertheless. We are not on bad terms with him. In ATMODA, a newsletter of the Latvian People's Front, there was a remarkable joke: now, for a withdrawal from the Party, a recommendation of three non-Party persons is required. Well, comrade Gidaspov can count on my recommendation anytime.

[SOBESEDNIK] In the '600 seconds' program, there was a topic about the illegal purchase of a 'Mercedes' by Yu. Solovyov, Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. On the next day, the bureau of the obkom decided to expel him from the Party. What is your attitude toward such a reaction to your story and, in general, how was this topic prepared?

[Nevzorov] We were just anticipating an effect like that. The commission shop for used cars had been observed by our agents for a long time. When we were informed that our assumptions proved true, our film crew acted like an attack unit. The documents had been hidden very thoroughly; part of them were in the bookkeeping office, another part—in the record book. But we managed to take them, to a great extent because of the professionalism of Volodya Grechishkin and Alexander Borisoglebsky.

[SOBESEDNIK] Do you take advice to keep silent about some subjects and to speak about others?

[Nevzorov] No, advisors can go to hell no matter who they are. I am so accustomed to my absolute independence, that I can't bear any pressure. I can always achieve whatever I like. It's a pity I can't finish off my defeated enemies—enemies of this city and those who oppose changes of the state system and of life in our country. But in general, I don't feel like emphasizing my weaknesses and strengths. If to go into it, it would appear that I am nothing but a weakness, because I appreciate firmness, powerfulness, and the ability to bend to my will everybody whom I meet that day. As a rule, I deal with people who don't want to act in a film and to reveal their secrets to me. That is why those features are necessary for me. By the way, this is also valid for my film crew. When I have to leave anywhere, I categorically forbid them to come to the TV studio and to work with anyone else.

[SOBESEDNIK] A few months ago, you were selecting youth for the school of reporters. What happened after that?

[Nevzorov] There were 400 applicants. We have chosen three of them: a 12-year old boy, a gloomy maid who is making impressive success in the reporter's craft, and a young man who is simply very gifted and in addition to that has great experience of operational work in militia. In this school, I will teach reporters how to penetrate where they are not let in, how to distinguish between genuine and false documents, and how to fight.

[SOBESEDNIK] All your programs make me feel creepy all over, particularly the criminal chronicle. I understand, this is not done for tickling one's nerves. But to what extent is such ruthlessness justified?

[Nevzorov] If we talk about a murder but show the cheerful face of an investigator, we would not inculcate feelings of disgust as to what had happened, to the very fact of the crime. I happened to meet with criminals, who told me that if they had seen before how frightful a dead and lifeless person is, they would never have committed a crime. They could not imagine how deep and strong the horror can be, caused by the outward entourage of a murder. That is why I believe that by demonstrating the criminal chronicle in an extremely ruthless way, we have taught very many people to be cautious. If people in Saint Petersburg live more cautiously, make acquaintances more cautiously, and are more cautious when opening their doors—this is our small achievement. I don't know how many lives we have saved by that.

Very often people ask me if I consider the actions of the program for obtaining information immoral. I'll give an example from one wonderful book. Its principal character during the storyline kills several people, steals money from his landlord, sleeps with two women in turn, and in addition to all that, is involved into a political intrigue. His friend, a chronic alcoholic, who in our time would have been placed into a special institution, also kills with his own hands several people and is involved into various machinations. Another friend is a souteur, has a lover, whose husband is an old and paralyzed invalid. The man robs and incidentally kills him, tells lies, and boasts. The fourth one is an unattractive person also. Then these four nice guys unite to kill a woman who used to be a wife of one of them and a lover of another. And all this is a classic novel of the world literature for children, called 'The Three Musketeers' by Mr. Dumas. If to determine their deeds according to the Articles of the Criminal Code, each of them deserves about fifteen years of severe regime, taking into account the principle of absorption of one article by another. But it appears that this book can teach generosity too. So the dialogue about morality and immorality is somewhat inappropriate when the reporter's work is being discussed.

Nevzorov's words make personally me uneasy, because in the areas dealing with people, no matter whether in journalism or law, it is dangerous to deny the role of ethics. I think it may cause not only moral traumas, but ultimately a negligent attitude to the very facts.

[SOBESEDNIK] What facts did you have at your disposal when you accused SOBESEDNIK of telling lies, after the publication of the material 'Sausage in the Light of Glasnost', where we suggested that the supplies of the Chernobyl meat, to the Leningrad meat-processing plant in particular, should be controlled, because after its processing the meat does not completely lose its radioactivity?

I asked this question after our conversation, not to reproach, but to make the situation clear and to understand. This points up, perhaps, his lack of real evidence and his desire to send to hell all those who are trying to understand and analyze the facts presented. He has an infinite confidence in his own rightness... Sometimes people are sympathetic but sometimes one doubts his objectivity. In the end who of us knows the real truth? But all this, again, was later, and in the meantime, our talk continued.

[SOBESEDNIK] Sasha, do congresses of the people's deputies inspire you with some confidence in the change of the current situation in the country?

[Nevzorov] No, Article 6 of the Constitution, or to be more precise, its elimination, could cause changes for the better, but this item was not even included into the agenda. It is strange enough that those who attempted to eliminate this article were non-Party people. It would have been quite natural, if the Party itself were striving to do that. If it does not want it, it indicates that it is power the Party wants by any means, and not the truth.

[SOBESEDNIK] Don't you recognize any parties?

[Nevzorov] I don't like anything dealing with the politics. I believe the professionalism of a journalist is in his not belonging to any particular party. Though I myself used to belong to one, when singing the bass part in a church choir.

[SOBESEDNIK] Why do you distinguish Nicholas II, the last Russian czar, of all rulers of the pre-Soviet period?

[Nevzorov] Nicholas II Romanov has an immense moral advantage in comparison with those who were ruling Russian even in our Time of Troubles. I can prove it very easily. As you remember, when the last emperor-czar felt he was not loved by the people, that the people neither wanted him nor believed him, he did not continue the struggle at the price of someone's blood, or by reorganizing the representative assembly Duma—instead of that, he abdicated. I don't remember a single general secretary having abdicated, though unloved and not respected.

[SOBESEDNIK] By the way, why do you refer to Leningrad as Peter all the time?

[Nevzorov] In times of wars and despair, Peter the Great gathered the means and forces to erect this city. At present, Peter, the creator of this city, has been absolutely undeservedly deprived of the honor to give his

name to it. If the Bolsheviks claim to be people with awakened consciousness, they themselves ought to be initiators of returning to the city its legal name, because the change of the name was an illegal act. It was, in particular, extremely dishonorable in respect to Lenin's memory, who, I am sure, would not have approved this situation and would not have misappropriated somebody else's glory.

[SOBESEDNIK] In one of your programs, the viewers were told that there is a box for KGB in the Kirov theater. I am aware that the girl-correspondent who put this information on the air was removed from work for a month.

[Nevzorov] If we operated with unchecked facts, we would lose the confidence of those who watch and like us. We did not have the facts to confirm this statement. The box in question has nothing to do with the KGB, but is assigned to the 9th Department, not subordinate to the KGB, which provides the security of members of the Politburo, their families, and of candidate-members of the Politburo, as well.

[SOBESEDNIK] What sort of terms are you on with other program hosts?

[Nevzorov] They had better stop copying and look for their own images. But our relations are very good.

[SOBESEDNIK] Do you drink or smoke?

[Nevzorov] I never drink, I always need to have a head on my shoulders. I like to smoke though, but only good cigarettes, because bad ones affect the voice.

[SOBESEDNIK] Are you as much intolerant in your relations with your wife, Alexandra Yakovleva?

[Nevzorov] Yes. She was told that if she agrees to act in an erotic scene in a film, we would immediately divorce. That is why she has already rejected two films.

[SOBESEDNIK] Who are your friends?

[Nevzorov] It occurred that everyone abandoned me, but nevertheless, the program was broadcasted. My friends are doing their business at their places—Kolya Gorbachevsky, Head of the Department of Struggle with Organized Crime, Nicolai Gubenko, Ilya Glazunov, and Urmas Ott.

[SOBESEDNIK] Does this mean you are still engaged in politics?

[Nevzorov] Yes, because honesty has become a political category nowadays, and a person wanting to make a program honest gets involved in politics, whether he likes it or not.

Latvian Journalists Union Chairman Views Republic Media Issues

90US0598B KOMMUNIST SOVETSKOY LATVII in Russian No 1, Jan 90 pp 78-83

[Interview with Ayvar Baumanis, board chairman of the Latvian SSR Union of Journalists, by Ruty Darbinis: "Journalist at the Crossroads"]

[Text] Almost two years have passed since the extraordinary session of the Latvian SSR Congress of Journalists was convened. The congress chose a new management board, a new auditing commission, and a new board chairman along with a new deputy chairman. This is a time that is filled with important political events in which journalists are actively participating. It is an indisputable fact that many Latvian journalists have won the deep respect and love of the people. Four of them have been chosen as USSR people's deputies. As M. Rukmane, first secretary of the Kirov party rayon committee, stated in her address to the report and election meeting of the primary party organization of the staff of the Latvian SSR Union of Journalists, the importance of the work being done by republic journalists is attested to by the furious nature of the criticism directed at the most active journalists by opponents of perestroika, who occasionally demand that order be restored in the mass media by discharging one or another of the journalists from his duties.

Thus it might seem that all is as it should be. Republic journalists, however, are not entirely satisfied either with their own efforts or with the work of their union, as may be seen in the following conversation between journalist Ruty Darbinis and Ayvar Baumanis, who is the board chairman of the Latvian SSR Union of Journalists and manager of the Latvian branch office of the Novosti Press Agency.

[R. Darbinis] At one of the joint plenums of the creative unions, Yanis Peters said that these are difficult times for the press. For journalists today, he said, are the servants of two masters—the people and their own publishers. A journalist is always constrained to take the middle of the road, so that he is never quite on track.

[A. Baumanis] It is up to the journalist, I would say, to be always on track. Such newspapers as LATVIJAS YAU-NATNE, ISGLITIBA, and LAUKU AVIZE have gone far beyond the basic guidelines laid down by their publishers. One has every right to say that these papers are servants of the people. If any publication is continuing to cling tenaciously, one might even say desperately, to the cannons of the old ways of thinking, it is the newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA. And it does so, in my view, because it is dreadfully afraid of breaking the old stereotypes that have been fashioned over the years. I know that there are talented and enlightened people working on the paper's editorial staff. In what direction efforts will be made depends entirely on the management. By continuing as it has been, the newspaper only serves to reinforce imperialistic thinking among the non-Latvian population, thereby deepening the split in society.

The years of perestroika have shown us more than a few examples of the "rebirth" of drab, dull publications. At times the journalists themselves have undergone rapid transformations. Andrey Tsirulis, for example, I once considered an inveterate colorless hack. But in the course of the national revival we have all become convinced that this fellow is ready to stand up to the death in defense of his people. Moreover, he cannot be accused of either nationalism or chauvinism. And this is not a lone example. It is simply the first that comes to mind.

This metamorphosis, which many people are undergoing these days, is in no way a chameleon-like process. It is happening to people who have always been honest but have been relentlessly ground down by the millstones of rigid ideology. The process is like that of a lawnmower—people resemble one another as they are all cut down to size. This leveling process has done immense harm.

[R. Darbinis] When I recall the extraordinary congress of the Union of Journalists, I wonder whether the celebration of universal love that we felt in those days was not perhaps premature. Remember the mountains of flowers, the telegrams, and congratulations? Did we deserve them?

[A. Baumanis] Individual journalists did deserve them, but not the Union of Journalists as a whole.

[R. Darbinis] Unfortunately, even today there is a price to be paid for journalistic integrity. Witness the recent events surrounding what happened to the Liyapaya KOMMUNIST and the Ekabpils SOVETSKAY DAUGAVAYES, and even in part to your own YUR-MALA.

[A. Baumanis] It was perhaps for this reason that YUR-MALA became the kind of paper where one could learn to work as one should. I remember how this occurred in my case. Every innovation by the city authorities was met with bristling resistance or a reaction like that caused by a toothache, occasionally prompting the outcry: "What are you allowing to happen!" But all in all we tried to write honestly. Particularly fierce opposition was aroused by newspaper accounts touching on ecological topics. Even a few years ago the information about its lamentable state in the republic's chief port was, so to speak, a family secret to the press. We members of the city's press corps were the first ones to break this "vow of silence." When I wrote four years ago about the fact that it would soon be impossible to bathe off the coast of Riga, I was accused of nationalism. My article was interpreted as an intentional effort to intimidate residents of the other republics, so that they would not travel here on vacation.

With respect to the rayon newspapers you mentioned, I personally did not take part in trying to settle their conflicts with the local party committees. Alexandr Yemalyanov went to Liyepaya, and the conflict was reviewed by the Council on Ethics and Law in Journalism, headed by the radio broadcaster Yanis Briyedis, a Latvian SSR Lenin State Prize winner. The findings

were published in the republic press. The differences in Yekabpils are yet to be resolved. My predecessor as board chairman of the republic Union of Journalists Viktors Avotins, and journalist Datse Terzena are studying the matter in detail.

It should be added that a number of difficult problems remain to be dealt with in the rayon and city press. In those areas where the rayon committees treat the needs of journalists with understanding, and do not try to set limits on their creative freedom, conflicts, as a rule, do not arise. Such areas include Tsesisskiy, Madonskiy, Talsinskiy, and Dobelskiy rayons, as well as a number of others.

[R. Darbinis] And what is to be done in those areas where there is still difficulty achieving a breakthrough in printing the facts?

[A. Baumanis] Fight on! Today, of course, it is not so easy to call an editor on the carpet and declare, "Henceforth, from tomorrow on, you are no longer an editor!" A gorkom or raykom first secretary can no longer make such a decision on his own. But I want to say, too, that if you are afraid of a reprimand, do not under any conditions become an editor. Take up something else in which no risks are involved.

[R. Darbinis] But surely it is possible to choose a "golden mean"—that is, to sidestep thorny issues by focusing upon and regularly running on the front page articles concerned with the management of local affairs, consisting of stock phrases, a few figures, and a couple of heartening appeals in conclusion.

[A. Baumanis] You know, such articles are often quite appropriate. We on the staff of YURMALA publish the articles we receive from well-established writers. Within the context of the paper as a whole, it soon becomes apparent who is who. Often in the editorial offices one hears it said: This author is not worth carrying, he is incapable of saying anything new; or this one cannot be included because he disseminates the ideas of Interfront or some other reactionary organization. In my judgment we are under an obligation to publish. The more we carry such writers, the sooner readers will come to know what sort of ideas they represent. The people cannot be deluded. Although belatedly perhaps, after overcoming various kinds of mistakes in their thinking, they always come to the truth. And when they finally achieve their own point of view, this is the greatest satisfaction and joy for a journalist. There is no need to fear the pluralism of opinion that obtains today in our society. The people have begun to think. That is the main thing.

[R. Darbinis] I cannot agree with you. In my view, the people have always been thinking, even in the years of stagnation, only they have been thinking in silence.

[A. Baumanis] No, the majority of them have simply been asleep. Now the time has come when that segment of the people who have been living without thinking are beginning to think, and those who have been silent are

beginning to speak. And a time will come when even those who are still only thinking will start to speak up. I have in mind particularly that segment of the non-Latvian population which has still not been able to make sense of what is going on around them. Certain of them find themselves in the power of an *idee fixe*, dwelling on such matters as when and in what kind of railroad cars will they be evacuated, and whether the union committee will be of material assistance in handling the luggage. When will they disabuse themselves of such absurd obsessive thinking?

[R. Darbinis] I would not call it an *idee fixe*. As you know, the central press and, what is more, the leading Russian newspaper have been steadily sowing and continue to sow distrust and fear of the future in the hearts of people who, for lack of a knowledge of the Latvian, are unable to familiarize themselves with the intentions of the so-called "nationalists" through primary sources, so to speak. And if they get their information from the bulletin YEDINSTVO, it makes one's hair stand on end.

[A. Baumanis] I agree with you entirely. But I hope and believe that this cloud of obscurantism will soon dissipate. A recent sociological survey indicates that the source of information that has the greatest trust among Latvians is ATMODA, and that among non-Latvians who live in the republic it is IZVESTIYA and central television. The newspaper SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA was only in eighth place. Non-Latvians, as a rule, do not read republic papers, nor do they watch local television. I am hopeful, however, that in the future the situation will change. The shortage of local information is already partially offset by the Latvian press digest LATVIA SEGODNYA.

[R. Darbinis] And what about the Russian edition of ATMODA?

[A. Baumanis] This newspaper is read and criticized—it is cursed at, but continues to be read all the same. The dialogue it achieves, of course, by no means begins with an exchange of pleasantries. It may also begin with vituperation.

[R. Darbinis] Does it not seem to you that our press today is too politicized? It would seem to me to make more sense if each press organ had its own view—its own leitmotif, so to speak. Right now they all make a mad rush into the political arena.

[A. Baumanis] But if we acknowledge that the press holds a mirror up to society, then political topics are bound to predominate in it today. Personally, I see nothing wrong in this.

[R. Darbinis] Let us talk a little about our Union of Journalists. In my view, even after the extraordinary session of the congress, it continues to eke out an extremely pitiful existence. What kind of a creative union can it be when the number of members already

exceeds 15,000? How is it capable of functioning normally? And how can it render any real assistance to its members?

[A. Baumanis] Yes, it is true, a majority of members of the Union of Journalists consist of people who generally do not write or who have long since severed relations with the editorial offices. If a person is not creative himself, though he enter the most creative of unions, it is not going to add to his talent. What we need is a professional union, like that of the writers, the artists, and the composers.

[R. Darbinis] The Union of Writers in our republic has about two hundred members. There it is not so simple to get in as it is in our union. We have seven to eight times as many members. The situation is abnormal. When I spoke at the extraordinary session of the congress, I proposed—though this may sound somewhat unscrupulous perhaps—that we conduct a purge of our ranks.

[A. Baumanis] I agree completely. But I should like to say one thing. We made one other mistake in selecting a board made up of a large number of people. Unless I am mistaken, there are 91 persons on it. There is no reason whatever for such hypertrophy! The union board presidium is also too big and inactive. At one of its last meetings, if you please, only six persons were in attendance.

One thing that gets in the way, I think, is that journalists regard their union as a kind of magic fairy. We picked a new board, a new presidium, and a new chairman, they seem to believe, and now there will be manna from heaven, and the milk and honey will flow. But these are the facts. We cannot count on any benefits in the form of apartments, cars, or junkets, and the rest is of remarkably little interest to a significant share of our membership. Why do people who are creative and energetic in their daily activities turn into such a passive bunch of spear-carrying extras on the union scene? The very existence of the union is, as it was in the old days, purely formal. The organization has a number of shortcomings, and the staff work is not carried out as it should be. In this respect we in the Presidium are the ones who are responsible more than anyone else. We do not seem to be able to determine the main directions of the work. Often important problems are overlooked, while efforts are expended on resolving make-believe issues. Even the activities of the primary organizations have become purely formal. The union still is unable to do much for its members. True, there have been occasions when we succeeded in defending the rights and reputations of certain of our members, such as Nikolay Kiryakov and Valdis Bekeris.

[R. Darbinis] Perhaps, if we have reached such a sorry state, the Union of Journalists is no longer needed. In general, how do you feel about it?

[A. Baumanis] Yes, the situation cannot be called heartening, particularly in terms of material conditions. The Union of Journalists has two consultants who receive

stipends of a hundred rubles each. Who are they to advise anyone about anything? They perform paperwork. So long as we are affiliated with the USSR Union of Journalists, there will be no shortage of paperwork to perform and process out. The Latvian SSR Union of Journalists does not even have a decent typewriter. If we want our union to become a congenial and attractive place to come to, we need more than anything else an appropriate base of material and technical supply.

[R. Darbinis] Are we really unable to get a share of the membership fees and author's royalties left to the republic organization?

[A. Baumanis] So long as we are institutionally tied to Moscow, things are not going to change. The publication of the digest LATVIYA SEGODNYA and the calendar "Dadzhis" yield some small return. When the House of Journalists goes into operation equipped with photocopiers, hopes for receiving a profit will become more realistic. Publication in Latvian of the newspaper MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, for example, might give the union its second wind.

In short, we need to make some money to begin with. We need people to respond and to be willing to work. So long as even a few viable ideas wither on the vine, there will be no revival. I remember once that Gunar Kurpnēk proposed, instead of the so-called creative associations, which are needed by no one, the establishment of workshops run by leading journalists—like the workshop of V. Krustinsh. I can tell you from experience that the journalists who were lucky enough to work under his tutelage got a kind of apprenticeship that would last them their whole lives. But the proposal was left unrealized.

[R. Darbinis] So we come to the problem of training cadres of young journalists. In my judgment the Department of Journalism at Latvian State University is coping with this task poorly. The young people there get a degree but not the necessary professional training.

[A. Baumanis] There is too much formalism in the curriculum. A good deal that is non-essential is drummed into their young minds, and it is the same for one and all. Why, for example, should I have to study television journalism if I know perfectly well that I am going to work on a newspaper? Many of the young people do not know how to write. I think that the department of journalism should emulate a newspaper editorial office headed by a bright and talented journalist. Here, apprentice students, from the first class on, write for the newspaper, and their work is subjected to unsparing criticism. Just as you must get in the water to swim, you should get into a news room to write the news. The kind of work that most journalism students do year after year in course work for degrees is of no use to anyone, least of all to writers. It would make more sense to turn out a substantive article even though it is no more than five pages long. In journalism, as in science, it is quality not

quantity that counts. And whoever cannot write a decent article should not be given a degree in journalism.

[R. Darbinis] And when will we progress to this point?

[A. Baumanis] I am confident that sooner or later we will be compelled to act in just this way. When journalists themselves become responsible for their work, they will soon realize that turning out inferior work is not only senseless but is to their own disadvantage. Right now the university turns out 20-25 percent of the journalists each year, but of course only a few of them become genuine journalists—that is, on a par with composers, artists, and professional writers. For example, if I have no talent drawing, I might study for ten or twenty years, and even get a degree. No matter, at best I will be able to turn out a sign for a shoe shop. We have lots of journalistic hacks of this kind.

In the Latvian Communist Party platform there is a statement that editors should not only function independently but should become legal experts. In that case, who is going to have any need of hacks?

[R. Darbinis] This means that money will become the controlling factor?

[A. Baumanis] Yes. In life money is the basis of everything. But we have ignored this truth for too long. Editorial staffs, which pay everyone alike, have a lot of dead weight. This is the obvious reason why the bulk of mass-circulation newspapers and journals are no more interesting than our mass-production goods. I remember once when the chief editor of YURMALA was sitting at his desk measuring the columns of an article with a ruler, I brought him a bucket to make the point: Why measure in meters if it can be done in liters? The entire system of journalistic work is going to have to be changed. The same price cannot be paid for fresh and bright ideas that is paid for truisms.

[R. Darbinis] But, in that case, a different type of manager will be needed?

[A. Baumanis] The editor of a newspaper or journal, first of all, is going to have to be a strong personality. If he himself is no more than an artisan, he belongs at best in an artel—not in a creative collective.

[R. Darbinis] What kind of hopes do you have in connection with the Law of the Press?

[A. Baumanis] There is no doubt that such a law is needed by society as a whole as well as by journalists. Everyone is awaiting its passage with great impatience. The draft law, which the USSR Supreme Soviet began discussion on at the end of last November, is in my view very progressive. Essentially, it proposes to do away with the existing system of directing the mass media based on absolute control and micromanagement of the press.

I am convinced, however, that the Latvian SSR Supreme Soviet should pass its own Law of the Press, all the more so for the reason that the debate in the country's parliament does not inspire confidence that all the progressive features of the initial draft are going to be preserved.

[R. Darbinis] Ayvar, what are the basic principles that you would lay down as a basis of perestroika in its application to the Latvian SSR Union of Journalists?

[A. Baumanis] First, the organization should become a truly professional union, capable of defending its members against various kinds of victimization and injustice and of arbitrating in the event a conflict between a journalist and his employer.

Second, it should become an organization that has the clout to intercede in upgrading the working and living conditions of its members. For years the Union of Journalists has not been able to obtain so much as a dictaphone or typewriter. There have been cases when a journalist has been in dire need of material assistance and the union has been in no position to provide it.

One more thing. Journalists often need the help of specialists who can provide wise counsel and serve as real consultants.

The union, as I see it, should function as a kind of club for professional journalists. So long as one is a member, one should strictly abide by the established rules, and not only pay dues regularly but really participate in the its activities.

In such a way perestroika becomes fully realized. Soon the House of Journalists will be in operation. In my view it should function precisely along the lines of a club. The main thing is that nothing should function formally. I am particularly upset by the creative sections, which presently include a section for the study of the Latvian language. How absurd this is—to teach people a language that serves, so to speak, as the very foundation of their productive activities. If a journalist does not have a sufficient proficiency in Latvian, he is a dilettante for whom nothing can be done within the ranks of professionals. It would enter no one's mind in a sewing shop, of course, to offer the workers there courses in sewing!

I want to add one more thing. For many years journalism has served as the Communist Party's housemaid. Right now, efforts are to be seen in virtually every editorial office to free ourselves from this state of subservience, and to rid ourselves of the demeaning habit of glancing over at the party committee whenever we take a step. We have abandoned the slogan "The People and Party Are One!" in recognition of the fact that the party is still only seeking its way in the direction of the people. That, in fact, is the sacred duty of the journalist—to help the party as soon as possible find its way.

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Republic Officials on Turkmen Television Programming Plans

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[Interview with Sh.O. Muradov, republic minister of communications and S. S. Rakhimov, chairman of Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio, by Turkmeninform correspondent; date and place not specified: "Television: Problems and Prospects"]

[Text] A new television channel, "Good Evening Ashkhabad!", appeared on republic television quite recently. The first shows, about the life of the city and its people, have attracted the attention of television viewers and have received a good response. Broadcasts from Uzbek television, which, beginning a year ago, have been translated in the cities of Chardzhou and Mary and in the republic capital, have also been very popular with working people in the republic. This is shown in particular by the many letters television viewers send to the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Turkmenistan and Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting]. The letter writers ask for more broadcasts and improvements in their regularity. They also comment upon their quality. The letters and wishes of television viewers are the reason for an interview a Turkmeninform correspondent had with Sh. O. Muradov, republic minister of communications, and S. S. Rakhimov, chairman of Turkmen SSR Gosteleradio.

S. S. Rakhimov says: "Television viewers' interest in programs from Uzbek Television is fully understandable. Our republics are linked by strong ties of friendship based upon common historical and cultural traditions and close, multifaceted social and economic contacts. Also, there are sizable numbers of Uzbeks living in Turkmenistan. They naturally want to learn more about the lives of their compatriots. Therefore it was decided to regularly translate broadcasts from Uzbek television. Of course, the present volume and quality of these broadcasts cannot satisfy us.

[Turkmeninform correspondent] What are the possibilities of increasing the translation of broadcasts from Uzbek television?

[Sh. O. Muradov] I think that the readers will not be disinterested to learn some figures. Today, thanks to the introduction of powerful radio and television broadcasting stations and low power retranslators, 97.5 percent of the republic population can watch one program from Central Television, 96.9 percent can watch 2 and 70 percent can watch 3 programs. This is more than the countrywide average.

Uzbek television can now be seen in those parts of Chardzhou and Tashauz oblasts adjacent to the Uzbek SSR. However, sizable capital investments are necessary to organize the translation of this program to all of Tashauz Oblast. Unfortunately, such resources are not available. There could also be improvements in the

picture quality of the television broadcasts that can now be watched by inhabitants of the southeastern rayons of Chardzhou Oblast.

In response to numerous requests, we have organized the translation of fragments of programs from Uzbek television in Chardzhou and Bayram-Ali using existing transmission equipment during breaks in the broadcast of the main programs, and in Ashkhabad on a newly introduced program. Unfortunately, the television broadcasting network in our republic was set up principally to broadcast two programs. The introduction of new programs, especially a third and fourth, has many difficulties. Sometimes even the purely technical ones cannot be overcome.

To have additional programs it is necessary to install transmitters in the decimeter range. Even if they have the same power as meter range transmitters, such units have only one half the reception range. This is because of the nature of wave propagation. Therefore, in order to retain the zone where all programs are available it is necessary to install high capacity broadcast equipment, build a new antenna tower and increase the capacity of the energy supply system.

This year there will be a technical and economic study of the reconstruction of radio and television broadcasting stations in Chardzhou and in the settlement of Kalinin in Tashauz Oblast. This will include the installation of additional transmission equipment for translating programs from Uzbek television.

In our view, because of the large capital investments required, it is inadvisable to further increase the number of programs broadcast by ordinary equipment. Judging from foreign experience in solving such problems, the solution is in speeding up the introduction of new earth satellite systems.

A new satellite system for transmitting republic television programs is to be introduced by the end of the 13th Five-Year Plan. With the help of comparatively small receiving stations these programs can be received in any place in the area serviced. Also, it will be possible to translate broadcasts from Frunze, Dushanbe and Alma-Ata as well as from Tashkent.

[S. S. Rakhimov] As you can see, problems of increasing the number of Uzbek television programs being broadcast are difficult to solve technically. Gosteleradio has completely exhausted the possibilities for expanding the volume of translation. However, using our reserves in the first program of republic television, we intend to open a special show for journalists. Twice a month, under the name "In a United Family" they will originate broadcasts in the languages of the peoples in our republic, including Uzbek. They will explain national traditions and more thoroughly cover the national cultures. We want broadcasts dedicated to the spiritual brotherhood of representatives from all nations and nationalities that live and work side by side to have their fitting place in Turkmen television.

At the same time talks are being conducted with Uzbek SSR Gosteleradio on the possible translation of programs from Turkmen television into those regions where Turkmen are concentrated.

Republic Authorities Propose Vremya Broadcasts Dubbed in Uzbek

*90US0598A Tashkent KOMSOMOLETS
UZBEKISTANA in Russian 13 Feb 90 p 4*

[Unattributed report: "Vremya"]

[Text] The management of the republic Gostelradio has requested Comrade Nenashcheva, who chairs the All-Union Committee for Television and Broadcasting, to have subject matter of the program "Vremya" transmitted to Tashkent approximately two hours ahead of schedule.

Why?

"We want to make arrangements for the principal television news program to be rebroadcast with a simultaneous translation in Uzbek," says N. Ya. Gaibov, chairman of the Uzbek SSR Gostelradio.

"This is impossible without obtaining at least the main subject matter in advance. Right now our request is about to be decided on. While we are in hopes of a positive response, should we be turned down, there are other options available; for example, to record the evening transmission, and then to broadcast it the following morning with a translation. True, there would be a loss in timeliness.

"We endorse the idea of dubbing the official language of the republic into the 'Vremya' broadcast. And we would also like to share an idea of our own. It would be good to show films of artistic merit and broadcasts of topical interest in the republic with Russian subtitles. This would be difficult. But as the experience of Kazakh, Tajik, and Turkmen television indicates, it is not impossible."

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